Riley v. State
| Docket Number: | 2007-KA-00445-COA Linked Case(s): 2007-KA-00445-COA ; 2007-CT-00445-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-24-2008 Opinion Author: GRIFFIS, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Trafficking in stolen firearms - Constitutionality of section 97-37-35(c) - Weight of evidence - M.R.E. 1002 - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 403 - M.R.E. 901 - Disproportionate sentence - Jury instruction Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-06-2007 Appealed from: Attala County Circuit Court Judge: Joseph H. Loper Disposition: CONVICTED OF TWO COUNTS OF TRAFFICKING IN STOLEN FIREARMS AND SENTENCED TO SERVE TWO CONCURRENT TERMS OF THIRTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: Doug Evans Case Number: 06-0105-CR |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | JAMES RILEY A/K/A "BOO-LU" |
GEORGE T. HOLMES,
LESLIE S. LEE |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: W. GLENN WATTS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Trafficking in stolen firearms - Constitutionality of section 97-37-35(c) - Weight of evidence - M.R.E. 1002 - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 403 - M.R.E. 901 - Disproportionate sentence - Jury instruction |
| Summary of the Facts: | James Riley was convicted of two counts of trafficking in stolen firearms. He was sentenced to two concurrent thirty-year sentences. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Constitutionality of section 97-37-35(c) Riley argues that section 97-37-35(c) is unconstitutional because it is vague as to the elements of the crime, it is vague regarding the number of weapons required for an enhanced penalty, it creates a presumption that puts the burden of proof on the defendant, and the sentences contained in the statute are grossly disproportionate to the crime listed. Questions will not be decided upon appeal which were not presented to the trial court and that court given an opportunity to rule on them. Because Riley did not raise this issue before the trial court, it is procedurally barred. Issue 2: Weight of evidence Riley argues that the State must enter the actual firearms into evidence instead of depending on photographs of the firearms. This argument is without merit. There is no “best evidence rule” under M.R.E. 1002 with regard to physical evidence that is not writings, recordings, or photographs. Under the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, the proponent of a photograph must establish that it is relevant under Rule 401, that it is not excluded under Rule 403, and the photograph must be authenticated under Rule 901 before a photograph may be admitted into evidence. The State satisfied these requirements. Riley also argues that the jury’s verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence because the only testimony that shows he knew the firearms were stolen is that of his alleged accomplice. The uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may be sufficient to convict an accused. Where there is slight corroborative evidence, the accomplice's testimony is likewise sufficient to sustain the verdict. However, such testimony should be viewed with great caution and suspicion and must be reasonable, not improbable, self-contradictory or substantially impeached. Here, the accomplice’s testimony was reasonable, consistent and substantially uncontradicted and the jury did receive a cautionary instruction. Also, the accomplice’s testimony was corroborated. Issue 3: Disproportionate sentence Riley argues that his sentence of thirty years is unconstitutional because it is disproportionate to the crime committed. Riley did not assert this argument at the trial court level. Therefore, it is procedurally barred. In addition, Riley’s sentence was within the statutory guidelines. Issue 4: Jury instruction Riley argues that a jury instruction was improper because it improperly shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. The argument he makes on appeal is procedurally barred as it is different than the argument he made at trial. In addition, the jury instructions as a whole do not shift the burden of proof. |
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