Flaggs v. State
| Docket Number: | 2006-KA-01702-COA Linked Case(s): 2006-KA-01702-COA ; 2006-CT-01702-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-27-2008 Opinion Author: BARNES, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Murder - Continuance - Challenge for cause - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - Discovery violation Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 07-27-2006 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Bobby DeLaughter Disposition: CONVICTED OF MURDER AND SENTENCED TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: Eleanor Faye Peterson Case Number: 05-0-933 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | TAVARES ANTOINE FLAGGS |
DONALD W. BOYKIN,
WILLIAM R. LABARRE |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: DEIRDRE MCCRORY CHARLES W. MARIS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Murder - Continuance - Challenge for cause - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - Discovery violation |
| Summary of the Facts: | Tavares Flaggs was convicted of murder and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Continuance Flaggs argues that the trial judge erred when he denied his motion for a two-week continuance so that he could obtain the results of the toxicology screen being performed on the victim’s blood. He argues that the results of the toxicology screen could have been critical to his defense given his allegations that the victim was on cocaine and was the initial aggressor. The denial of a continuance is not an issue reviewable on appeal where the denial of the continuance is not assigned as a ground for a new trial in the defendant's post-trial motion for a new trial. Flaggs’ motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial contained numerous claims, none of which was the trial court’s denial of his motion for a continuance. Accordingly, Flaggs is procedurally barred from raising this issue on appeal. In addition, Flaggs cites to no authority that would require the State to test every item of evidence collected, Flaggs made no attempt to have the blood tested until the week before the trial, and the fact that the victim was on cocaine does not automatically indicate that he was the initial aggressor. Issue 2: Challenge for cause Flaggs argues that the trial court erred in granting the State’s challenge for cause of a prospective juror. The juror was repeatedly asked whether he believed himself capable of following the proceedings in the case, and each time he responded that he did not think he was capable of doing so. The court may remove a juror for cause when a party has cause to challenge the juror's competency or impartiality. Based on the record in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s challenge for cause. In order to ensure that the most fair and accurate verdict is reached, a juror should, at the very least, be able to follow the proceedings. Flaggs also argues that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his challenge for cause of a juror who admitted during voir dire that, as a result of his job as an analyst for the JPD, he knew all of the police officers. The juror repeatedly stated that, despite his knowledge of the individuals involved, he could be fair and impartial and would decide the case based only on the evidence presented. His statements in this regard were entitled to considerable deference from the trial court. Issue 3: Expert testimony Flaggs argues that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting the testimony of Dr. Hayne regarding blood spatter, because Dr. Hayne was never qualified as a blood spatter expert. At trial, Flaggs’ counsel stipulated to Dr. Hayne’s qualifications as a forensic pathologist. M.R.E. 702 expressly allows expert testimony regarding non-scientific matters, so long as the witness's knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education qualify him as an expert in a given field, and the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. The State argues that the field of forensic pathology encompasses the analysis of crime scenes, which would include blood spatter. While the State cites no authority supporting this proposition, Dr. Hayne has been accepted in other cases as an expert in the analysis of blood spatter. Moreover, the supreme court has indicated that forensic pathologists are qualified to give opinions regarding blood spatter. Notwithstanding this finding, the Court notes that Dr. Hayne’s testimony regarding blood spatter was far too speculative to have been reliable. Although Dr. Hayne attempted to verify that his opinions were based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the equivocal nature of his testimony casts doubt on his assertion. However, any error was harmless. Even if such testimony had been excluded, the jury heard Flaggs admit to stabbing the victim multiple times on the tape of his interrogation, and given the testimony of Dr. Hayne regarding defensive posturing, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Flaggs did not act in self-defense. Issue 4: Discovery violation Flaggs argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the introduction of the post-shoulder-surgery apparatus, purportedly worn by the victim, without following the Box procedure when Flaggs was not made aware of the existence of the apparatus until the day before the trial. The trial court overruled Flaggs’ objection to the introduction of the apparatus on the grounds that the State had not committed a discovery violation; therefore, the trial court concluded that the Box procedure was not triggered. The trial court correctly found that there was no such violation; the State notified Flaggs of the apparatus as soon as it became aware of its existence. Even assuming the trial court erred in failing to follow the Box procedure, the error was harmless. Admission of the shoulder apparatus did not affect the final result of the case nor did it work adversely to a substantial right of Flaggs. Even if the shoulder apparatus had been excluded, there was significant evidence contradicting Flaggs’ claim that he acted in self-defense in killing the victim. In addition, the jury still heard evidence of Wright’s shoulder surgery and of his physical limitations following the surgery. |
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