Brown v. State


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Docket Number: 2006-KA-00315-COA
Linked Case(s): 2006-KA-00315-COA ; 2006-CT-00315-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 05-20-2008
Opinion Author: MYERS, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Manslaughter & Rape - Manslaughter instruction - Expert testimony - M.R.E.702 - Right of confrontation - Weight of evidence - Photographs - Probable cause - Cross-examination - M.R.E. 611(b) - Dismissal of juror
Judge(s) Concurring: LEE, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): KING, C.J. AND CARLTON, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 12-12-2005
Appealed from: WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Judge: Richard Smith
Disposition: CONVICTED OF COUNT I, MANSLAUGHTER, AND SENTENCED TO SERVE TWENTY YEARS; CONVICTED OF COUNT II, RAPE, AND SENTENCED TO SERVE THIRTY YEARS; SENTENCE IN COUNT II TO RUN CONSECUTIVE WITH SENTENCE IN COUNT I, ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
District Attorney: Willie Dewayne Richardson
Case Number: 2002-329

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: KING YOUNG BROWN, JR.




BRANDON ISAAC DORSEY



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: STATE OF MISSISSIPPI OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: DESHUN TERRELL MARTIN  

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    Topic: Manslaughter & Rape - Manslaughter instruction - Expert testimony - M.R.E.702 - Right of confrontation - Weight of evidence - Photographs - Probable cause - Cross-examination - M.R.E. 611(b) - Dismissal of juror

    Summary of the Facts: King Brown, Jr., was convicted of manslaughter and rape. He was sentenced to twenty years for manslaughter and to thirty years for rape. He appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Manslaughter instruction Brown argues that a jury instruction regarding manslaughter was improperly submitted to the jury. A lesser included offense instruction should be granted unless the trial judge can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn in favor of the accused from the evidence, that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense. In this case, the jury was given instructions on both murder and manslaughter. The jury evaluated all the evidence and witnesses presented at trial and found that Brown was guilty of manslaughter, but not murder. Whether a defendant has committed murder or manslaughter is ordinarily a question to be resolved by the jury. Thus, the court did not err in allowing the instruction. Issue 2: Expert testimony Brown argues that the court erred in admitting expert testimony stating that the hair samples from the crime scene had the same characteristics as known hair samples belonging to Brown and the victim. Under M.R.E.702, the witness must be qualified as an expert because of the knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education he or she possesses. In addition, the witness’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge must assist the trier of fact. The State presented testimony that the expert underwent a one-year training program at the crime laboratory regarding forensic hair examination. Testimony additionally established that the expert was certified by the American Board of Criminalistics and by the Mississippi Crime Laboratory. The testimony provided by the expert was based on his expertise, skill, and experience in the field of forensic hair examination; and his testimony was helpful to the jury in formulating its verdict. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony. Issue 3: Right of confrontation Brown argues his right to confront his accuser was violated in this case because the DNA analyst who testified was not the analyst who performed the tests. The witness in this case did not perform the tests on the DNA found at the scene, but she was the laboratory manager at the time the tests were performed. She also testified at trial that although she did not perform the testing, she did review the work of the analyst who actually performed the tests. In addition, she testified that she further made her own analysis of the work performed by the analyst. Further, she is not so far removed from the process as to be reduced to the level of a records custodian. Thus, she was sufficiently involved with the analysis and overall process so as to avoid violating Brown’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Issue 4: Weight of evidence Brown argues that the court erred in failing to grant his motion for a new trial because his manslaughter conviction went against the weight of the evidence. The State presented evidence that demonstrated that the body was found inside two unique garbage bags which could only be obtained by unlocking a shed in the backyard. The State argued that the bags were unique because they were both unusually large in size and obtained from Brown’s stepfather’s brother, who lived in Arkansas. The State put forward evidence which identified Brown’s fingerprint on the bag containing the child’s body. Additionally, the State pointed to evidence that pubic and head hairs found on the victim’s shirt had the same characteristics of Brown’s. The State also put forward expert testimony regarding head hair found in the dirty clothes located in Brown’s bedroom that exhibited the same microscopic characteristics as those of the victim’s. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient for both the rape and manslaughter convictions. Issue 5: Photographs Photographs are properly admitted if they can be found to aid in describing the circumstances of the killing and the corpus delicti, describe the location of the body and cause of death, and supplement or clarify witness testimony. Brown argues that the photographs admitted at trial lacked evidentiary value. All the pictures objected to by Brown were autopsy photographs of the victim. The photographs helped to corroborate the medical-expert testimony and to clarify and explain the circumstances surrounding the victim’s death. Issue 6: Probable cause The evidence referred to in the search warrant was sufficient to provide a substantial basis for the trial court to determine that probable cause existed and to order seizure of Brown’s hair, saliva, and blood samples for testing. The search warrant that was submitted to the court demonstrated the following evidence: that the victim was found murdered, wrapped in two garbage bags in the suspect’s garbage can, that the garbage bags the victim was found in were consistent with the size and color bags found in the suspect’s home, and that the garbage bags were wrapped in masking tape of the same size and color of masking tape located in the suspect’s locked shed. The warrant also submitted that a witness saw the suspect throwing two garbage bags in the trash can during the time frame of the child’s death. The warrant further demonstrated evidence that a fingerprint taken from the garbage bag which contained the victim’s body was identified as the print of the suspect. Issue 7: Cross-examination Brown argues that the trial court improperly limited his ability to cross-examine the State’s fingerprint expert, because he was unable to sufficiently question the expert about whether the FBI required the use of a twelve-point standard to properly identify the owner of a set of prints. M.R.E. 611(b) allows liberal cross-examination so long as the issues are relevant. Some of the testimony regarding the FBI’s abandonment of the twelve-point-identification system elicited during the proffered examination was also brought up during the cross-examination at trial, although it was admittedly less extensive. The expert admitted at trial and during the proffered examination that the FBI had formerly required a twelve-point system in order to make a fingerprint identification, but the FBI abandoned that standard in favor of using the scientific methodology of examining the uniqueness of the print itself. The court did not err in limiting cross-examination. Issue 8: Dismissal of juror Brown argues that the dismissal of an African American juror during trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. To avoid an abuse of discretion charge with regard to dismissal of a juror, the supreme court has suggested that the trial court record should reflect the exact reasons for a juror’s dismissal. In addition, even where no valid reasons are evident from the record, an aggrieved party must demonstrate actual prejudice by the trial court’s decision before the court will reverse. Here, there was no error in the trial court’s dismissal of the juror. The trial court specifically found on the record that the particular juror had failed to follow clear instructions given numerous times during the trial not to speak to outside persons. Further, Brown has not shown any actual prejudice resulting from the dismissal of the juror.


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