Vo v. Hancock County


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Docket Number: 2007-CA-00071-COA
Linked Case(s): 2007-CA-00071-SCT ; 2007-CA-00071-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 05-13-2008
Opinion Author: BARNES, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Reckless disregard - Section 11-46-9(1)©
Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 12-03-2006
Appealed from: Hancock County Circuit Court
Judge: Stephen Simpson
Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED TO HANCOCK COUNTY
Case Number: 04-0292

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: ROBIN LEE VO




CHAD P. YOUNGBLOOD, MICHAEL E. COX



 

Appellee: HANCOCK COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI WALTER W. DUKES  

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Topic: Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Reckless disregard - Section 11-46-9(1)©

Summary of the Facts: Robin Lee Vo sued Hancock County for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of an automobile accident with Deputy Christopher Russell while he was acting within the scope of his employment with the Hancock County Sheriff’s Department. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Hancock County, and Vo appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: The trial court granted Hancock County’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Vo failed to establish that Deputy Russell acted with reckless disregard when he struck her vehicle. According to section 11-46-9(1)(c), governmental entities and their employees engaged in the performance of duties or activities related to police or fire protection are immune from claims arising from alleged tortious conduct when acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties unless the employee acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury. In order to establish reckless disregard, Vo must show facts from which a trier of fact could conclude that Deputy Russell’s conduct created an unreasonable risk; this risk included a high probability of harm; Deputy Russell appreciated the unreasonable risk; and Deputy Russell deliberately disregarded that risk, evincing almost a willingness that harm should follow. Viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Vo failed to adduce specific facts which would rebut Hancock County’s contention that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Deputy Russell acted with reckless disregard; thus, Vo’s claim fails as a matter of law. While there is a factual dispute regarding whether Deputy Russell looked both ways, or even one way, before backing out, it is not material. This is because, under the circumstances, it would not constitute reckless disregard even if Deputy Russell failed to look in either direction. Failure to look to the right could indicate simple negligence but does not rise to the conscious indifference standard of reckless disregard. Vo also argues that discovery had hardly commenced before the trial court granted summary judgment; therefore, summary judgment was improper. Although Vo was deposed by opposing counsel before the motion’s filing, Deputy Russell was not. However, further discovery was not warranted in this case to determine if a genuine issue of material fact existed. In addition, there was sufficient time to compel further discovery before Hancock County’s motion for summary judgment, but Vo failed to do so.


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