Cummings v. Miss. Dep't of Employment Sec.
| Docket Number: | 2006-CC-02030-COA Linked Case(s): 2006-CC-02030-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-22-2008 Opinion Author: BARNES, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Unemployment benefits - Timeliness of appeal - Section 71-5-531 - M.R.C.P. 3 - M.R.A.P. 2(a)(2) - M.R.A.P. 3(a) - Arbitrary and capricious decision - Misconduct - Due process - M.R.C.P. 5(b) Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ. Dissenting Author : IRVING, J., without separate written opinion. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Roberts, J. without separate written opinion. Procedural History: Dismissal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-20-2006 Appealed from: Choctaw County Circuit Court Judge: Joseph H. Loper Disposition: CIRCUIT COURT DISMISSED CLAIMANT’S APPEAL OF BOARD OF REVIEW DECISION TO DENY CLAIMANT BENEFITS Case Number: 2006-0032-CV-L |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | THERESA L. CUMMINGS |
THERESA L. CUMMINGS (PRO SE) |
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| Appellee: | MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AND LUCKETT TYNER LAW FIRM | ALBERT B. WHITE, EUGENE T. HOLMES |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Unemployment benefits - Timeliness of appeal - Section 71-5-531 - M.R.C.P. 3 - M.R.A.P. 2(a)(2) - M.R.A.P. 3(a) - Arbitrary and capricious decision - Misconduct - Due process - M.R.C.P. 5(b) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Theresa Cummings, an associate attorney, resigned from her former employer, Luckett Tyner Law Firm, giving the firm a 120-day notice as required in her employment contract. However, she continued to work at the law firm during the notice period. Subsequently, she applied for unemployment benefits when Luckett Tyner terminated their working relationship about one month prior to the end of her 120-day notice date. Initially, a MDES claims examiner disqualified Cummings for unemployment benefits. Cummings appealed, and an administrative appeals officer reversed the claims examiner’s decision and awarded Cummings benefits. Luckett Tyner then appealed, and the MDES’s Board of Review reversed the appeals officer’s decision and denied Cummings benefits. The circuit court dismissed her appeal, and Cummings appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Timeliness of appeal Cummings argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing her appeal as untimely. MDES argues that the circuit court properly dismissed Cummings’s appeal as untimely as the cover sheet and decision letter were not filed until after the statutory deadline for an appeal had expired. Section 71-5-531 requires a party aggrieved by a decision of the Board of Review to commence an action in the circuit court within ten days after the decision of the Board of Review has become final. Although the time period is to be strictly construed, the time period may be extended if good cause is shown, and Cummings has demonstrated good cause in this case. Prior to the expiration of the time period, the circuit court clerk received Cummings’s document entitled “Motion for Extension of Time and Notice of Appeal.” Although the body of the document did not state any specific grounds for the appeal, but rather merely sought an extension of time to appeal, the title clearly demonstrated Cummings’s intent to appeal the decision of the Board of Review. Moreover, MDES has not contended that it was not sufficiently apprised of Cummings’s intent to appeal. Neither section 71-5-531 nor M.R.C.P. 3 states specifically that a civil cover sheet is a prerequisite to commencing an action. Moreover, although the Board of Review’s decision letter adequately informed Cummings of the pertinent time limitations, it did not inform her that she was required to file a cover sheet or a copy of the decision letter in order to perfect a timely appeal. Justice would not be served by requiring Cummings’s case to be dismissed based on her failure to include a civil cover sheet when the court clerk received Cummings’s notice of appeal within the requisite time period. Although the Mississippi Supreme Court’s order requires a civil cover sheet, this requirement is meant to serve an administrative purpose, not to bar an otherwise timely notice of appeal. By analogy, M.R.A.P. 2(a)(2) requires the clerk, in the event that it is found that a party has failed to comply substantially with the rules, to give the party notice of the deficiency and fourteen days to correct such deficiency, and M.R.A.P. 3(a) states that failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the perfection of the appeal. Therefore, at the supreme court level, a deficiency in the form of the notice of appeal does not affect the timeliness of the appeal. Issue 2: Arbitrary and capricious decision Cummings argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the Board of Review’s denial of unemployment benefits due to misconduct connected with work, and therefore, its decision was arbitrary and capricious. Misconduct is conduct evincing such willful and wanton disregard of the employer’s interest as is found in deliberate violations or disregard or standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect from his employee. Evidence sufficient to draw a reasonable finding of misconduct by the Board of Review includes the following: the November billing records; Cummings’s failure to attain the expected two to three month learning curve after having been employed at the firm for approximately nine months, in spite of the fact she demonstrated the ability to perform such work; Cummings’s inability to complete common tasks that were usually assigned to paralegals, even though she had previously managed other attorneys at her previous job and holds a Ph.D. and several other degrees; Cummings’s failure to work on weekends to complete assignments although it had been implied that she should do so; the considerable number of verbal warnings and constructive criticism by partners Luckett and Tyner, couched in the nature of counseling, as to the length of time it was taking Cummings to complete assignments; and Cummings’s own disinterest in protecting her job, especially after she gave notice of her resignation. Thus, the decision of the Board of Review to deny Cummings unemployment benefits was supported by substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Issue 3: Due process Cummings argues that she was denied due process, pursuant to M.R.C.P. 5(b) regarding service of pleadings, as Cummings never received the MDES’s motion to dismiss her appeal, nor did she have an adequate opportunity to respond. MDES’s motion to dismiss was filed one day before the circuit court’s dismissal of her appeal as untimely; thus, Cummings’s argument that she should have been afforded an opportunity to respond is moot. Further, Cummings was given notice of Luckett Tyner’s motion to dismiss, which had her proper address on its certificate of service and was filed in the circuit court. Based on the record, Cummings was given sufficient notification as to the employer’s motion to dismiss, and she failed to respond. |
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