Brand v. Barr
| Docket Number: | 2007-CA-00249-COA Linked Case(s): 2007-CA-00249-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-22-2008 Opinion Author: CARLTON, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Contract - Timeliness of appeal - M.R.C.P. 59(e) - M.R.A.P. 4(a) & (d) Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CONTRACT |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-14-2005 Appealed from: Clay County Chancery Court Judge: Dorothy W. Colom Disposition: DENIED MOTION TO CLARIFY JUDGMENT Case Number: 2004-0307-C |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | BERT BRAND |
BRANDON SCOTT LESLIE |
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| Appellee: | J. DEXTER BARR AND MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION A/K/A MSU DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION | M. JAY NICHOLS, THOMAS MURRAY TUBB, AUBREY E. NICHOLS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Contract - Timeliness of appeal - M.R.C.P. 59(e) - M.R.A.P. 4(a) & (d) |
| Summary of the Facts: | In 1999, Bert Brand entered into an agreement with Christine Brand, to lease, for a period of ten years, certain farm and pasture land located in Clay County. The lease applied to two parcels of land in Clay County. The first parcel, referred to as “Gilreath Place,” consisted of approximately 320 acres. The second, called “Home Place,” consisted of approximately 402 acres. In consideration for the lease, Brand agreed to pay to Christine one-fourth of the agricultural proceeds he earned from the land. Additionally, he agreed to pay her $5 per acre of pasture land per year. Brand was to be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the pastures and fences located on the property. In 2000, Christine and J. Dexter Barr entered into an option agreement to purchase a portion of the property that was subject to Brand’s farm lease. In 2003, Christine was placed under a conservatorship. Christine’s conservator, Virginia Brand, deeded the property known as Gilreath Place to Barr, as agreed to in the option contract between Christine and Barr. The property was still subject to Brand’s farm lease at that time. In 2004, Barr filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking to have the farm lease between Brand and Christine declared void. The chancellor ruled in favor of Barr, declaring the lease null and void. Brand filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Brand did not appeal the chancellor’s decision. In 2005, Christine died, and her will bequeathed the property known as Home Place to the Mississippi State University Foundation, which became an interested party in the litigation by virtue of Christine’s lease of the property to Brand. Brand filed a motion to clarify the judgment approximately eighteen months after filing his motion for reconsideration. The chancellor denied the motion finding it to be untimely filed and without merit. Brand appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Since Brand’s motion to clarify the judgment of the trial court was filed untimely, his appeal is also untimely. M.R.C.P. 59(e) requires that a motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than ten days after entry of the judgment. Further, Brand’s motion was filed eighteen months after the time for filing an appeal from the judgment. M.R.A.P. 4(d) provides an extension of the thirty days allowed under M.R.A.P. 4(a) when a party files certain post-trial motions, including a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment. The time for appeal begins to run only after the entry of the order disposing of the last post-trial motion, if the motion is filed no later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. The time for Brand to appeal the merits of the underlying case had long since passed when he filed his motion for clarification. The untimely filing of a motion to clarify in no way extends the period of time in which Brand could have appealed the original, dispositive order nor did the chancellor’s denial revive Brand’s opportunity to appeal the original judgment. Thus, the appeal is time-barred. |
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