Jones v. State
| Docket Number: | 2006-KA-01994-COA Linked Case(s): 2006-KA-01994-COA ; 2006-CT-01994-SCT |
|
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-15-2008 Opinion Author: ISHEE, J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Armed robbery - Admission of evidence - Unlawful arrest - Probable cause for arrest - Photographic lineup - Defective indictment - URCCC 7.06 - Mistrial - Sufficiency of evidence Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-14-2006 Appealed from: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Samac Richardson Disposition: CONVICTION OF ARMED ROBBERY AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: David Byrd Clark Case Number: 17318 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | GREGORY DEON JONES |
GLENN STURDIVANT SWARTZFAGER |
|
|
| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Armed robbery - Admission of evidence - Unlawful arrest - Probable cause for arrest - Photographic lineup - Defective indictment - URCCC 7.06 - Mistrial - Sufficiency of evidence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Gregory Jones was convicted of armed robbery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as a violent habitual offender. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Admission of evidence Jones argues that his motion to suppress the evidence should have been granted because the evidence was the product of an unlawful arrest and its admittance was more prejudicial than probative under M.R.E. 403. If Jones ever obtained a ruling on the motion from the trial court, the ruling is not apparent from the record on appeal. It is the movant's responsibility to obtain a ruling on a motion from the trial court, and the movant's failure to pursue a ruling on a motion constitutes a waiver. By failing to pursue a ruling on the motion from the trial court or by not objecting to the admission of the evidence, Jones abandoned the motion and waived this issue for appeal. Issue 2: Probable cause Jones argues that the Jackson Police Department arrested him without probable cause and a valid arrest warrant. The existence of probable cause or reasonable grounds justifying an arrest without a warrant is determined by factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The determination depends upon the particular evidence and circumstances of the individual case. Whether the arrest warrant was properly issued is irrelevant in this case. There is ample evidence to support that probable cause existed for Jones’s arrest without a warrant. In a photographic lineup that included five other individuals, the store clerk identified Jones as the armed robber. The store clerk’s positive identification was sufficient in itself to provide the police with reasonable grounds to suspect that Jones committed the crime. Issue 3: Photographic lineup Jones argues that the differences between his photograph and the others impermissibly tainted the identification process. An impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification does not preclude in-court identification by an eye witness who viewed the suspect at the procedure, unless from the totality of the circumstances surrounding it, the identification was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Jones takes issue with the photographic lineup because his photograph indicated that it was taken by the Jackson Police Department and was eleven years old. He further points out that he is the only individual wearing a coat, which happened to be included in the store clerk’s description of the armed robber. The minor differences in the appearance of Jones's photograph are not so distinctive as to improperly single him out. All photographs used in the lineup have the same format, that is, they each contain the same background and are marked with “Jackson Police Department.” Moreover, the men in the photographs are all African-American males, have the same build, and possess the same facial features in accordance with the store clerk’s description of the armed robber. The fact that Jones is the only individual wearing a coat is a minor difference. Issue 4: Defective indictment Jones argues that the indictment was fatally defective because it incorrectly stated that the date of the alleged robbery was March 5, 2005, rather than February 5, 2005. Under URCCC 7.06, failure to state the correct date in an indictment shall not render the indictment insufficient. An amendment to change the date on which the offense occurred is one of form only, unless time is an essential element or factor in the crime. Time was not an essential element or factor in the armed robbery allegedly committed by Jones. Also, the facts in the record indicate that Jones never filed an alibi defense. Therefore, the trial court did not err by failing to quash the indictment. Issue 5: Mistrial Jones argues that the court erred by not granting him a mistrial when the jury became deadlocked during deliberation. It has long been the rule that a criminal jury should be given ample time to consider its verdict; and how long should it be held together for that purpose is for the trial judge, which decision will not be disturbed in the absence of the disclosure of such an abuse of this power by the trial judge as indicates that the jury was coerced into returning to a verdict. Here, it is apparent that the jury was not in a hopeless deadlock. Rather, the verdict rested on the shoulders of one juror. The trial judge asked the foreman if he thought that allowing the jury time to “sleep on it” would make a difference. The foreman agreed that it would. Further, upon arriving the next morning and before resuming deliberations, the trial judge delivered the Sharplin instruction to the jury. Under the circumstances, there is no evidence that the trial judge abused his discretion by sending the jurors home for the night and requiring them to resume deliberations the next morning. Issue 6: Sufficiency of evidence Jones argues that the State was unable to prove its case by alleging that the impermissible photographic lineup caused the store clerk to misidentify him. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence to convict Jones of armed robbery. The State was able to present eyewitness testimony of the armed robbery and a positive identification of Jones as the perpetrator. His description on the day after the robbery matched that given to police by the store clerk, and upon apprehending Jones, police recovered the knife later identified as the weapon used in the armed robbery. Furthermore, to the degree possible, the testimony of the store clerk was consistent with the evidence in the surveillance tape and photographs. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
