Winters v. Calhoun County Sch. Dist.


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Docket Number: 2007-CA-00476-COA
Linked Case(s): 2007-CA-00476-SCT ; 2007-CA-00476-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 04-01-2008
Opinion Author: IRVING, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Education employment contract - Demotion - Section 37-9-101 - Motion to dismiss - M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)
Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, AND ISHEE, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ.
Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Barnes, J. without separate written opinion.
Procedural History: Dismissal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-01-2007
Appealed from: Calhoun County Chancery Court
Judge: Edwin Hayes Roberts, Jr.
Disposition: THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED THE SCHOOL DISTRICT AND SCHOOL BOARD’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Case Number: 2006-225(c)

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: DEBRA L. WINTERS




DAVID BURKS LANGFORD, BILLIE JO WHITE, MATTHEW DANIEL WILSON



 

Appellee: CALHOUN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT AND CALHOUN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION RICHARD JARRAD GARNER, JAMES A. KEITH, LAURA ANNE FORD  

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Topic: Education employment contract - Demotion - Section 37-9-101 - Motion to dismiss - M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)

Summary of the Facts: The Superintendent of the Calhoun County School District, upon the recommendation of the principal of Calhoun City High School, assigned Debra Winters to the Calhoun County Alternative School for the 2006-2007 school year. Winters unsuccessfully appealed to the Calhoun County Board of Education. Winters filed a notice of appeal and petition for appeal with the Calhoun County Chancery Court. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the chancery court. Winters appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Winters argues that the chancellor abused his discretion in finding that the Board had renewed her contract and that she had not been demoted. Section 37-9-101 clearly indicates that it is applicable to educators whose contracts have not been renewed. However, section 37-9-101 does not address demotions. As defined by a federal district court, a demotion includes any reassignment under which the staff member receives less pay or has less responsibility than under the assignment he held previously, which requires a lesser degree of skill than did the assignment he held previously, or under which the staff member is asked to teach a subject or grade other than one for which he is certified or for which he has had substantial experience within a reasonably current period. Applying that definition, there is nothing in the record which supports Winters’ contention that she was demoted. The 2005-2006 and the 2006-2007 contracts are nearly identical; each requires that Winters be employed as a teacher with the Calhoun County School District for 187 days. The difference in the contracts is that under the 2006-2007 contract Winters’s salary would have been $36,100 compared to $35,620 under the 2005-2006 contract. It is clear that Winters did not receive less pay under the 2006-2007 contract, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that she would have had less responsibility at the alternative school. Thus, Winters has failed to prove that she was demoted. Winters argues that the chancellor erred in not treating the Board’s motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, as she contends that the Board’s motion includes facts outside of the pleadings. M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) authorizes lower courts to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The record shows that the 2006-2007 contract was attached to the Board’s motion to dismiss, and the chancellor considered it when making his decision. However, any error that Winters suffered was harmless because the petition referenced the 2005-2006 contract, and the 2006-2007 contract was nearly identical to the 2005-2006 contract. Therefore, the chancellor did not become privy to any knowledge by virtue of the 2006-2007 contract that he did not already have from the 2005-2006 contract.


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