Brown v. State


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Docket Number: 2006-KA-02058-COA
Linked Case(s): 2006-CT-02058-SCT ; 2006-KA-02058

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 12-04-2007
Opinion Author: Ishee, J.
Holding: AFFIRMED

Additional Case Information: Topic: Murder & Attempted arson - Motion to suppress - Lay opinion testimony - M.R.E. 701 - M.R.E. 702 - Evidence of mental state - Culpable negligence instruction - Redirect examination - Closing argument - Weight of evidence
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Chandler, J., Griffis, J., Barnes, J. and Roberts, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Carlton, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 10-24-2006
Appealed from: Marion County Circuit Court
Judge: Michael R. Eubanks
Disposition: CONVICTED OF MURDER AND SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND ATTEMPTED ARSON SENTENCED TO TWO YEARS TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH THE SENTENCE OF LIFE
District Attorney: Claiborne McDonald
Case Number: K00-0333-E

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Mikimie Tenille Brown a/k/a Mikimie Brown a/k/a Mikimie Kim Brown




George T. Holmes, Leslie L. Lee, Scott Joseph Schwartz



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: State of Mississippi Jeffrey A. Kingfuss  

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    Topic: Murder & Attempted arson - Motion to suppress - Lay opinion testimony - M.R.E. 701 - M.R.E. 702 - Evidence of mental state - Culpable negligence instruction - Redirect examination - Closing argument - Weight of evidence

    Summary of the Facts: Mikimie Brown was found guilty of murder and attempted arson. She was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and two years for the attempted arson with the two years to run concurrently with the life sentence. She appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Motion to suppress Brown argues that because she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and borderline personality disorder, her written confession given to law enforcement was rendered involuntary. The State meets its burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the voluntariness of a statement and its admissibility by presenting the testimony of an officer or other person with personal knowledge regarding whether the statement or confession was made voluntarily. Here, both officers present at the time the confession was taken testified that Brown voluntarily came to the police station without assistance, coercion, or persuasion by police. While there, the officers observed that Brown had no problem remembering the event in question and showed no signs of being under the influence of intoxicants or a mental disability. The trial court did not commit manifest error in finding that Brown's statement was voluntarily and knowingly made. The State made a prima facie case of voluntariness. Issue 2: Lay opinion testimony Brown argues that the court committed reversible error by allowing a Mississippi Highway Patrol Investigator to testify that Brown did not appear to be suffering from any mental disease or illness, because testimony concerning Brown’s mental state amounted to expert opinion testimony governed by M.R.E. 702. M.R.E. 701 allows a lay witness to testify as to his opinion on matters of which he has first-hand knowledge which other lay people do not have. In contrast where in order to express the opinion, the witness must possess some experience or expertise beyond that of the average, randomly selected adult, it is a Rule 702 opinion and not a Rule 701 lay opinion. Opinion testimony based on the personal observations of the witness should be considered lay opinion under Rule 701. Here, the officer was asked if the defendant appeared to be under the influence of drugs, or alcohol or be mentally disturbed, to which he answered that Brown did not appear so. The word “appeared” is key in this instance, as it focuses on what the officer believed based on his personal perception of Brown at the time of questioning. Further, his testimony was helpful to the determination of a fact in issue: whether the officers believed Brown’s confession to be voluntary. Accordingly, the officer’s testimony regarding Brown’s mental state was admissible lay opinion testimony under Rule 701. Issue 3: Evidence of mental state Brown argues that the court erred by refusing to allow testimony from a doctor that it was her opinion that Brown suffered from diminished capacity at the time of the alleged criminal acts, because the evidence was relevant as a mitigating factor to her ability to form the statutory intent to commit the crime of murder. Diminished capacity is not a recognized defense to a criminal charge in Mississippi. In order to prove that a defendant had the mental capacity to commit the crime, the State must only show that he knew right from wrong under the M’Naughten test. Because Brown was trying to assert a diminished capacity defense in hopes of mitigating her crime to manslaughter as opposed to murder, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Brown to admit evidence of her mental state. Issue 4: Culpable negligence instruction Brown argues that the law on culpable negligence was improperly stated in a jury instruction, because it gave the jury no distinguishable difference between murder and culpable negligence manslaughter. If the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. The jury instruction at issue regarding manslaughter by culpable negligence has previously been approved by our supreme court and offers a correct statement of law. Issue 5: Redirect examination Brown argues that there were two instances when the trial court allowed the State an unfair advantage by exceeding the scope of redirect examination. Trial courts have broad discretion in allowing or disallowing redirect examination of witnesses and when the defense attorney inquires into a subject on cross-examination of the State's witness, the prosecutor on redirect is entitled to elaborate on the matter. There is nothing in the record which shows that the judge abused his discretion by permitting the redirect examination at issue. Given that it was Brown who opened the door to the subject matter, the State was entitled to explore the matter on redirect. Issue 6: Closing argument Brown argues that during closing argument the State misrepresented to the jury that the person who accompanied Brown to the victim’s house on the morning of the shooting was convicted of a federal offense at the time of the incident, hoping that the jury would hold Brown guilty by association. Given the latitude afforded to an attorney during closing argument, any allegedly improper prosecutorial comments must be considered in context, considering the circumstances of the case, when deciding on their propriety. Here, the prosecutor attempted to call the person’s character into question in order to explain why Brown brought him to the scene on the day of the murder. In doing so, he stated that this person was serving a forty-eight-month sentence in federal prison for bank robbery. He did not state that the person served that time prior to accompanying Brown, but rather clarified the statement by stating that it occurred “later on.” There is nothing wrong with this argument. Issue 7: Weight of evidence Brown argues that her motion for directed verdict should have been granted based on the theory of “imperfect defense,” heat of passion manslaughter. The jury at Brown's trial was instructed on murder, heat of passion manslaughter, and culpable negligence manslaughter. It chose to convict on the murder charge. The evidence in this case is legally sufficient, and the great weight of the credible evidence supports the verdict.


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