Smith v. State
| Docket Number: | 2006-KA-01946-COA Linked Case(s): 2006-KA-01946-COA |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-11-2008 Opinion Author: MYERS, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Murder - Admission of confessions - Right to counsel - Initial appearance - Right to speedy trial - Sequestered voir dire Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-29-2006 Appealed from: George County Circuit Court Judge: Robert P. Krebs Disposition: CONVICTED OF MURDER AND SENTENCED TO SERVE A TERM OF LIFE IN THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: Anthony N. Lawrence, III Case Number: 2004-10-093(1) |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | MICHAEL LATAVIN SMITH |
H. BERNARD GAUTIER |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LADONNA C. HOLLAND | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Murder - Admission of confessions - Right to counsel - Initial appearance - Right to speedy trial - Sequestered voir dire |
| Summary of the Facts: | Michael Smith was convicted of murder and sentenced to a term of life. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Admission of confessions Smith argues that his various confessions were not voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly given because he did not have capacity to waive his Miranda rights, i.e., he had limited intellectual capacity and obtained no education beyond the fifth grade. To be admissible at trial, a confession must have been intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily given, and not a product of police threats, promises or inducements. A confession will be considered voluntary, if, after looking at the totality of the circumstances, the statement is the product of the accused’s free and rational choice. The trial court considered many factors in its determination that the confessions would be admissible. The trial court noted that Smith had previously pleaded guilty to other charges, indicating that he understood the system. The trial court also determined that Smith had sworn that he could read and write, when he pleaded guilty to the other charges. The trial court additionally found that there was no evidence indicating that he was coerced or intimidated into making the statements, and there was no evidence that Smith possessed a learning disability or low IQ that would prevent him from fully understanding and waiving his rights. The record contains no evidence that demonstrates that Smith did not validly waive his Miranda rights. Issue 2: Right to counsel Smith argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because his statements to the police were introduced into evidence without Smith having benefit of counsel. Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until a prosecution is commenced, that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings -- whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. Therefore, Smith’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not formally attach until he was indicted or charged with the murder. Smith was formally charged with the murder on August 18, 2004, and made his initial appearance on the murder charge that same day; thus his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at this time. At his arraignment, he was provided with an attorney and was informed of his right to an attorney. Thus, there is no merit in Smith’s contention that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. Issue 3: Initial appearance Smith argues that the State failed to provide him with an initial appearance within forty-eight hours of his arrest on murder charges. Smith was being held in custody on three unrelated bench warrants from August 12, 2004, until August 17, 2004. Smith was then charged with the murder on August 18, 2004, and arraigned in court that same day. Thus, there is no merit to his argument. Issue 4: Right to speedy trial Smith argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated. Smith’s various continuances tolled the time from January 24, 2005, until June 26, 2006, resulting in no speedy trial violations. In addition, sufficient good cause was shown for each of the continuances granted by the trial court. Thus, there was no violation of Smith’s statutory right. Smith argues that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated because he never personally agreed to a continuance motion or to waive his rights to a speedy trial; thus, there was no good cause for the continuances granted. To determine if his constitutional right has been violated, the court must consider length of delay, reason for delay, defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to defendant. There was over an eight-month delay in the time Smith’s case was brought to trial which is presumptively prejudicial. Most of the continuance motions requested by counsel for the defense were sought in order to prepare for trial, to allow extra time in light of newly appointed counsel to prepare for trial, to prepare for expert witnesses, to allow new counsel to be appointed because of failing health of the current co-counsel for Smith, or to obtain records of information needed in preparation for trial. During the time of preparation for Smith’s trial, Hurricane Katrina struck, causing attorneys working on Smith’s case to be uprooted from the area, which further contributed to the delay in Smith’s trial preparation. Thus, there existed sufficient good cause for each of the delays allowed by the trial court. Smith asserted his right to a speedy trial. The delays were to the benefit of Smith. Many of the delays were requested in order to obtain records and to allow his defense team time to adequately prepare for trial. Thus, Smith’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. Issue 5: Sequestered voir dire Smith filed a motion seeking individual sequestered voir dire on the limited issue of attitudes toward race and intimate interracial relationships, which was denied by the trial court. He argues this was error. The record contains no evidence that Smith suffered actual prejudice or actual harm as a result of the trial court’s denial of a sequestered voir dire. Thus, this issue is without merit. |
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