Koestler v. Koestler
| Docket Number: | 2006-CA-01959-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-04-2008 Opinion Author: ROBERTS, J. Holding: Reversed and Rendered |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Involuntary commitment - Mootness doctrine - Capable of repetition yet evading review - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(a)(1) - M.R.E. 801(c) - M.R.E. 703 - Issuing of writ - Notice of hearing Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ. Dissenting Author : CARLTON, J., with separate written opinion. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-16-2006 Appealed from: Hinds County Chancery Court Judge: William H. Singletary Disposition: INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT Case Number: 2006-582 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | THELMA KOESTLER |
MARCIE TANNER SOUTHERLAND,
SHARON ANGLIN COUNTS,
JENNIFER POWELL FORTNER |
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| Appellee: | MARILYN ELIZABETH KOESTLER | NO BRIEF FILED |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Involuntary commitment - Mootness doctrine - Capable of repetition yet evading review - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(a)(1) - M.R.E. 801(c) - M.R.E. 703 - Issuing of writ - Notice of hearing |
| Summary of the Facts: | Marilyn Koestler successfully petitioned the Hinds County Chancery Court to have her mother, Thelma Koestler, involuntarily committed to the Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield. Thelma was discharged just days after she arrived at Whitfield. Thelma appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Mootness doctrine Because Thelma was discharged from Whitfield, she concedes that her appeal could be considered moot. However, she argues that her appeal falls under an exception to the mootness doctrine, i.e., a matter is “capable of repetition yet evading review.” There are two qualifiers to a finding that a moot appeal is capable of repetition yet evading review: the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration and there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subject to the same action again. Thelma’s appeal falls squarely under the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine. Thelma’s commitment was very brief. She did not have time to appeal before her discharge. Further, there is a reasonable expectation that Thelma could be subject to the same action. According to Thelma’s brief, during her confinement at Baptist and Whitfield, Thelma’s children successfully filed a petition for conservatorship over her. Issue 2: Hearsay Thelma argues that the special master erred when he allowed a social worker to read a doctor’s letter into evidence. M.R.E. 801(a)(1) defines a statement as an oral or written assertion. The doctor’s letter is most definitely a written assertion. The doctor did not testify at the hearing and was offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted – that Thelma should be committed to inpatient treatment. Therefore, the letter qualifies as hearsay under M.R.E. 801(c). What is more, letters that are written specifically for litigation purposes stating that a party to a trial is competent, incompetent, sane or insane are hearsay when offered as evidence unless accompanied by the testimony of the declarant. There can be no doubt that the doctor’s letter was written specifically for litigation purposes. The letter was addressed “To Whom it May Concern” and was dated the same date the chancellor directed the chancery clerk to issue the writ to take Thelma into custody. Therefore, the special master abused his discretion when he allowed the letter to be read into evidence. It is readily apparent that, but for the special master’s decision to admit this letter into evidence, there would have been no recommendation for inpatient treatment. Therefore, Thelma was prejudiced by the admission of the letter. Without this letter, it is impossible that there could be clear and convincing evidence that Thelma should be committed to involuntary inpatient treatment. While M.R.E. 703 allows an expert to use certain other sources in forming his or her own opinion, Rule 703 is not a vehicle for admissibility of otherwise inadmissible evidence. Moreover, it is not intended to allow an expert to abdicate his or her opinion or defer his or her opinion to that of another expert. Issue 3: Issuing of writ The chancery clerk issued the writ to take Thelma into custody on October 13, 2006, and filed it three days later. Thelma argues the writs were defective because the chancellor did not sign either one. Thelma did not raise this issue during her hearing before the special master. This issue will not be considered for plain error because the point is moot based on the Court’s resolution of Thelma’s hearsay issue. In addition, there appears to be no statutory authority for Thelma’s proposition. Issue 4: Notice of hearing Thelma argues that the chancellor committed plain error when he allowed the hearing to take place on the same day she received her notice. This issue is moot for all practical purposes. However, under similar circumstances preserved by a proper objection, it is entirely possible that Thelma did not receive adequate notice. It is clear that Thelma received notice of the hearing on the day of the hearing. Suffice it to say that it is entirely possible that a maximum of four hours would not amount to reasonable notice. Assuming Thelma had four hours notice, during those four hours, she underwent a medical exam, a pre-evaluation, a psychological exam, she was taken into custody, and transported from the Baptist hospital in Jackson, Mississippi to the HCDC in Raymond, where she met her attorney for the first time. |
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