Woods v. State
| Docket Number: | 2006-KA-00417-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-29-2008 Opinion Author: CHANDLER, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Statutory rape - Opinions on truthfulness - Prior consistent statement - M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) - Discovery violation - Grand jury testimony - URCCC 9.04(A) - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A) - Closing argument - Sufficiency of evidence Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., IRVING, BARNES AND CARLTON, JJ. Dissenting Author : ROBERTS, J., with separate written opinion. Dissent Joined By : LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS AND ISHEE, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-16-2005 Appealed from: LEFLORE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: W. Ashley Hines Disposition: CONVICTED OF ONE COUNT OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SENTENCED TO THIRTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: Joyce Ivy Chiles Case Number: 2004-0098 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | ARTHUR WOODS |
JAMES H. ARNOLD |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Statutory rape - Opinions on truthfulness - Prior consistent statement - M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) - Discovery violation - Grand jury testimony - URCCC 9.04(A) - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A) - Closing argument - Sufficiency of evidence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Arthur Woods was convicted of one count of statutory rape, and the court sentenced him to thirty years. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Opinions on truthfulness In its case-in-chief, the State on several occasions asked its witnesses to give an opinion on whether the victim was being truthful when she stated that she and another girl had sex with Woods. On each occasion, the trial court sustained Woods' objection to this testimony. Opinion testimony as to a witness's truthfulness is of dubious competency. Therefore, an opinion by one witness as to another's veracity is generally inadmissible. Therefore, the trial court properly sustained Woods' objections to the State's attempt to elicit opinions on the truthfulness of the statements from various other witnesses. Though the objections were sustained, Woods argues that the prosecution's repeated attempts to elicit this impermissible testimony was prosecutorial misconduct that prejudiced him. The trial court gave a preliminary instruction stating that, when an objection is sustained, "that would not be presented to the jury," and also instructed the jury at the close of evidence that it should not speculate as to the answer to any question the court did not allow to be answered. It is presumed the jury followed the trial court's instructions. Issue 2: Prior consistent statement Woods attempted to introduce the videotaped statement made by the other girl (not the victim) to the defense investigator in which she denied that the sex (between Woods and her) had occurred. Woods argues that the taped statement was admissible under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). A prior consistent statement may not be introduced to refute all forms of impeachment or merely to bolster a witness's credibility, but only to refute an alleged motive. Under the prosecution's theory, this girl’s motive to lie arose in response to the influence of the defense investigator. The videotape of the statement to the defense investigator did not refute this alleged motive because the statements were not made before the alleged motive arose. Rather, the videotape's sole function was to bolster the credibility of the girl’s trial testimony. Therefore, the trial court correctly excluded the taped statement as hearsay. Issue 3: Grand jury testimony The State attempted to impeach the other girl with her prior inconsistent statements to the grand jury. After being informed of her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the girl testified that she told the grand jury she had sex with Woods, but this had been a lie. Woods contends that URCCC 9.04(A) required the State to provide him with the grand jury testimony and that the trial court erred by allowing the impeachment despite the discovery violation. While prior inconsistent statements used to impeach a witness are not discoverable under Rule 9.04 absent a request for disclosure, a prior inconsistent statement that is also used to bolster the substantive case of a party is subject to reciprocal discovery. The witness’s prior inconsistent statement to the grand jury that she had sex with Woods not only impeached her credibility, but also bolstered the State's substantive case against Woods. Therefore, regardless of whether the grand jury testimony was transcribed, the State had an obligation under Rule 9.04(A)(1) to disclose the substance of it. However, the purpose of the discovery rules is to prevent trial by unfair surprise or ambush. Woods knew the basics of the grand jury testimony and thus could not have been surprised by its contents. Given the purpose of the rule and the relative insignificance of the impeachment of the witness with her grand jury testimony, the error was harmless. Issue 4: Hearsay During the direct examination of the victim, the State had her read from the note that started the investigation. Woods argues that contents of the note were inadmissible hearsay and should have been excluded by the trial court. The portions of the note read by the victim contained her own statements acknowledging that the sex had occurred, as well as a relation of a subsequent conversation she had with Woods in which Woods admitted having had sex with the girls. Woods' statements acknowledging sex with the girls were admissions by a party-opponent and were admissible pursuant to M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A). The victim's statements in the note were consistent with her testimony and were admissible under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). The note contained her statements prior to the recantation that were consistent with her trial testimony and tended to rebut the notion that she fabricated the allegations for trial. Issue 5: Closing argument Woods argues that in closing argument, the prosecution improperly vouched for the merits of its case. As Woods did not contemporaneously object, this issue is procedurally barred. Issue 6: Sufficiency of evidence The elements of statutory rape are met when a person seventeen years of age or older has sexual intercourse with a child over the age of fourteen but under the age of sixteen, if the child is thirty-six or more months younger than the person and is not the person's spouse. The totally uncorroborated testimony of a sex crime victim is sufficient to support a guilty verdict where it is consistent with the circumstances and is not discredited or contradicted by other credible evidence. Woods argues that the victim's testimony that she had sex with him was uncorroborated, was cast into doubt by her prior recantation, and for those reasons was insufficient to support his conviction of statutory rape. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to enable a reasonable jury to find Woods guilty of statutory rape. The victim gave detailed testimony about her sexual encounter with Woods. It was undisputed that she was present at Woods' home at the time the statutory rape was to have occurred. Though she did not immediately report the incident to the authorities, she did discuss it with another girl in a note written five days after the incident. And, her denial of the allegations to the defense investigator and statements about her stepmother's threats did not so thoroughly discredit or contradict her testimony that a reasonable jury could not have concluded that she had sex with Woods. |
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