R.L. v. G.F.


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Docket Number: 2007-CA-00350-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 01-22-2008
Opinion Author: CARLTON, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Termination of parental rights - Application of section 93-15-103 - Guardian ad litem - Section 93-15-107
Judge(s) Concurring: KING,C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 12-28-2006
Appealed from: Coahoma County Chancery Court
Judge: William Willard
Disposition: NATURAL FATHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS TERMINATED.
Case Number: 2006-330

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: R.L.




WILLIAM BOLTON SEALE



 

Appellee: G.F. SHAUN EREN YURTKURAN  

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Topic: Termination of parental rights - Application of section 93-15-103 - Guardian ad litem - Section 93-15-107

Summary of the Facts: When G.F. and R.L. divorced in 2004, their child custody agreement provided that G.F. would have primary physical custody of their child. R.L. had visitation with the child on the first, third, and fifth weekends of each month, as well as various holidays and an extended period during the summer. R.L. was also required to pay $400 per month for support of the child. R.L. last visited with the child in December 2003. G.F. filed a complaint seeking to terminate R.L.’s parental rights in 2006, claiming that he had failed to contact his son for nearly two years. The chancellor ordered that R.L.’s parental rights to his son be terminated. R.L. appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Section 93-15-103 R.L.’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to section 93-15-103(3)(b), which allows parental rights to be terminated when a parent has made no contact with a child under the age of three for six months or a child three years of age or older for a period of one year. R.L. argues that the chancery court incorrectly applied the statute, because the court failed to take into consideration G.F.’s refusal to allow him to visit with his son and focused too much attention on the fact that he was behind on his child support payments. It is clear from the chancery court’s bench ruling and its order terminating parental rights that the decision to terminate R.L.’s parental rights was predicated on more than R.L.’s failure to pay child support, though failure to support the child was material to the chancellor’s ruling. The chancellor found that R.L. actually failed to maintain contact with his child for a period of approximately two years and ten months. R.L. claims that he called G.F. monthly in an effort to see his son, but she refused to allow the visits. Even if his claim is true, R.L. never took any steps toward enforcing his rights under the custody and visitation agreement. The chancellor did not improperly apply section 93-14-103 in rendering his judgment. Issue 2: Guardian ad litem R.L. argues that the guardian ad litem was not adequately informed as to her duties as a guardian ad litem and that her report was insufficient. Section 93-15-107 requires that a guardian ad litem be appointed to protect the interest of the child in a termination of parental rights case. The role of the guardian ad litem is to act as a representative of the court and to assist the court in protecting the interests of an incompetent person by investigating and making recommendations to the court. The guardian ad litem in this case met these requirements. R.L. has not shown that the guardian ad litem was incompetent or inadequately informed, nor has he shown that she acted other than in the best interests of the child.


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