Trinity Mission Health & Rehab. of Clinton v. Estate of Scott
| Docket Number: | 2006-CA-01053-COA Linked Case(s): 2006-CA-01053-SCT ; 2006-CA-01053-COA ; 2006-CT-01053-SCT ; 2006-CT-01053-SCT |
|
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-08-2008 Opinion Author: KING, C.J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Contract - Arbitration agreement - Third-party beneficiary - Unconscionability - M.R.A.P. 28(j) - Section 11-1-52 Judge(s) Concurring: LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ. Dissenting Author : IRVING, J., without separate written opinion. Procedural History: Motion to Compel Arbitration Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CONTRACT |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-17-2006 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Winston Kidd Disposition: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION DENIED. Case Number: 251-04-858CIV |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | TRINITY MISSION HEALTH & REHABILITATION OF CLINTON AND LPNH HOLDINGS LIMITED, LLC |
JOHN L. MAXEY,
HEATHER MARIE ABY |
||
| Appellee: | THE ESTATE OF MARY SCOTT, BY AND THROUGH ELZENIA JOHNSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MARY SCOTT, AND ON BEHALF OF AND FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF THE WRONGFUL-DEATH BENEFICIARIES OF MARY SCOTT | ANTHONY LANCE REINS, D. BRYANT CHAFFIN, SUSAN NICHOLS ESTES |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Contract - Arbitration agreement - Third-party beneficiary - Unconscionability - M.R.A.P. 28(j) - Section 11-1-52 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Elzenia Johnson filed a wrongful death suit against Trinity Mission Health and Rehabilitation of Clinton alleging that her mother, Mary Scott, suffered injuries during her stay which caused her death. Trinity filed a motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration pursuant to the admission agreement, which was denied. Trinity appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Trinity argues that the admission agreement containing the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable, because Johnson could bind her mother as a health care surrogate through section 41-41-201, Johnson had the authority based on principles of agency, and Scott received the benefits from the contract, even though she was a non-signatory to the contract. While Scott did not sign the contract, the plain language of the contract makes it very clear that its sole purpose is to bind Trinity to provide services for Scott. The benefit that she received was the health-care services that were laid out in the admissions agreement. These rights and benefits bestowed upon Scott sprang forth from the terms of the contract. Thus, Scott was a third-party beneficiary of the contract, and she was bound to arbitrate any claims within the scope of the arbitration provision. Since this suit is a derivative action, Johnson must stand in the position of the decedent. Since Scott’s claims would have been subject to arbitration, Johnson is likewise subject to the arbitration provision. Pursuant to M.R.A.P. 28(j), Johnson sought to inform the Court of the recently decided supreme court case Grenada Living Ctr., LLC v. Coleman, 961 So. 2d 33 (Miss. 2007). While the supreme court held that Coleman was not a third-party beneficiary to the contract, it stated that the “case does not stand for the proposition that non-signatories can never be bound to arbitration.” Therefore, while Coleman is similar to this case, it is not determinative of this issue. All of Johnson’s claims arise out of the acts or omissions that Trinity agreed to provide in the contract. Therefore, the dispute of the parties is clearly covered by the language of the arbitration provision contained in the contract. Johnson argues that fourteen provisions of the admission agreement are unconscionable or illegal. Trinity concedes that several provisions are unconscionable and should be stricken. Therefore, the following provisions of the admission agreement are stricken: C5 (requiring forfeiture by the resident of all claims except those for willful acts); C8 (waiving liability for criminal acts against individuals); E7 (placing a limit on actual damages at $50,000); E8 (waiving punitive damages); E12 (requiring the resident to pay for enforcement costs of the agreement if the resident challenges the grievance resolution process or its award); E16 (requiring legal action within one year of the alleged event); and the last sentence of Section F that disallowed punitive damages and reinforced the limit on actual damages under E7. In addition, the following provisions are also unconscionable: the provision that reserves to Trinity the right of access to the courts, while denying Johnson the very same right; the provision that in collections matters, the resident would be responsible for the costs of litigation; and the provision that the parties must submit to a grievance resolution process for all matters, except payment of services. The provision that sets the costs for requested copies at three dollars per page has been superceded by section 11-1-52 and is therefore stricken. The remainder of the admission agreement, including the remaining arbitration provision is still binding upon the parties. Therefore, the trial court erred when it denied Trinity’s motion to compel arbitration. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
