Davis v. Davis
| Docket Number: | 2006-CA-02161-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-03-2008 Opinion Author: GRIFFIS, J. Holding: REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Modification of child support - Material change in circumstances - Private school tuition Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ. Dissenting Author : MYERS, P.J., without separate written opinion. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-09-2006 Appealed from: DeSoto County Chancery Court Judge: Percy L. Lynchard, Jr. Disposition: CHANCELLOR REFUSED TO MODIFY ORIGINAL DIVORCE DECREE. Case Number: 94-1-59 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | ANNE LYNN BESH DAVIS |
PEGGY A. JONES |
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| Appellee: | RONALD KENT DAVIS | MALENDA HARRIS MEACHAM |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Modification of child support - Material change in circumstances - Private school tuition |
| Summary of the Facts: | Anne and Kent Davis signed a property settlement agreement which was fully incorporated into their divorce decree. The agreement gave Anne physical custody of the couple’s only child. Kent was ordered to pay Anne $700 per month in child support. When Anne was laid off from her primary employment, Kent filed a petition for a modification of custody and a temporary restraining order. After extensive litigation, both Anne and Kent decided that it would be in their daughter’s best interest to live with Kent. The chancellor entered an agreed order that gave both parties joint legal custody and gave Kent primary physical custody. The order also mandated that Anne pay only $100 per month in child support because she was unemployed. This agreement did not fully dispose of all financial obligations. The chancellor heard arguments on the issue of private school tuition and college expenses. Kent argued that the private school payments were contractual, and therefore, the payments could not be modified. Anne argued that the payments constituted child support, and therefore, the payments could be modified. After a hearing, the chancellor granted Kent’s motion to dismiss and did not address the contract versus child support issue because Anne did not have present sufficient evidence that there was a material change in circumstances justifying a modification. Anne appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Anne argues that the chancellor erred in determining that there was not enough evidence to support a material change of circumstances and assigning her half of the costs of her daughter’s private school education, because the parties had already agreed that a modification was appropriate. The original agreement between Anne and Kent was contractual in nature. The parties are bound by the language of the contract where a contract is unambiguous. Here, the agreement is unambiguous. Thus, both parties are bound by its terms. Both Anne and Kent agreed that Anne had undergone a material change in circumstances, because they had agreed in the order that she had become unemployed and could only afford $100 in child support a month. Once the chancellor and both parties signed the agreement, the parties became bound by the terms of the agreed order. Thus, the fact that Anne had become unemployed became a determination by the court, i.e., the equivalent of res judicata, and Kent would have to move for modification to have Anne’s child support obligation increased. Kent argues that the educational provision in the divorce decree was a contractual provision and, thus, could not be modified. As to the private school tuition, Mississippi case law has repeatedly held that pre-college tuition is considered part of child support, not an extraordinary expense. The chancellor did not consider whether the material change of circumstances, which the parties agreed had occurred, would also require a modification of the parties’ obligation as to private school tuition. Proper resolution of this case requires that it be remanded for the chancellor to make this determination. |
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