O'Neal v. State


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Docket Number: 2007-KA-00788-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 03-25-2008
Opinion Author: GRIFFIS, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Aggravated domestic violence - Admission of evidence - Discovery violation - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 701 - M.R.E. 702 - M.R.E. 103(a)
Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 04-18-2007
Appealed from: Lamar County Circuit Court
Judge: R. I. Prichard, III
Disposition: CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND SENTENCE TO SERVE TWENTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITH TWELVE YEARS SUSPENDED, WITH FIVE YEARS ON POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION, AND FINE OF $2,000
District Attorney: Claiborne McDonald
Case Number: K-2004-705P

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: SHAWN GAVIN O’NEAL




BRENDA JACKSON PATTERSON



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: STATE OF MISSISSIPPI OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: W. GLENN WATTS  

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    Topic: Aggravated domestic violence - Admission of evidence - Discovery violation - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 701 - M.R.E. 702 - M.R.E. 103(a)

    Summary of the Facts: Shawn O’Neal was convicted of aggravated domestic violence and was sentenced to twenty years, with eight years to serve, twelve years suspended pursuant to five years of post-release supervision. He appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Admission of evidence O’Neal argues that the court erred when it allowed the victim’s son to testify about the necklace he found in the garage on the day his mother was injured. O’Neal did not know about the necklace until the morning of trial, which was almost three years after the alleged assault. The State claimed to have received the necklace only days before and to have shown it to defense counsel that morning. When defense counsel again objected to the necklace being entered into evidence after the witness testified, the trial court overruled the objection. Thereafter, defense counsel did not request any extra time to examine the necklace and did not request a continuance. An accused’s remedy for tardy disclosure of that to which he was entitled in pre-trial discovery is a continuance reasonable under the circumstances. Counsel for O’Neal chose to allow the trial to continue and did not make any such request for a continuance, thereby waiving any remedy for the State’s discovery violation. In addition, testimony about the broken necklace was cumulative evidence of the victim’s testimony. Issue 2: Expert testimony O’Neal argues that the court committed reversible error by allowing a witness to testify as to the causation of the victim’s injury despite the fact that he was called as a lay witness and not as an expert witness. The supreme court has held that it is possible for an expert in an area of knowledge to give a lay opinion, but not if the witness is operating in his professional capacity. Where a witness is to give testimony derived from specialized knowledge gained by education or experience, the testimony is not lay opinion testimony. The lines between M.R.E. 701 and 702 should not be blurred. It is clear that the witness, as the orthopedic surgeon who performed the victim’s surgery, was qualified to testify as an expert. He was acting in his professional capacity when he testified that the type of fracture the victim experienced was caused by a high-energy force as opposed to a simple fall. Clearly, he should have been qualified as an expert witness under M.R.E. 702; therefore, O’Neal would have been allowed discovery in order to test the witness’s qualifications before his testimony was presented to the jury. However, his testimony regarding the causes of this type of fracture was harmless under M.R.E. 103(a), because there was sufficient evidence submitted to the jury to establish the crime of aggravated domestic violence.


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