Williams v. State
| Docket Number: | 2005-KA-01338-COA Linked Case(s): 2005-KA-01338-COA ; 2005-CT-01338-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-25-2008 Opinion Author: CARLTON, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Murder - Motion to suppress - Testimony from officers - Prior inconsistent statement - M.R.E. 613(b) - Cross-examination - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 402 - M.R.E. 403 - Right to compulsory process - M.R.E. 611(a) - Lesser-included offense instruction Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-18-2005 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Tomie Green Disposition: CONVICTED OF TWO COUNTS OF MURDER AND SENTENCED TO SERVE TWO CONCURRENT TERMS OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. District Attorney: Eleanor Faye Peterson Case Number: 03-0-310-00TTG |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | JAMES R. WILLIAMS, III |
JULIE ANN EPPS,
ROBERT FARLEY WILKINS |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LADONNA C. HOLLAND | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Murder - Motion to suppress - Testimony from officers - Prior inconsistent statement - M.R.E. 613(b) - Cross-examination - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 402 - M.R.E. 403 - Right to compulsory process - M.R.E. 611(a) - Lesser-included offense instruction |
| Summary of the Facts: | James Williams, III was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Motion to suppress Williams argues that his confession was taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, which he claims was sufficiently invoked when his mother and stepfather, in his presence, told police not to question him without an attorney. The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination requires that before custodial interrogation may take place, a criminal defendant must be advised of his right to have an attorney present. Once the right to counsel is invoked, questioning must cease unless and until an attorney is present or the defendant himself reinitiates further discussions with police. Here, it is undisputed that police reinitiated discussions with Williams after the alleged invocation of his right to counsel. However, a defendant’s right to counsel is not invoked by a third party’s acting outside the presence and knowledge of the defendant. Williams argues that the “no third party rule” does not apply to his situation because his parents made a request for counsel in his presence. This distinction is of no consequence to the outcome of this case. For an assertion of the right to counsel to be effective, it must emanate from the suspect, not from a third party. The suspect must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Williams’ remarks, in response to his parents’ requests for counsel, of “thank you so much for coming and helping me here” and/or “yes ma’am I understand” do not amount to an unambiguous request for counsel. Issue 2: Testimony from officers Williams argues that the court erred by failing to require the State to offer the testimony of two officers at the suppression hearing. However, only those officers claimed to have induced a confession by some means of coercion are required to testify at the hearing. Williams did not assert that these two officers threatened or coerced him, nor does the record indicate that either officer was present when the coercive tactics were alleged to have occurred. Issue 3: Prior inconsistent statement Williams argues that the court erred in prohibiting the defense from using extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement to impeach a prosecution witness. Before extrinsic evidence may be used to impeach a witness under M.R.E. 613(b), there must be an actual contradiction in fact between the testimony and the prior statement. A prior statement is inconsistent if under any rational theory its introduction might lead to a conclusion different from the witness’s testimony or the statement has a reasonable tendency to discredit the witness’s testimony. Williams fails to demonstrate how the witness’s prior statement is inconsistent with his trial testimony. The transcript of the interview was sought to impeach the witness’s trial testimony that he was not promised leniency. However, the witness did not represent that he was promised leniency in either statement. Issue 4: Cross-examination Williams argues that the judge erred in refusing to allow his attorney to cross-examine a witness using his juvenile court records, introduce one of the victim’s bank statements and pictures of a witness at an ATM, and have a witness and Williams stand next to each other in order to show that the witness was larger. A criminal defendant is entitled to conduct broad and extensive cross-examination of the witnesses against him, and especially is this so with respect to the principal prosecution witness. However, this right is not absolute. Here, the witness’s youth court record was not admissible for the purposes for which it was offered. Juvenile adjudications cannot be used for general impeachment purposes, and the juvenile court record of the witness was offered for general impeachment purposes. With regard to the victim’s bank statements, the evidence was not relevant under M.R.E. 401 and 402, because the witness admitted that he used the victim’s ATM card on several occasions to withdraw money. Even if determined relevant, this evidence would properly be excluded under M.R.E. 403 as its probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. With regard to an in-court size comparison of Williams and a witness, their sizes at the time of trial can hardly be considered probative of their respective sizes at the time of the murders which occurred two years earlier. Issue 5: Right to compulsory process When the State called its final witness, counsel for Williams asked whether the witness on cross-examination whether he was under subpoena because the defense intended to call him to testify as part of its case-in-chief. The trial judge ruled that any direct examination of the witness must be conducted at the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief. After the State’s redirect examination of the witness, the trial judge asked counsel for Williams if he wished to conduct any direct examination and he declined the invitation. Williams argues that the trial judge’s ruling violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. The essence of this issue involves the trial court’s right to control the presentation of evidence under M.R.E. 611(a). Under Rule 611(a), it is within the trial court's discretion to decide whether to allow a witness to be recalled to the stand. Clearly, the trial judge’s decision was made in the interest of efficiency as contemplated by Rule 611(a)(2). Issue 6: Lesser-included offense instruction Williams argues that the trial judge erred in refusing his instruction on accessory after the fact. A lesser-related offense instruction should be granted unless the trial judge can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorably to the accused, that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of the lesser-related offense. Here, the evidence was such that no reasonable jury could find Williams not guilty of murder, yet guilty of accessory after the fact. Williams’ confession and an eyewitness’s testimony overwhelmingly refute any suggestion that Williams acted only as an accessory after the fact. By his own admission, corroborated by the eyewitness testimony, Williams was a principal to the crime of murder. |
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