In re de St. Germain v. de St. Germain
| Docket Number: | 2006-CA-01480-COA Linked Case(s): 2006-CA-01480-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-18-2008 Opinion Author: ROBERTS, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce - Property settlement agreement - Timeliness of motion to set aside divorce - M.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), (5), (6) - Section 93-5-2 - Financial declarations - UCCR 8.05 - Overreaching Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: IRVING, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 07-24-2006 Appealed from: Lawrence County Chancery Court Judge: J. Larry Buffington Disposition: MOTION TO SET ASIDE DIVORCE OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION DENIED Case Number: 99-0132 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | IN THE MATTER OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE OF ROBERT D. DE ST. GERMAIN AND BRENDA L. DE ST. GERMAIN: BRENDA L. DE ST. GERMAIN |
RENEE M. PORTER |
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| Appellee: | ROBERT D. DE ST. GERMAIN | ROBERT E. EVANS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce - Property settlement agreement - Timeliness of motion to set aside divorce - M.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), (5), (6) - Section 93-5-2 - Financial declarations - UCCR 8.05 - Overreaching |
| Summary of the Facts: | Robert and Brenda de St. Germain filed a joint bill for divorce. Approximately three months later, they executed a property settlement agreement. According to that agreement, Robert was to receive all real property except for a convenience store. Additionally, Robert was to receive custody of their son, while Brenda was to pay Robert child support. In 1999, the chancery court entered a final decree of divorce. Simultaneously, Robert and Brenda executed an amended property settlement agreement. According to the amended agreement, Robert received the convenience store, as well as all the other real property. Despite the divorce decree, Robert and Brenda continued to live together until September 2004. When they finally separated, Brenda filed a motion to set aside the divorce or, in the alternative, for equitable distribution of the marital property. The chancellor dismissed Brenda’s motion without conducting a hearing. Brenda appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Timeliness of motion Brenda argues that the chancellor erred when he declined to grant her motion to set aside the divorce. Within her motion to set aside the divorce, Brenda did not state the specific basis for her motion. Viewed in its context, Brenda’s motion could have been based on M.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) – fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party. To the extent that it was based on Rule 60(b)(1), it was clearly untimely. One who proceeds under Rule 60(b)(1) must file the motion within six months after the underlying judgment was entered. Additionally, Brenda’s motion could have been based on M.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) (it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application) or the catch-all provision under M.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) (any other reason justifying relief from the judgment). One who proceeds under either Rules 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6) must do so within a reasonable time. Brenda filed her motion approximately five years after the chancellor entered the divorce judgment. The allegations raised within the motion could have been submitted much earlier than five years after the judgment of divorce. Therefore, the chancellor properly dismissed the motion. Issue 2: Property settlement agreement Brenda argues that, by failing to find either agreement adequate and sufficient, the chancellor committed reversible error. The chancellor did not commit reversible error by failing to use the specific words “adequate and sufficient.” The supreme court has held that section 93-5-2 anticipates more than just a mere recitation of the obligatory words of the statute. Instead, it is necessary to view the actual agreement and the provisions it contains to determine whether the agreement is adequate and sufficient in terms of equity and entirety. Issue 3: Financial declarations Brenda argues that the chancellor erred when he failed to require the Uniform Chancery Court Rule 8.05 financial disclosures before he granted their divorce. Failure to require Rule 8.05 declarations does not require that the Court set aside a divorce judgment for a subsequent equitable distribution. Issue 4: Overreaching Brenda argues that the chancellor should have set aside the amended property settlement agreement because Robert engaged in overreaching. This matter is procedurally barred since Brenda failed to raise it before the chancellor. In addition, Brenda failed to demonstrate an inequality of bargaining power or other circumstances that would indicate she lacked a meaningful choice when she entered the agreements. |
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