Morris Newspaper Corp., et al. v. Allen


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Docket Number: 2003-CA-00192-COA
Linked Case(s): 2003-CA-00192-COA2003-CT-00192-SCT
Oral Argument: 05-11-2004
 

 

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Court of Appeals: Opinion Date: 10-12-2004
Opinion Author: Chandler, J.
Holding: Reversed and Remanded in part; Affirmed in part

Additional Case Information: Topic: Contract - Intentional infliction of emotional distress - Job performance - Sexual and romantic conduct - Post-judgment interest - Section 75-17-7 - Punitive damages
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Bridges and Lee, P.JJ., Irving, Myers, Griffis and Barnes, JJ
Non Participating Judge(s): Ishee, J.
Procedural History: Request for New Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CONTRACT

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-28-2002
Appealed from: Circuit Court of Harrison County
Judge: Stephen Simpson

Note: Link Inactive

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Morris Newspaper Corporation d/b/a WXXV-TV and Tom MacArthur








 

Appellee: Rebecca Allen  

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Topic: Contract - Intentional infliction of emotional distress - Job performance - Sexual and romantic conduct - Post-judgment interest - Section 75-17-7 - Punitive damages

Summary of the Facts: Rebecca Allen sued Morris Newspaper Corporation and Tom MacArthur for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of an employment contract, including breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. At the close of Allen's case, the court directed verdicts on Allen's claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, leaving solely the breach of contract claim before the court. The jury returned a verdict for Allen in the amount of $227,000. Morris and MacArthur appeal. Allen cross-appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Emotional distress At the close of Allen's case, Morris moved for a directed verdict on all Allen's claims. Allen confessed the motion as to her tort claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, leaving her breach of contract claim before the court. The court then instructed the jury that it could consider past, present mental anguish, if any, in determining the amount of compensatory damages to award. Morris argues that the grant of a directed verdict on Allen's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim limited Allen's damages to those arising out of a breach of the employment contract. Having proceeded solely on her breach of contract claim, Allen was entitled to pursue all damages flowing from the breach. A plaintiff can obtain emotional distress damages upon proof that a breach of contract was accompanied by conduct amounting to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. A plaintiff may also obtain damages for emotional distress for a breach of contract upon a showing that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress resulting from a negligent act by the defendant along with some physical manifestation of injury or demonstrable physical harm. Here, the court did not instruct the jury on either intentional infliction of emotional distress or negligent infliction of emotional distress accompanied by physical injury but allowed the jury to award mental anguish damages to Allen based solely upon a finding that Morris breached the contract. This was incorrect. If Allen presented sufficient evidence of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress accompanying the breach to allow her mental anguish claim to go to the jury, then this instructional error requires a new trial. To prove the intentional tort, the plaintiff must show the defendant's conduct was malicious, intentional, willful, wanton, grossly careless, indifferent or reckless. The evidence favoring Allen regarding Morris and MacArthur's conduct surrounding Allen's wrongful termination was similar to the conduct which has been found insufficient to constitute outrageous conduct justifying recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress. MacArthur's anger and name-calling at the termination meetings was certainly inappropriate and upsetting, but it does not rise to the level of extreme, outrageous or grossly careless conduct. As there was insufficient evidence of outrageous conduct, Allen was not entitled to a jury instruction on damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The evidence that Allen was physically affected by her wrongful termination is too scant to support recovery on this ground. The only evidence of physical injury or illness was Allen's testimony that she had an upset stomach and lost weight. Since it is impossible to calculate that portion of the jury's general verdict of $227,000 attributable to emotional distress damages, if any, the case is reversed and remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of actual damages based upon the breach of contract and excluding damages for mental anguish/emotional distress. Issue 2: Motions in limine Morris argues that the court erred in denying three of its motions in limine. Several witnesses who worked with Allen at WLOX testified that she was a competent news anchor both before she left WLOX to go to WXXV and after she resumed work at WLOX. Morris argues that the court should have excluded this testimony, because it was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial because it related to Allen's performance after leaving WXXV. Allen offered the evidence to show continuity in the high quality of her job performance. This evidence was relevant because it tended to disprove Morris's contention that Allen performed poorly at WXXV and that she was fired for cause. Morris also argues that the court erred in failing to exclude evidence of MacArthur's affairs and his sexual and romantic conduct, because this evidence was irrelevant since Allen failed to file a sexual harassment suit after receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC, or because Russo was wholly responsible for Allen's firing and demotion. However, the evidence of his sexual and romantic conduct toward Allen and others was certainly relevant to show that MacArthur had an impermissible motive for the firing. Because a fact question existed as to MacArthur's level of involvement in the termination decision, the evidence of his sexual and romantic conduct was relevant to show his possible wrongful motive for firing Allen. WXXV later terminated MacArthur for financial improprieties and faulty record keeping. Morris argues that the court erred in failing to exclude evidence of the reasons MacArthur was fired. The record shows that Morris elicited the very testimony on direct examination which it had sought to exclude via the motion in limine. Morris's elicitation of the testimony waived its standing objection, and opened the door to Allen's cross-examination on the same subject. Issue 3: Post-judgment interest The court imposed post-judgment interest at a rate of eight percent, and Morris argues that eight percent is too high considering rates charged by the federal courts and commercial lenders. However, the court was within its discretion in imposing the eight percent post-judgment interest rate pursuant to the revised section 75-17-7. Issue 4: Punitive damages Allen argues that the court erred by denying her request to submit her claim for punitive damages to the jury. In order for punitive damages to be awarded, the plaintiff must demonstrate a willful or malicious wrong or the gross, reckless disregard for the rights of others. Because Morris's conduct was insufficiently malicious, intentional, willful, wanton, or grossly reckless to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the evidence cannot support an award of punitive damages.


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