In re Estate of Burgess v. Trotter
| Docket Number: | 2007-CA-01266-COA Linked Case(s): 2007-CA-01266- COA2007-CA-01266-COA |
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| Oral Argument: | 06-26-2008 | |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-09-2008 Opinion Author: GRIFFIS, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Appellate court directives - Mutual mistake - Location of strip - Monuments of title - Collateral estoppel - Existence of fences Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Chandler, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, and Carlton, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-19-2007 Appealed from: Hinds County Chancery Court Judge: Patricia D. Wise Disposition: DETERMINED THE OWNERSHIP OF PARCEL TWO AND THE LOCATION OF A 140-YARD STRIP OF LAND Case Number: G99-65 W/4 |
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| Note: | Audio Only | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | THE ESTATE OF FRANCIS N. BURGESS, SR., DECEASED, BY AND THROUGH DOROTHY F. BURGESS, DULY APPOINTED EXECUTOR, FRANCIS N. BURGESS, JR., AND LULA BURGESS |
CLAY L. PEDIGO |
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| Appellee: | H. ALEX TROTTER | WATTS CASPER UELTSCHEY, SHELDON G. ALSTON, JOSEPH ANTHONY SHERMAN | ||
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| Topic: | Real property - Appellate court directives - Mutual mistake - Location of strip - Monuments of title - Collateral estoppel - Existence of fences |
| Summary of the Facts: | Alex Trotter filed a complaint to quiet and remove clouds on title against adjoining landowners, Francis N. Burgess, Sr.; Francis N. Burgess, Jr.; and Lula Burgess. The Burgesses filed a counterclaim to quiet title and remove clouds on the same property. The chancellor determined that Trotter owned the property in dispute and found that the ambiguously conveyed 140-yard strip of property should be located at the driveway of the Burgesses’ home thereby creating a right of access from the home to the Bolton-Brownsville Road. The Burgesses appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case. On remand, the chancellor found that Trotter owned parcel two and provided a definite legal description of the 140-yard strip located along the Burgesses’ driveway. The Burgesses appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Appellate court directives The Burgesses argue that the chancellor committed manifest error on remand by ignoring the appellate court’s directives. While the appellate court may have suggested some possible conclusions, these suggestions should not be interpreted as usurping the role of the fact-finder. In addition, the chancellor made findings as to the directives issued by the appellate court. Issue 2: Mutual mistake The Burgesses do not dispute that Trotter holds record title to parcel two because the 1911 deed, and the subsequent 1927 deed conveying the same property, are unambiguous. Instead, they argue that the parties to the 1911 deed erroneously, and by mutual mistake, believed that the property conveyed in the 1911 deed included parcel two thereby bringing the western boundary line of the Burgesses’ property over to the old Bolton-Brownsville Road. They argue that the chancellor erred on remand because she analyzed whether there was a mutual mistake in the deeds instead of whether there was a mutual mistake as to the location of the boundary lines. On remand, the chancellor was instructed to make findings related to possible mutual mistake as to the boundary locations – not mistakes contained in the deed language. Although the chancellor did use somewhat confusing language, the chancellor did make findings of fact as to the potential mutual mistake of the parties as to the location of the Burgesses’ property boundary. The chancellor heard conflicting expert testimony presented by each party, and it was within her discretion to find that, on remand, the Burgesses failed to prove mutual mistake beyond a reasonable doubt. Issue 3: Location of strip The Burgesses argue that the chancellor erred on remand by finding that the 140-yard strip described in the 1941 deed was located in the same place as stated in her initial opinion. The case was remanded so the chancellor could make a definite description for the 140-yard strip. There was no mandate that the chancellor should situate the 140-yard strip in a different location. Issue 4: Monuments of title The Burgesses argue that the chancellor used “the land now owned by said A.L. Burgess,” as a monument of title and that a monument of title cannot be a piece of land. The fact that the chancellor referred to “the land now owned by said A.L. Burgess” as a monument is at best a mistake of form and not of substance because our case law allows chancellors to use certain and dependable descriptive items in a deed to construe the deed as a whole. Although the chancellor referred to A.L. Burgess’s land as a monument, she did not err because adjacent land, like a monument, can be used to give meaning to an ambiguous deed description. Issue 5: Collateral estoppel The Burgesses argue that the chancellor erred by relying on the testimony of Trotter because it had been substantially impeached and was barred by collateral estoppel. The Burgesses did not properly preserve the issue of collateral estoppel for appeal. The Burgesses did not object to Trotter’s testimony during trial as being barred under a theory of collateral estoppel or move for summary judgment under the theory of collateral estoppel. In addition, the appellate court does not have the necessary information in the record required to apply collateral estoppel. Issue 6: Existence of fences At the trial on remand, the Burgesses’ real estate agent testified that she saw a cross-fence when she walked the Burgesses’ property and that after the attempted sale of the land she saw bulldozers pushing down fences on the disputed property. The Burgesses argue that the chancellor abused her discretion by ignoring evidence that there was a boundary-line fence along the eastern side of the old road, which Trotter had destroyed after the 1997 survey. The chancellor did not ignore the Burgesses’ evidence regarding fences. In her order, she acknowledged the evidence regarding the fences. She, however, chose to place little weight on this evidence and relied on the unambiguous 1927 deed instead. The chancellor’s findings of fact were not manifestly wrong. |
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