Pannell v. State
| Docket Number: | 2006-KA-01882-COA Linked Case(s): 2006-KA-01882-COA ; 2006-CT-01882-SCT |
|
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-09-2008 Opinion Author: Ishee, J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded for a new trial |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Arson - Admission of confession - Assertion of right to counsel - Further interrogation Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Chandler, Griffis, Barnes, and Roberts, JJ. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Carlton, J. with separate written opinion. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: IRVING, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-06-2006 Appealed from: PRENTISS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Thomas J. Gardner Disposition: CONVICTED OF ARSON AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS, WITH TEN YEARS SUSPENDED, IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: John Richard Young Case Number: CR05-187 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | RAYMOND L. PANNELL |
PHILLIP BROADHEAD,
JOHN CARL HELMERT |
|
|
| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: W. GLENN WATTS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Arson - Admission of confession - Assertion of right to counsel - Further interrogation |
| Summary of the Facts: | Raymond Pannell was convicted of arson and sentenced to twenty years, with ten years suspended. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Pannell argues that his confession was taken at a time after he had asserted his right to have counsel present during questioning and therefore, his right to counsel was violated. An accused, having expressed his desire to deal with police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. It is undisputed that Pannell asserted his right to counsel prior to being questioned by police. The question of admissibility turns on whether Pannell, after asserting his right to counsel, reinitiated contact with the officers or whether his confession came in response to further interrogation by the officer, i.e., whether showing the accused the evidence compiled against him after he has requested to see his attorney constitutes custodial interrogation in violation of his constitutional rights. The Mississippi Supreme Court has applied a broad interpretation to the term “interrogation” to include not only questioning, but rather questioning and its functional equivalent. The law in this state, however, provides little guidance as to what procedures should be considered interrogation. Pannell invoked his right to cut off questioning, thereby triggering the prohibition against further interrogation. In response, the officer failed to cease communication with Pannell completely. Instead, he notified Pannell that he had compiled strong evidence against him. He then proceeded to lay out the contents of the evidence file before Pannell. Only after Pannell reviewed the evidence did he decide to give a written statement confessing to the arson. Given the facts of this case, the officer should have known that his actions were likely to elicit a confession. It is obvious that the officer showed Pannell the evidence file in an attempt to have him reconsider his request for counsel; a tactic that proved successful as Pannell was not prompted to speak until he reviewed the evidence placed before him. Further, the actions of the police in this case reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in the custody itself. Of primary significance is the manner in which the police detained Pannell, holding him long enough to obtain a confession and releasing him only after his written confession was secured. These actions, taken together, reflect a police effort, whether out of intent or neglect, to deprive Pannell of his constitutional rights. The State argues that even if Pannell did assert his right to counsel, that right was validly waived when he signed the Miranda waiver and voluntarily agreed to make a statement. Pannell argues that his signed waiver of rights was not effective because he did not initiate the interrogation. When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. There is no evidence that Pannell initiated further discussions with the officer after asserting his right to counsel. Pannell was prompted to speak only after the officer showed him the contents of the evidence file. Accordingly, Pannell’s supposed waiver of his constitutional rights during questioning was invalid. Without Pannell’s confession, the State presented only circumstantial evidence establishing that Pannell actually set fire to the house. Although the State submitted testimony that placed Pannell at the scene of the crime on the day in question, it presented little concrete evidence actually showing Pannell was responsible for setting the fire. Pannell was also able to provide an alibi by presenting three separate witnesses who testified to his whereabouts on the day in question. Further, his confession was the only confession to the crime obtained by the police. Given these facts: that Pannell’s confession was the only confession available, that it appeared essential to the State’s ability to prove Pannell’s guilt, and that it appeared to be the weighing factor in the grand jury’s decision to indict Pannell, the circuit court’s admission of the confession was not harmless error. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
