Callahan v. Ledbetter


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Docket Number: 2007-CA-00908-COA
Linked Case(s): 2007-CA-00908-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 09-09-2008
Opinion Author: Roberts, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Personal injury - Waiver of defense of contributory negligence - M.R.C.P. 8(c) - M.R.C.P. 15(b) - Contributory negligence - Imputation of fault - Amount of damages
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Chandler, Griffis, Ishee, and Carlton, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Barnes, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 04-24-2007
Appealed from: LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Judge: Thomas J. Gardner
Disposition: JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS
Case Number: CV02-031(G)L

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: DONNA CALLAHAN AND DONNA HOLST




CLARENCE MCDONALD LELAND



 

Appellee: CALENDAR J. LEDBETTER AND LEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD WILLIAM C. MURPHREE, GARY L. CARNATHAN  

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Topic: Personal injury - Waiver of defense of contributory negligence - M.R.C.P. 8(c) - M.R.C.P. 15(b) - Contributory negligence - Imputation of fault - Amount of damages

Summary of the Facts: Donna Callahan and Donna Holst filed an action against Lee County School Board and Calendar Ledbetter, after their vehicle collided with a school bus driven by Ledbetter. The trial court ruled in favor of Callahan and Holst, but applied a portion of fault to Callahan. Callahan and Holst appeal.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Waiver of defense Callahan and Holst argue that because Lee County failed to plead contributory negligence in its answer as required by M.R.C.P. 8(c), it waived the ability to raise the issue of contributory negligence at trial. M.R.C.P. 15(b) allows issues to be tried by expressed or implied consent of the parties even if not raised by the pleadings. Rules 8(c) and 15(b) are harmonious in application. Lee County raised the issue of comparative negligence on two separate occasions during the trial. Callahan and Holst did not voice an objection at either request for the trial court to apply comparative negligence and therefore, there is no error. Issue 2: Contributory negligence Callahan argues that the record lacks substantial evidence to show that she shared in the negligence that caused the accident; thus, the trial court erred in assigning her a portion of fault. The trial court was faced with the following facts: an accident that occurred on a flat, straight road in the late afternoon; the fact that a large, yellow school bus had the time to completely occupy the Trace with a good portion of the bus past the center line before colliding with Callahan’s car; deposition testimony from Ledbetter that she did not see Callahan’s car; and incredible versions as to the amount of time between when Ledbetter pulled into the Trace and when the bus arrived at the point of collision. This evidence supports the court’s holding. Issue 3: Imputation of fault After fixing Holst’s damages at $40,000, the trial court applied the percentages of fault and held that Holst was entitled to $26,000 from Lee County. Callahan and Holst argue that the trial court erred by imputing Callahan’s assigned fault to Holst. However, it is clear from the trial court’s order that the allocation of fault assigned to Callahan was not imputed to Holst, but applied to her award of damages. Pursuant to section 85-5-7(3), Lee County was only liable for the portion of fault assigned to it applied to the total amount of damages awarded to Holst. This amounted to 65% of $40,000, or $26,000. Issue 4: Amount of damages Holst argues that the trial court erred in fixing her damages at $40,000. Holst suggests that because Lee County did not contest the authenticity of the medical bills admitted into evidence, the necessity and reasonableness of the bills were conceded. Section 41-9-119 creates a presumption that proof of medical bills acts as prima facie evidence of their reasonableness and necessity. However, such a presumption is rebuttable and the ultimate determination is for the finder of fact to make. Additionally, a finding that medical bills are reasonable and necessary does not equate to a finding that those bills were incurred as a result of a defendant’s negligence. In this case, the trial court chose to place more weight on the testimony of a doctor whose opinion was that the wreck did not cause any long-term trauma, and Holst should have recovered no more than six months after the accident. Thus, the amount of damages awarded to Holst was not unreasonable. The trial court awarded Callahan $3,000 in total damages. Callahan argues that this amount was clearly erroneous because of the amount of mental and physical trauma she experienced. Callahan neither received treatment for emotional distress nor described how her distress affected her life other than it made her more protective of her son than she was before the accident. Therefore, the court did not err in fixing Callahan’s total damages at $3,000.


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