Burgess v. Trotter
| Docket Number: | 2001-CA-01098-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-18-2003 Opinion Author: Southwick, P.J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Ambiguity of decree - Adverse possession - Deraignment of title - Impeachment of witness Judge(s) Concurring: McMillin, C.J., King, P.J., Bridges, Thomas, Lee, Irving, Myers and Chandler, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Griffis, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-11-2001 Appealed from: Hinds County Chancery Court Judge: Patricia D. Wise Disposition: JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS Case Number: G-99-65 W/4 |
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| Note: | The original opinion is withdrawn and this opinion is substituted therefor. Appellants' motion for rehearing is granted. Griffis, J., not participating. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Francis N. Burgess, Sr., Francis N. Burgess, Jr. and Lula Michelle Burgess |
CLAY L. PEDIGO |
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| Appellee: | H. Alex Trotter | STEPHEN L. BEACH III |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Real property - Ambiguity of decree - Adverse possession - Deraignment of title - Impeachment of witness |
| Summary of the Facts: | The motion for rehearing is granted, and this opinion substituted for the original opinion. H. Alex Trotter filed a complaint against adjoining landowners to quiet and remove clouds on title to real property. Francis Burgess, Sr., Francis Burgess, Jr. and Lula Burgess filed a counterclaim that their own title be quieted. The chancellor ruled for Trotter on most of the disputed property, and also determined the location of a 140-yard strip of land. The Burgesses appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: 140-yard strip The Burgesses argue that the chancellor’s effort to locate and then describe the 140-yard strip conveyed in 1941 leaves the property ambiguously situated. The court’s decree described the tract as beginning at the South edge of the Burgess driveway and running East over to the Burgess property. There is no indication of whether the southern boundary of the driveway is the northern or southern boundary of the tract or how far north or south the tract goes. It is also unclear whether the 1941 deed contained a void description that conveyed no property. The chancellor’s findings did not address the matter of a potential mutual mistake at the time of the old deeds about the location of the east line of the quarter-quarter section nor discuss what is fairly credible evidence that there were long-time fences. The evidence of mistake on the understood location of the Burgess property’s western boundary was central to determining what the 1941 deed was intended to do. Therefore, the decision on the 140-yard strip is reversed so that the credibility and weight of the evidence about mistake can be determined. In addition, the chancellor should consider the remaining contested property since there is uncertainty about whether the chancellor considered all the legal issues raised by the evidence. Issue 2: Adverse possession The Burgesses argue that the court erred in denying their claim for adverse possession of the disputed property. For possession to be adverse, it must be under claim of ownership; actual or hostile; open, notorious, and visible; continuous and uninterrupted for a period of ten years; exclusive; and peaceful. Because neither side presented sufficient evidence to prove that it had overcome the record title of the other, the court’s determination on this issue is affirmed. Issue 3: Deraignment of title The Burgesses argue that Trotter failed properly to deraign his title since he did not list three deeds which conveyed away some of the property. Because the omitted deeds were mentioned in the complaint as deeds whose removal as clouds were being sought, Trotter complied with the obligation to deraign. Issue 4: Impeachment of witness The Burgesses argue that the chancellor erred in refusing to allow Trotter to be impeached by use of testimony in prior litigation. While an objection was made as to the relevancy of the issue, no proffer was made of what the response might have been. If the issue resurfaces during new proceedings, this impeachment can be reconsidered. |
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