T.K. v. Simpson County Sch. Dist., et al.
| Docket Number: | 2001-CA-01279-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-27-2003 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Causation - Supervision - Foreseeable sexual activity - Proximate cause - Expert testimony - Investigation - Sanctions - Requests for admission - Polygraph examination - Findings of fact - M.R.C.P. 52 Judge(s) Concurring: McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, MYERS AND GRIFFIS, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Irving, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-28-2001 Appealed from: SIMPSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Robert G. Evans Disposition: JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL DENIED. Case Number: 98-0167 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | T. K. BY HER GUARDIAN AND NEXT FRIEND, D. K. |
W. DAVID ROSS
MICHAEL S. ALLRED |
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| Appellee: | Simpson County School District; John Moore, Dr. Kathryn Weathersby, Donny Maddox, J. O. Smith and M. D. Deer, Individually and in Each of Their Official Capacities as Members of The Simpson County School Board; Jack McAlpin, Individually and as Superintendent of The Simpson County School District; and Ernest Jaynes, Individually and as Principal of Magee Middle School | KENNETH S. WOMACK TIMOTHY DALE CRAWLE |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Causation - Supervision - Foreseeable sexual activity - Proximate cause - Expert testimony - Investigation - Sanctions - Requests for admission - Polygraph examination - Findings of fact - M.R.C.P. 52 |
| Summary of the Facts: | T. K., through her guardian and next friend, brought suit against the Simpson County School District, alleging that she had been sexually assaulted by two male classmates and claiming the District was liable for damages because of its failure to properly supervise students. The court entered a judgment for the defendants, and T.K. appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Causation T.K. argues that the court erred in requiring her to prove that she had been sexually assaulted. To recover in tort, a plaintiff must show both causation in fact and proximate cause. Factual findings will not be reversed if supported by credible evidence. The court's decision in this case is supported by T. K.'s recanting her allegations on at least one occasion and the absence of any physical evidence of an assault. The alleged attackers denied the attack, and an expert witness testified that T. K.’s behavior was inconsistent with that of a victim. Therefore, the court did not err. Issue 2: Supervision T. K. argues that, because the court noted that the lack of bad faith, maliciousness or wanton disregard allowed it to find that this standard was met, it applied the incorrect legal standard. The court's opinion stated that the duty owed by the school was ordinary care. This is the correct standard. T. K. also argues that the evidence fails to support a finding that supervision was present. A plaintiff, even a child, has a burden of showing that school district employees do not perform the duties to which they are assigned. The court heard the testimony and observed the demeanor of the witnesses. T. K. had the burden of proof of showing the teachers were, in fact, not at their assigned locations. The court’s ruling in the District's favor with regard to this issue will not be disturbed. Issue 3: Foreseeable sexual activity T. K. argues that, because she was eleven years old and unable to consent to sex, the court erred in not finding that the District had the legal duty to prevent all foreseeable sexual activities among students, consensual or otherwise. No Mississippi statute or case establishes that a school has a duty to prevent any and all sexual contact. Liability only attaches when a school fails to utilize ordinary care to prevent foreseeable injury. Because the District exercised ordinary care, there was no showing of breach of duty. Issue 4: Proximate cause T. K. argues that the court erred in its application of proximate cause. Proximate cause requires that the injury is foreseeable by the defendant. The District is not held to a standard which requires a guarantee that all students will refrain from any sexual contact. Here, the court correctly reasoned that without a showing of both a breach of duty as well as cause in fact, proximate cause itself cannot lead to recovery. Issue 5: Expert testimony T.K. argues that the court erred in admitting the testimony of a master's level psychometrist and licensed counselor who was accepted as an expert pertaining to investigations of sexual abuse allegations. Her argument goes to the expert’s credentials, not the subject of his testimony. There was a credible basis for accepting the counselor as an expert in the area pertaining to exhibited characteristics of sexually abused children. Issue 6: Investigation T. K. argues that the District erred in not determining that her charges of rape were true. The District had a duty to utilize ordinary care to prevent reasonably foreseeable injuries, but the District did not have a duty to prove T. K.'s claim that she was raped. Issue 7: Sanctions T. K. argues that sanctions imposed by the court for a discovery violation by the District were insufficient and that the court should have struck the District's answer and entered judgment for T. K. Sanctions that determine the merits of a case are only applied if no less drastic measure will protect the integrity of the judicial process and deter similar discovery violations, and are generally applicable where the failure to disclose arose from a client's own behavior. Given the record, there is not an unequivocal showing that the District or its attorneys intended to deceive, nor is it clear where the fault in failing to disclose arose. In addition, the discovery violation went to breach of duty and proximate cause, and T. K. could not have prevailed had she proven breach of duty and proximate cause because no causation in fact was shown. Issue 8: Requests for admission In her requests for admissions, T. K. requested the District admit that sexual contact occurred. Although the District denied this request, T.K. and her alleged attackers were later sent to the alternative school. T. K. argues that the court erred in denying her motion that school board members be estopped from testifying regarding their decision to discipline the students. Given that the court was the trier of fact, and its comments show that it took into effect the differences when it weighed the credibility of the school board members' testimony, there was no abuse of discretion in allowing the testimony. Issue 9: Polygraph examination T. K. argues that the court erred in not allowing her to admit into evidence testimony going to the fact that she had taken, and passed, a polygraph examination. Polygraph test results are inadmissible either substantively or to impeach testimony. Issue 10: Findings of fact T. K. argues that the court erred in denying her motion made pursuant to M.R.C.P. 52, for a particularized findings of facts and conclusions of law. A court has technically complied with the mandates of Rule 52 where it makes general findings of fact and conclusions of law although requested by a party to make specific findings. Here, the court’s order complies with M.R.C.P. 52. |
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