Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. V. Peacock


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Docket Number: 2005-CA-00209-COA
Linked Case(s): 2005-CA-00209-COA ; 2005-CT-00209-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 11-07-2006
Opinion Author: BARNES, J.
Holding: Reversed and Remanded

Additional Case Information: Topic: Medical malpractice - Expert testimony - Findings of fact
Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., SOUTHWICK, GRIFFIS, ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ.
Dissenting Author : CHANDLER, J.
Dissent Joined By : IRVING, J.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 11-29-2004
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: Winston Kidd
Disposition: JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF IN AMOUNT OF $250,000
Case Number: 251-00-1007CIV

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL CENTER




JAMES A. BECKER, ANASTASIA G. JONES



 

Appellee: DAVID PEACOCK, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF ROBERT EARL PEACOCK LARA E. GILL, RONALD KEITH FOREMAN  

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Topic: Medical malpractice - Expert testimony - Findings of fact

Summary of the Facts: David Peacock filed suit for the death of his father, Robert Peacock, under Mississippi’s wrongful death statute. Dr. Karen Borman was an employee of the University of Mississippi Medical Center, a state entity, during the treatment of Peacock, and the case was therefore brought under the Tort Claims Act. After a motion for summary judgment and a motion to strike the affidavit of Peacock’s expert were denied, a bench trial was conducted. The trial court agreed with the plaintiff’s theory of the case. The court found that Peacock had experienced pain and suffering prior to his death, and therefore awarded the statutory maximum amount of damages at that time of $250,000. UMC appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Expert testimony Peacock’s case at trial was built around the expert testimony of Dr. Leon Sykes, Jr., a board-certified surgeon in general, thoracic, and critical care surgery. At trial, UMC contested neither Dr. Sykes’ qualifications as an expert nor the relevancy or reliability of his testimony. On appeal, UMC admits that Dr. Sykes was qualified to testify in his proffered field of expertise but questions the reliability of Dr. Sykes’ testimony. The problem with UMC’s argument is that it never made any Daubert challenge below. Where a party fails to object to the admission of expert testimony during trial, the appellate court reviews the decision to admit that evidence for plain error. A finding of plain error is necessary where a party’s substantive/fundamental rights are affected and the error results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. To determine whether plain error has occurred, the appellate court must determine if the trial court has deviated from a legal rule, whether that error is plain, clear or obvious, and whether the error has prejudiced the outcome of the trial. In this case, the $250,000 judgment against UMC would in fact affect a substantial right of the State because of the involvement of state funds. Reviewing the trial court’s decision to admit Dr. Sykes’ testimony for plain error, the Court cannot find that the trial court’s admission of the testimony constituted plain, clear or obvious error. His testimony was not rendered unreliable, UMC failed to bring out any lack of experience on the record, and UMC failed to ask relevant questions regarding certain of the medical records. Thus, the court did not err in allowing the testimony of Dr. Sykes. Issue 2: Findings of fact UMC argues that the court erred in its findings of fact. UMC argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Peacock suffered from abdominal compartment syndrome. Based on Dr. Sykes’ testimony, there was sufficient evidence upon which the trial judge could have found that Peacock suffered from abdominal compartment syndrome. A related finding by the trial court that “[t]he defense contends that, although Robert Peacock suffered from abdominal compartment syndrome, it was managed appropriately” is unsupported by the record. This finding by the trial court seems particularly incredible because the trial court notes in another part of its opinion that the defense expert clearly advanced the opinion that Peacock never suffered from abdominal compartment syndrome. The trial court also found that a laparotomy could have relieved abdominal pressure. The court apparently relied on the alleged admission by Dr. Borman that she could have performed a laparotomy that would have relieved pressure. However, this admission is rejected because it compromises the finding of fact that a laparotomy would have relieved the pressure. The trial court order suggests that Dr. Borman would not perform a laparotomy on Peacock due to the presence of sepsis, but then that she contradicted herself by stating that she could have performed the operation before the sepsis was present. However, Dr. Borman clearly states that, although a laparotomy could be performed on anyone at anytime, she did not believe this was the correct procedure to perform on Peacock during this time period. She also states that there was a change in Peacock’s condition, and that sepsis was likely present, and that a laparotomy would have not have been beneficial. The court’s finding is an unfair mischaracterization of Dr. Borman’s testimony. The trial court order states: “Dr. Borman did, however, feel that Robert Peacock had abdominal compartment syndrome.” There is no substantial support for this statement in the record. The finding mischaracterized Dr. Borman’s testimony and was therefore clearly erroneous. The court also found that Peacock had “no” urine output on July 4. However, the record shows that there was a decrease in urine output. The trial court order states, “On July 4, 1999, the University Medical Center diagnosed Robert Peacock’s problem as ‘abdominal compartment syndrome.’” However, the testimony and evidence introduced at trial establishes that, while a diagnosis of abdominal compartment syndrome was considered, among others, Peacock was never diagnosed by UMC as having abdominal compartment syndrome. Because the trial court erred in adopting certain findings of fact that are not supported by substantial evidence, the case is reversed and remanded for further consideration and findings by the trial court. On remand, the court should also address UMC’s argument that risk factors contributed to Peacock’s condition and decreased the chances of a successful surgery.


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