Davis v. Christian Brotherhood Homes of Jackson, Miss., Inc., et al.
| Docket Number: | 2005-CA-01743-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-08-2007 Opinion Author: BARNES, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Wrongful death - Premises liability - Duty to licensee - Admissions - M.R.C.P. 36(b) - Foreseeability - M.R.E. 401 - Proximate causation - Expert opinion - M.R.E. 702 Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-10-2005 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Bobby DeLaughter Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED TO DEFENDANTS Case Number: 251-04-466CIV |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | BERNICE DAVIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH
BENEFICIARIES OF LUCIUS DAVIS, DECEASED |
JENNIFER PAIGE WILKINS
BARRY W. HOWARD
ROBERT FARLEY WILKINS |
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| Appellee: | CHRISTIAN BROTHERHOOD HOMES OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, INC., WILLIAM E. MCKNIGHT AND SOUTHLAND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION | WALKER REECE GIBSON MICHAEL WAYNE BAXTER |
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| Topic: | Wrongful death - Premises liability - Duty to licensee - Admissions - M.R.C.P. 36(b) - Foreseeability - M.R.E. 401 - Proximate causation - Expert opinion - M.R.E. 702 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Bernice Davis, the mother of Lucius Davis, filed a wrongful death action in her individual capacity and as representative of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Lucius. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Christian Brotherhood Homes of Jackson, Mississippi, Inc., William E. McKnight, and Southland Management Corporation. Davis appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Lucius Davis was shot to death at Christian Brotherhood Apartments. If Lucius was an invitee as asserted by Davis, then Christian Brotherhood had a duty to protect him from the foreseeable criminal acts of others. If, on the other hand, Lucius was a licensee, as Christian Brotherhood argues, then Christian Brotherhood had no duty to protect him from the criminal acts of third parties. Christian Brotherhood admitted, in response to Davis’s third set of requests for admissions, that Lucius Davis was an invitee based on present information and belief. Subsequent to this admission, however, Christian Brotherhood filed a motion pursuant to M.R.C.P. 36(b) to withdraw and amend its response to reflect Christian Brotherhood’s denial of the requested admission. The trial court never ruled on Christian Brotherhood’s motion before entering summary judgment in favor of Christian Brotherhood, and the language of Rule 36(b) states that any matter admitted is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Even assuming that Christian Brotherhood was entitled to withdraw and/or amend its admission that Lucius was an invitee, Lucius was an invitee on the premises of CBA. There is no dispute that Lucius had been residing at CBA for over a year with his mother, Bernice, and sister who were both tenants of CBA. Accordingly, Christian Brotherhood owed Lucius the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect him from reasonably foreseeable injury at the hands of another. There is no evidence in the record which would suggest that Christian Brotherhood was aware of the shooter’s violent nature. Although the manager at CBA admitted that he had heard about the shooter’s criminal history, knowledge of a person’s criminal history does not necessarily equate with knowledge of a person’s violent nature. Based on the record, there is a genuine dispute as to whether an atmosphere of violence existed on the premises of CBA, and with respect to whether Christian Brotherhood had actual or constructive knowledge of an atmosphere of violence. In addition to deposition testimony detailing specific and general incidents of criminal activity, Davis presented JPD crime statistics for the precinct and beat encompassing CBA. While the evidence presented might not conclusively establish that any individual crime reflected therein was actually committed, the crime statistics and activity log are at least some evidence that violent crimes were frequently committed at or in the vicinity of CBA. Under M.R.E. 401, this evidence makes the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable than it would be without the evidence. There is also a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Christian Brotherhood breached the duty it owed to Lucius to protect against the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties. In light of the criminal activity at and around the premises of CBA, a reasonable jury could conclude that CBA breached the applicable standard of care by failing to provide security measures. Lucius was injured by the criminal activity of a third party on the premises of CBA. This is exactly the risk and type of harm against which Christian Brotherhood had a duty to protect Lucius and other invitees at CBA. That Christian Brotherhood could not anticipate the exact sequence of events leading up to the actual shooting is of no consequence when assessing the foreseeability of the dangers created by their acts or omissions. In light of the nature, amount, and frequency of the crimes against persons reported at and in the vicinity of CBA, a reasonable jury could conclude that an individual being shot and killed on the premises of CBA was foreseeable. However, there is no evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that the security measures proposed by Davis would have prevented the shooter from being on the premises of CBA at the time of the shooting. From the evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that the shooter was on the premises of CBA as a guest and would have been there notwithstanding security measures designed to prevent persons with no connection to CBA from gaining entry. The only evidence contained in the record which supports Davis’s argument that a lack of security guards and inadequate lighting was the proximate cause of Lucius’s death is the affidavit of a JPD officer designated by Davis as an expert in the fields of security and law enforcement. Because there is no factual basis for the expert’s conclusions, the trial court properly disregarded the affidavit’s conclusions on causation under M.R.E. 702 because his opinions lacked reliability. Since there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether a lack of security measures was the cause in fact of Lucius’s death, summary judgement was proper. |
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