Knight v. State
| Docket Number: | 2005-CP-00110-COA Linked Case(s): 2005-CT-00110-SCT ; 2005-CP-00110-COA |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-26-2007 Opinion Author: GRIFFIS, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Post-conviction relief - Successive bar - Amendment of judgment - M.R.C.P. 59(e) - M.R.C.P. 60(a) - M.R.C.P. 60(b) - Voluntariness of plea - Sufficiency of indictment - Grand jury process - Ineffective assistance of counsel Judge(s) Concurring: LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., CHANDLER, BARNES, ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): KING, C.J. AND CARLTON, J. Concurs in Result Only: IRVING, J. Procedural History: PCR Nature of the Case: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-22-2004 Appealed from: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Samac Richardson Disposition: POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DENIED. Case Number: 2004-0279R |
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| Note: | MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 09/28/2006: DENIED; MOTION FOR MODIFICATION - DENIED; AFFIRMED: 06/26/2007 | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | SHAWN LOUIS KNIGHT |
SHAWN LOUIS KNIGHT (PRO SE) |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BILLY L. GORE |
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| Topic: | Post-conviction relief - Successive bar - Amendment of judgment - M.R.C.P. 59(e) - M.R.C.P. 60(a) - M.R.C.P. 60(b) - Voluntariness of plea - Sufficiency of indictment - Grand jury process - Ineffective assistance of counsel |
| Summary of the Facts: | The motion for modification is denied as requested; however, the original opinion is being modified with this substituted opinion. Shawn Knight pled guilty to gratification of lust and was sentenced to fifteen years, with five years suspended, followed by five years supervised probation. Knight filed a motion for post-conviction relief which was denied. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Successive bar When Knight appealed the denial of his motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the lower court to supplement the record with the plea hearing transcript. The lower court complied; however, it was accompanied by an ex parte “Supplemental Findings of the Trial Court” stating that the trial court should have considered the petition a successive writ and asking the Court to correct this error and to sanction Knight. Knight argues that the lower court has violated proper procedure and waived its holding by not considering it in the first place. He also argues the State waived this argument when it was not raised below. The State did not raise this issue below, nor did it raise it here in its brief. Having failed to do so, the State’s argument that Knight’s petition is a successive writ would ordinarily not be considered. However, the State did not have an opportunity to respond and raise this defense, because the trial judge summarily dismissed Knight’s motion without requiring an answer by the State. M.R.C.P. 59(e) provides that a motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be filed no later than ten days after entry of judgment. If a judge seeks to do this sua sponte, he is also bound by the ten day period, as well as the requirements of notice and hearing set out in Rule 59(d). Failure to do so renders the amended judgment void. Not only was the supplementation filed almost a year later, but neither Knight nor the State had notice or a hearing before the judgment was altered. M.R.C.P. 60(a) does not authorize the supplementation because a clerical error is not involved. Rule 60 (b) does not apply, because the court’s supplemental findings and holdings were not to grant relief from judgment. There is no any authority in the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure which allows a trial court to reopen a judgment and supplement its findings and holdings under these circumstances. Therefore, the trial court was without jurisdiction to reopen and amend the judgment after it was appealed. Issue 2: Voluntariness of plea Knight argues that he never waived his rights in a face-to-face exchange with the trial court and that the trial court never discussed the elements of sexual battery. A plea is voluntary and intelligent when the defendant is informed of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea. Failure of a trial court to advise the defendant of any constitutional rights which are waived by a guilty plea, will not render a guilty plea to be involuntary if such information has been supplied from another source, such as his attorney. In this case, the judge’s failure to explain each right during the plea hearing is not fatal to the voluntariness of the plea. The video and plea petition sufficiently explained the constitutional rights that Knight would waive if he pled guilty. The trial court determined in a face-to-face exchange that Knight understood the video and plea petition. Knight argues that he was never informed of the elements of sexual battery for which he was indicted. The trial court informed Knight of the elements of gratification of lust, the lesser offense to which Knight was pleading guilty. Thus, his understanding of the additional elements required to prove sexual battery is a nonissue. Issue 3: Sufficiency of indictment Knight argues that the indictment failed to list all of the elements of the crime charged. The indictment alleges that he engaged in sexual penetration with the victim against her will. Thus, the indictment was sufficient to charge the crime of sexual battery. Issue 4: Grand jury process Knight argues there was no evidence of penetration, and therefore, the grand jury should not have indicted him for sexual battery. A guilty plea waives the right to trial and the right that the prosecution prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Issue 5: Ineffective assistance of counsel Knight argues that his attorney did not adequately explain the charges and that his attorney failed to investigate the evidence against Knight. There is no proof that his attorney did not explain the charges to him. To the contrary, Knight twice swore under oath that his attorney explained the charges to him and that he understood them. He also offers no evidence that his attorney did not investigate this piece of evidence, or explain how he has the doctor’s report, if his attorney did not. |
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