Stringer v. Lowe


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Docket Number: 2005-CP-01348-COA
Linked Case(s): 2005-CP-01348-COA ; 2005-CT-01348-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 11-07-2006
Opinion Author: ISHEE, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Legal malpractice - Statute of limitations - Section 1983 liability
Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, AND ROBERTS, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): SOUTHWICK, J.
Procedural History: Dismissal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - LEGAL MALPRACTICE

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 11-04-2004
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: Tomie Green
Disposition: MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED.
Case Number: 251-96-877

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: CHARLES LAVEL STRINGER




CHARLES LAVEL STRINGER (PRO SE)



 

Appellee: THOMAS J. LOWE, JR. JOHN HINTON DOWNEY  

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Topic: Legal malpractice - Statute of limitations - Section 1983 liability

Summary of the Facts: Charles Stringer filed suit against Thomas Lowe Jr., alleging legal malpractice in a criminal case. The court entered an order granting Lowe’s motion for summary judgment. Stringer appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Stringer argues that the court erred in applying the three-year statute of limitations. Stringer terminated Lowe on September 21, 1990. Stringer filed suit against Lowe alleging legal malpractice on September 4, 1996. Furthermore, the statute of limitations was not tolled. Stringer argues that the statute of limitations should begin to run when a conviction or sentence is invalidated and not when the party becomes aware of the alleged misrepresentation. The statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action properly begins to run on the date the client learns or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should learn of the negligence of his lawyer. Stringer terminated Lowe on September 21, 1990, which suggests that he had learned of the alleged negligence that was committed by Lowe. Stringer finally argues that actions taken by a court-appointed attorney constitute state actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For purposes of section 1983 liability, public defenders are not state actors when the alleged constitutional violation arose as a result of traditional defense counsel duties. Except for the source of payment, the relationship between public defender and client is indistinguishable from that of any other attorney and client. Once a lawyer has undertaken representation of an accused, the duties and obligations are the same whether the lawyer is privately retained, court-appointed or serving in a legal aid or defender program. Thus, section 1983 was not properly used by Stringer in this case.


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