Johnson v. State
| Docket Number: | 2005-KA-01913-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-15-2007 Opinion Author: BARNES, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Capital murder - Accomplice instruction - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-03-2005 Appealed from: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: William E. Chapman, III Disposition: CONVICTED OF CAPITAL MURDER AND SENTENCED TO A TERM OF LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: David Byrd Clark Case Number: 2001-0426 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | JAMES JOHNSON |
WALTER E. WOOD |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BILLY L. GORE |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Capital murder - Accomplice instruction - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) |
| Summary of the Facts: | James Johnson was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Accomplice instruction Johnson argues that since the State’s theory at trial was that Johnson was a principal perpetrator in the felony murder, it was error to allow an instruction based on a theory of accomplice liability to be submitted to the jury. Although a defendant may be indicted as a principal, a jury instruction based on accomplice liability is proper, provided that the evidence presented supports the instruction given. If the jury believed all of the testimony offered by one of the witnesses, including Johnson’s confession to which the witness testified, then there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Johnson was the principal in the robbery and murder. Viewing the testimony of the witnesses in a light most favorable to the State, with all reasonable inferences drawn accordingly, the evidence contained in the record is sufficient to support an accomplice jury instruction as well as sufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding Johnson guilty of capital murder. Issue 2: Hearsay testimony Johnson argues that a witness should not have been allowed to testify as to what Johnson and/or Johnson’s alleged accomplice told her regarding the disposal of the pair’s bloody clothes. Johnson also argues that his motion in limine should have been granted with respect to testimony offered by a detective in which he referred to several anonymous phone calls. A party is entitled to a motion in limine only when the trial court finds the material or evidence in question will be inadmissible at a trial under the rules of evidence and the mere offer, reference, or statements made during trial concerning the material will tend to prejudice the jury. M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) exempts from the definition of hearsay any out-of-court statement which is offered against a party only if that statement was made by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Before a co-conspirator's testimony can be admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the prosecution has the burden of establishing the preliminary fact of a conspiracy. There was substantial evidence that Johnson and another man were involved in a conspiracy. A witness testified that she overheard Johnson and two other individuals planning the robbery. Accordingly, the preliminary fact of conspiracy was established, and any statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy could be offered against Johnson as non-hearsay pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E). With regard to the detective’s reference to anonymous tips, the testimony did not divulge the substance of what was said in those conversations, did not divulge the identity of any of the callers, and was offered only to give information as to how and why Johnson was developed as a suspect. Because this testimony was merely a statement of fact regarding his investigative process, it was not hearsay. |
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