Ray v. Ray, et al.


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Docket Number: 2006-CA-00210-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 08-07-2007
Opinion Author: MYERS, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Wills & estates - Redetermination of heirs - M.R.C.P. 60(b) - Wrongful death beneficiaries - Section 91-1-15 - Section 11-7-13 - Interest - M.R.A.P. 37
Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, AND CARLTON, JJ.
Dissenting Author : IRVING, J.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 12-30-2005
Appealed from: SUNFLOWER COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
Judge: Jane R. Weathersby
Disposition: DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REDETERMINATION OF HEIRS AND RESIDENCY.
Case Number: 2004-0140
  Consolidated: CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2006-CA-00712-COA: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JENNIFER MARIE RAY, DECEASED: ROBERT DEAN RAY, FLOYD MALCOLM RAY, II AND DAVID GLENN RAY, APPELLANTS v. DOROTHY AND RICHARD GREGORY RAY, APPELLEES

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: DOROTHY RAY AND RICHARD GREGORY RAY




ROBERT NICHOLAS NORRIS LOUIS H. WATSON, JR.



 

Appellee: ROBERT DEAN RAY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JENNIFER MARIE RAY, DECEASED, FLOYD MALCOLM RAY, II AND DAVID GLENN RAY KUYKENDALL HORNE-MURRY W. DEAN BELK  

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Topic: Wills & estates - Redetermination of heirs - M.R.C.P. 60(b) - Wrongful death beneficiaries - Section 91-1-15 - Section 11-7-13 - Interest - M.R.A.P. 37

Summary of the Facts: Jennifer Ray died in a motor vehicle accident. She was survived by her mother, Dorothy Ray, and five half-siblings - two on her mother’s side and three on her father’s side. One of Jennifer’s half-siblings on her father’s side, Robert Dean Ray, petitioned and was appointed as administrator of her estate and was issued letters of administration. Thereafter, Robert filed a petition to determine heirs and approve the wrongful death claim on behalf of the estate. The chancellor issued a decree adjudicating Jennifer’s heirs-at-law to be her mother and all five half-siblings. Additionally, a decree was issued finding Jennifer’s legal residence at the time of death to be Sunflower County, and holding that the Mississippi Wrongful Death Statute applies to the claims involving Jennifer’s death. Jennifer’s mother, Dorothy, and half-brother, Richard Ray, filed a wrongful death action in the Sunflower County Circuit Court. Approximately two weeks after filing the complaint, Dorothy and Richard’s attorney withdrew his representation in the chancery court and the circuit court cases. When their new counsel filed a notice of appearance, Dorothy and Richard sought a ruling from the circuit court that Jennifer’s wrongful death suit jurisdiction lay in Georgia, contradicting the chancery court order finding that Mississippi was the proper jurisdiction for the wrongful death suit. The circuit court declined Dorothy and Richard’s request. Counsel for Dorothy and Richard then entered an appearance in the chancery court action and sought to set aside and vacate the decree determining the heirs by filing a petition for redetermination of Jennifer’s heirs. The chancellor denied Dorothy and Richard’s petition, and they appeal.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Redetermination of heirs A court has the power under M.R.C.P. 60(b) to vacate a final judgment, order or proceeding to promote the ends of justice in certain circumstances enumerated by the rule which include mistake, inadvertence, and newly discovered evidence. In the event relief is warranted for the discovery of new evidence, such a motion must be made within six months of the entry of the judgment. A trial court, in its consideration of a movant’s petition for relief under Rule 60(b), must take into account that final judgments should not be lightly disturbed; that the Rule 60(b) motion is not to be used as a substitute for appeal; that the rule should be liberally construed in order to achieve substantial justice; whether the motion was made within a reasonable time; whether if the judgment was rendered after a trial on the merits the movant had a fair opportunity to present his claim or defense; whether there are any intervening equities that would make it inequitable to grant relief; and any other factors relevant to the justice of the judgment under attack. The Georgia relatives argue that they should have been granted relief from the determination of heirs because the chancellor misapplied the controlling law of intestacy when determining that Jennifer was a resident of Mississippi at the time of her death and Jennifer’s mother and five half-blooded siblings were entitled to receive a portion of Jennifer’s property. Testimony and exhibits provided that by the time of Jennifer’s death, she had registered to vote in Sunflower County, was planning to getting a Mississippi driver’s license and planned to take the ACT in preparation to enroll in nursing school. Jennifer had applied for food stamps in Mississippi and the application was introduced into evidence. No contradictory testimony or exhibits were produced refuting the evidence before the chancery court. The Georgia relatives rely on the fact that Jennifer still retained a Georgia driver’s license, the accident report and death certificate listed Jennifer as a resident of Georgia, and Jennifer would have been required to pay out-of-state tuition for the fall semester of 2003 at Mississippi Delta Community College. These reasons were easily discoverable by the exercise of minimum due diligence and cannot qualify as newly discoverable evidence. Based on the evidence, the chancellor did not err as a matter of law in refusing to find that Jennifer was a resident of Georgia at the time of her death. Issue 2: Wrongful death beneficiaries The Georgia relatives argue that only Jennifer’s mother is the proper beneficiary of the wrongful death claim because Jennifer was an illegitimate child, because the status of all five of Jennifer’s siblings was half-blood, and because Jennifer never had any contact with her half-siblings on her father’s side during her lifetime. A wrongful death action is a separate action from the estate of the deceased, therefore, the beneficiaries of a wrongful death action for the death of the decedent may differ from the heirs of the intestate’s estate. If Jennifer was an illegitimate child, in order for her half siblings on her father’s side to inherit, these half-siblings would have to establish their right to inherit as kindred of her deceased father pursuant to section 91-1-15. However, there is no support, other than the Georgia relatives’ assertions, indicating that Jennifer was an illegitimate child. In fact, proof was offered to the contrary and introduced at the hearing regarding the heirship determination. A reading of section 11-7-13 makes clear that application of the wrongful death statute in this case provides that Jennifer’s wrongful death beneficiaries include all five of her half-siblings, as well as her mother. Therefore, the chancellor did not err in holding that Jennifer’s wrongful death beneficiaries are her mother and five half-blooded siblings. Issue 3: Interest The Texas relatives sought a ruling from the chancery court to be awarded legal interest to be taxed on the eventual proceeds of the wrongful death settlement in the circuit court action from December 30, 2005, to the date of final adjudication of the chancery court’s denial of the redetermination of heirs in the appellate nun pro tunc. The chancery court denied the Texas relatives’ motion for an award of interest. The Texas relatives argue that the chancellor had the broad equitable authority to grant a judgment of interest to be taxed on the amount of settlement proceeds that have remained undistributable since the Georgia relatives were denied their petition for redetermination of heirs and reconsideration of Jennifer’s residency and that the interest judgment is warranted pursuant to M.R.A.P. 37. This case is not one affirming a money judgment, but is one affirming a chancellor’s determination of a Rule 60(b) motion challenging the finding of a decedent’s residency and an adjudication of heirship. Had the chancellor granted the Texas’ relatives’ motion for interest to be taxed against the Georgia relatives’ shares, his ruling would have been premature. At this point in the circuit court wrongful death claim litigation, the cause of action against the defendants had not yet been dismissed pursuant to a settlement. There were no available, tangible settlement funds to be deposited into the decedent’s estate or into the chancery court interpleader fund. Only after the funds are deposited into the chancery court can the chancellor then consider taxing the interest against the shares of the Georgia relatives.


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