Wells v. Tucker
| Docket Number: | 2006-CA-00385-COA Linked Case(s): 2006-CA-00385-COA2006-CT-00385-SCT2006-CT-00385-SCT2006-CT-00385-SCT |
|
| Oral Argument: | 03-28-2007 | |
* This video is best viewed in the most current version of Google Chrome, Internet Explorer with Windows Media Player plug-in, or Safari (Mac Users). |
||
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-04-2007 Opinion Author: ROBERTS, J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Medical malpractice - Bias of experts - M.R.E. 616 - M.R.E. 411 - M.R.E. 403 - Substantial connections test Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., IRVING AND ISHEE, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): LEE, P.J. AND CARLTON, J. Dissenting Author : GRIFFIS, J. Dissent Joined By : CHANDLER AND BARNES, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-14-2005 Appealed from: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: William E. Chapman, III Disposition: JURY VERDICT AND FINAL JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT Case Number: 2002-20 |
|
| Note: | This opinion was reversed by the Supreme Court on 10/2/2008 and the trial court judgment was reinstated. To view the SCT opinion, use the following link: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO49348.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | FELICIA WELLS AND REGINALD WELLS |
DARRYL MOSES GIBBS
ROGEN K. CHHABRA
JONATHAN C. TABOR |
||
| Appellee: | JAMES (MARTY) TUCKER, M.D., INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AND/OR AGENCY FOR JACKSON HEALTHCARE FOR WOMEN, P.A. | SHELLY G. BURNS WHITMAN B. JOHNSON |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Medical malpractice - Bias of experts - M.R.E. 616 - M.R.E. 411 - M.R.E. 403 - Substantial connections test |
| Summary of the Facts: | Felicia and Reginald Wells sued Dr. James Tucker and alleged that Dr. Tucker negligently caused a perforation of Felicia’s bowels during a C-section delivery. The jury returned a verdict for Dr. Tucker. The Wellses appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The Wells sought to impeach the credibility of Dr. Tucker’s experts by demonstrating that, because Dr. Tucker and his physician experts were covered by the same mutual insurance company, Dr. Tucker’s experts were biased in favor of Dr. Tucker because they had a direct personal financial interest in the outcome of the case. The court precluded the Wells from impeaching Dr. Tucker’s experts by demonstrating a commonality of insurance coverage, and the Wellses argue this was error. The Wellses argue that M.R.E. 616 permits their liberal cross-examination of the experts. However, if the Wellses were allowed to impeach Dr. Tucker’s experts as they intended, that would have the simultaneous effect of announcing that Dr. Tucker had liability insurance. Pursuant to M.R.E. 411, evidence of liability insurance is not strictly or rigidly prohibited but may be admitted if offered for another purpose. One of those contemplated purposes is the demonstration of bias or prejudice. A balancing test must be conducted pursuant to M.R.E. 403. In considering this issue, most jurisdictions apply what has become characterized as a “connections test” or a “substantial connections test.” The substantial connection analysis looks to whether a witness has a sufficient degree of connection with the liability insurance carrier to justify allowing proof of this relationship as a means of attacking the credibility of the witness. The circuit court did not discuss its resolution of the M.R.E. 403 balancing test beyond the statement that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed the probative value of bias. There can be no doubt that Dr. Tucker’s insured experts had some financial interest in the outcome. As for an exact degree of bias, it is difficult to calculate just how probative the evidence is. It is certainly probative of bias or prejudice to some degree. It was sufficiently probative of bias that Dr. Tucker’s counsel opined to the circuit court that, should the circuit court admit it, he would have to find different experts. The contemplated prejudicial effect of such evidence is that, if admitted, it will taint the jury’s deliberations in that the jury will be more likely to render a verdict for a plaintiff if the jury is aware that a defendant will not have to pay damages himself. However, it is difficult to understand the circuit court’s logic in excluding the evidence when the circuit court explicitly stated that the jury was already aware that Dr. Tucker had medical professional liability insurance. The credibility of each party’s medical experts is crucial in cases such as this and, more often than not, outcome determinative. It is, as it should be, a grave concern when any court limits a party from appropriately testing the credibility of such medical experts by exposing any potential bias or prejudice that an expert may have in favoring one party or the other. Under the circumstances revealed in this record, the circuit court abused its discretion in prohibiting the testimony at issue. On remand, Dr. Tucker would be entitled to a cautionary instruction to the jury upon request. The jurors should be instructed that they should not consider any evidence of the presence of liability insurance in determining whether Dr. Tucker acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. Instead, the jury may only consider such evidence of liability insurance as it may effect the bias or prejudice of a witness. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
