Brooks v. Pennington, et al.


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Docket Number: 2006-CA-00396-COA
Linked Case(s): 2006-CA-00396-COA ; 2006-CT-00396-SCT ; 2006-CT-00396-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 05-29-2007
Opinion Author: ROBERTS, J.
Holding: Affirmed in part; Reversed and Remanded in part

Additional Case Information: Topic: False imprisonment - Tort Claims Act - Section 11-46-9(1)(m) - Duties of sheriff upon surrender of bondman’s principal - Reckless disregard - Recusal of judges
Judge(s) Concurring: MYERS, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, BARNES, ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ.
Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Lee, P.J.
Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Griffis, J.
Concurs in Result Only: KING, C.J.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: Negligence

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 02-16-2006
Appealed from: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Judge: William E. Chapman, III
Disposition: ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED.
Case Number: 2005-230

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: WILLIE LEE BROOKS




DAVID C. DUNBAR BENNY MCCALIP "MAC" MAY



 

Appellee: RONNIE PENNINGTON, AS SHERIFF OF RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, AND WESTERN SURETY COMPANY J. LAWSON HESTER JACQUELINE H. RAY  

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Topic: False imprisonment - Tort Claims Act - Section 11-46-9(1)(m) - Duties of sheriff upon surrender of bondman’s principal - Reckless disregard - Recusal of judges

Summary of the Facts: Willie Brooks was cited by the Flowood Police Department for driving under the influence, third offense, and other charges. Following his arrest, Brooks secured a bond in the amount of $40,000 on the DUI charge and $3,000 on the other charges for his release from jail pending adjudication of the charges against him. Under the agreement between his bail bondsman, the bonding company, and Brooks, Brooks was to pay an approximate total of $4,025 to obtain the bond. By agreement with the bail bondsman, Brooks initially paid $1,825, signed a promissory note for $2,500, and was released. Brooks appeared in the Municipal Court of Flowood for his preliminary hearing and pled guilty to DUI, second offense. The third offense DUI was reduced by the prosecutor to DUI, second offense, which is a misdemeanor. He was ordered to pay a fine and was sentenced to six months in the Rankin County jail, with five months of that time suspended, and twelve months probation. All pending charges were concluded by his guilty plea. Brooks was immediately returned to the Rankin County jail to serve out the remaining twenty five days of his thirty days on incarceration. Upon release from jail, Brooks made sporadic payments to his bail bondsman. Approximately seven months after his release, Brooks’ licensed, professional bail bondsman, Edward Martin, arrested him, took him into custody, and filed a surrender of bond by bail bond surety with the Rankin County jail. Brooks was held at the Rankin County jail from September 28, 2004, until January 20, 2005. He was finally released after an attorney informed the sheriff’s department that Brooks had already served his sentence for DUI. Brooks filed a complaint against Ronnie Pennington, as Sheriff of Rankin County, Rankin County, and Western Surety alleging claims of negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, reckless disregard, negligence per se, wrongful detention, false imprisonment, abuse of process, false arrest, and deprivation of constitutional rights. The defendants filed for summary judgment which the court granted. Brooks appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Brooks argues that the defendants are not immune from liability under the provisions of the Tort Claims Act because he was never lawfully incarcerated and therefore, section 11-46-9(1)(m) does not apply. In granting immunity from claims brought by an inmate, Section 11-46-9(1)(m) does not distinguish between those lawfully and those unlawfully within the custody of the state. In addition, section 11-46-9(1)(m) is inapplicable to the facts of this case. Martin surrendered Brooks to the Rankin County Sheriff’s Department on September 28, 2004. At the moment the Rankin County Sheriff’s Department accepted Martin’s surrender, Brooks’s causes of action accrued because it was that act, accepting surrender of Brooks, that served as the genesis of the claims before the trial court. There is no precedent explicitly establishing the duties of a sheriff upon surrender of a bondman’s principal. In cases such as this the following duties must be satisfied. First, the sheriff, or his agent, must verify the identity of the defendant, that the defendant is, in fact, who the bondsman says he is. Second, the sheriff, or his agent, must verify the identity of the bondsman, that the surrendering individual is, in fact, a licenced professional bondsman entitled to invoke section 99-5-27. Lastly, the sheriff, or his agent, must use reasonable care to verify that the bond upon which the accused is being surrendered is presently valid and binding on the principal and surety. These duties must be satisfied before the principal is accepted. Consequently, they must be satisfied before the principal can be accepted as an inmate. The jailors on duty at the time of Brooks’s surrender should have had their jail docket and related jail records available showing that Brooks had been charged with felony DUI by the Flowood Police Department on January 19, 2004, placed in their jail until bonded out on January 24, and returned to their jail by the Flowood Police Department on January 29 as a consequence of a Flowood Municipal Court judgment of conviction to serve thirty days for a DUI second offense. Those same records should have indicated Brooks’s release some twenty-five days later upon completion of his sentence. Prior to the sheriff’s acceptance of Brooks, minimal inquiry should have verified that the felony DUI bond upon which Martin was surety was no longer valid because Brooks had been convicted, sentenced, and served his time on the DUI charge. Therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the duties detailed above were breached, as well as to Brooks’ damages. Brooks also argues that the defendants’ failure to present him before a neutral magistrate within forty-eight hours of his surrender and failure to conduct any investigation into the lawfulness of the surrender by the bail bondsman or the status of any pending charges constituted reckless disregard. Brooks alleged that after being told of their mistake the jailers/deputies refused to investigate the grounds for his continued detention, refused him another bond, refused to take him before a neutral magistrate, refused to tell him what crime he was charged with, and generally ignored his protest of unlawful incarceration. Under these facts, this is sufficient evidence to create a jury question as to whether the conduct, through action or inaction, of the sheriff’s department evinced a reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of Brooks. Brooks also argues that the judges should have recused themselves because they necessarily have continuous dealings with the Rankin County Sheriff and Rankin County, and are therefore implicitly connected to them. Holding that an appearance of impropriety exists solely because a case involves the county or sheriff of the county that the judge presides over is contrary to established case law.


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