Richardson v. Stogner
| Docket Number: | 2006-CA-00777-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-29-2007 Opinion Author: ROBERTS, J. Holding: Reversed and Rendered |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Child support - Personal jurisdiction - M.R.C.P. 81 - M.R.C.P. 12(b) - Subject matter jurisdiction - Custody Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 04-05-2006 Appealed from: WALTHALL COUNTY CHANCERY COURT Judge: Debbra K. Halford Disposition: CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT ORDER ENTERED. Case Number: 2005-0272 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | JOHN D. RICHARDSON |
RICHARD C. FITZPATRICK |
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| Appellee: | SHERI RICHARDSON STOGNER | JOSE BENJAMIN SIMO |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Child support - Personal jurisdiction - M.R.C.P. 81 - M.R.C.P. 12(b) - Subject matter jurisdiction - Custody |
| Summary of the Facts: | Following Sheri Richardson Stogner’s move to Mississippi from Louisiana, she filed a complaint requesting child support, which was later amended to include a request for a determination of child custody, as at the time of her complaint there was no court-issued order speaking to support or custody. John Richardson filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied the motion and granted Stogner legal and physical custody of the parties’ son and also awarded her child support. Richardson appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Personal jurisdiction Richardson argues that the order awarding child support issued by the trial court is void as it lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The parties were residents of Louisiana at the time of marriage, conception of their child and at the time of divorce. While Stogner would eventually relocate to Mississippi, Richardson would remain in Louisiana and, as indicated in the record, had no contacts with the State of Mississippi. In fact, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Richardson has ever in any way entered the State of Mississippi. Though he was personally served with an M.R.C.P. 81 summons at his place of employment in Louisiana, that alone does not impart a Mississippi court with personal jurisdiction over him. In denying Richardson’s motion to dismiss, the trial court indicated that it obtained personal jurisdiction over him when his counsel agreed to an order setting the case for trial. In child support actions, Rule 81 instructs that no answer is required, absent a request by the court. This has been interpreted to mean that an affirmative defense is not waived, and may be raised at trial, even if absent from a responsive pleading as no responsive pleading is required. As such, in the context of a Rule 81 matter, the lone action of agreeing to an order setting the case for trial does not act as a general appearance or otherwise waive the defense that the court lacks personal jurisdiction. Pursuant to Rules 12(b) and 81(d), Richardson could have raised the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction for the first time at trial. Therefore, the act of agreeing to set the case for trial, without speaking to the merits of the matter (such as setting temporary child support and custody within the order), is not a general appearance for the purpose of exercising personal jurisdiction over Richardson. Issue 2: Subject matter jurisdiction In his complaint for divorce, Richardson requested a determination of child support and child custody. He and Stogner would subsequently come to an agreement on those issues and inform the Louisiana court of their consent judgment. However, through an oversight by Richardson’s then counsel, this judgment was never presented to the court for formal ratification until later. Richardson argues that his initial request for a determination of the issues placed continuing and exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the matter with Louisiana courts. So long as Louisiana remains the residence of the obligor, a tribunal of that state issuing a support order consistent with its laws retains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order. Richardson filed a motion to enter the consent judgment five years after the divorce was granted. Richardson’s motion was granted and the consent judgment was signed by the court. Implicit in the court’s granting of the motion was a determination by the court that the action had not been abandoned despite the delay. Stogner never challenged the jurisdiction of the Louisiana courts to establish child support. Therefore, the Chancery Court of Walthall County did not have subject matter jurisdiction needed in order to establish a support order. With regard to custody, while there was a five- year delay from the initial filing and an adjudication of child custody, the action was not abandoned or otherwise terminated. As Louisiana was the home state of the parties’ child at the time of commencement of the Louisiana action, the Louisiana court had jurisdiction to decide the matter. As such, pursuant to section 93-27-206, the Chancery Court of Walthall County did not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide the issue. |
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