Lancaster v. Stevens, et al.


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Docket Number: 2006-CA-00814-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 07-17-2007
Opinion Author: LEE, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed in part; Reversed and Remanded in part

Additional Case Information: Topic: Legal malpractice - Breach of contract - Intentional infliction of emotional distress - Timeliness of motion
Judge(s) Concurring: MYERS, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): KING, C.J., AND CHANDLER, J.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - LEGAL MALPRACTICE

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-30-2006
Appealed from: Clay County Circuit Court
Judge: Henry L. Lackey
Disposition: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SUSTAINED
Case Number: 11,649

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: JIMMY L. LANCASTER




KRISTY L. BENNETT



 

Appellee: J. JOSHUA STEVENS, JR. AND H. SCOTT ROSS JAN F. GADOW RODNEY A. RAY W. WRIGHT HILL, JR.  

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Topic: Legal malpractice - Breach of contract - Intentional infliction of emotional distress - Timeliness of motion

Summary of the Facts: Jimmy Lancaster filed a complaint for legal malpractice and breach of contract against his attorneys, Joshua Stevens and Scott Ross, for mishandling the appeal of his conviction of capital murder. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Stevens and Ross. Lancaster appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Legal malpractice To recover for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence the existence of a lawyer-client relationship, negligence on the part of the lawyer in handling his client’s affairs, and proximate cause of the injury (i.e., but for his attorney’s negligence, the plaintiff would have been successful in the prosecution or defense of the underlying action). Using the “but for” test, Lancaster cannot succeed on a legal malpractice claim. The trial court in Lancaster’s capital murder case gave sufficient justifications for its ruling on the two issues that would have been appealed to the Fifth Circuit had Lancaster’s brief been filed correctly. Also, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on these two issues. Issue 2: Breach of contract Lancaster argues that he can still succeed on a breach of contract claim because the “but for” standard used by the trial court is not applicable to a breach of contract action. Lancaster paid $10,000 with the expectation that his attorneys would ensure the proper filing of his appeal. Even if Stevens and Ross felt the appeal to the Fifth Circuit was futile, they still undertook the appeal and accepted payment and, thus, incurred an obligation to press ahead absent a proper withdrawal. An attorney who abandons an appeal without informing his client or being properly relieved by the court of record is guilty of breaching an implied contractual duty. Stevens and Ross admit that an attorney/client relationship existed and that they breached their contractual duty to Lancaster in failing to properly file his brief to the Fifth Circuit. As it was undisputed that Lancaster’s attorneys breached their contractual duties, the trial court erred in not submitting this issue to a jury for a determination of damages. The jury should also consider whether punitive damages are warranted. Issue 3: Intentional infliction of emotional distress Stevens and Ross argue that Lancaster failed to put them on notice that he was bringing an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The trial judge erred in failing to make a ruling on Lancaster’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. His complaint provided sufficient facts to place the defendants on notice that he was raising an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Lancaster also specifically mentioned a claim for reckless infliction of emotional distress in a brief before the lower court and in a supplemental brief he filed. Issue 4: Timeliness of motion Over two-and-a-half years after the dismissal of his appeal, Lancaster filed a motion pursuant to F.R.C.P. 60(b) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi asking that the court vacate or set aside its order denying his application for writ of habeas corpus. The petition asked the district court, after vacating the previous order, to file a new order again denying the writ, thereby affording him the opportunity to file a timely appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The district court denied the 60(b) motion, and Lancaster appealed its decision to the Fifth Circuit which affirmed the district court. Lancaster argues that the defendants’ conduct resulted in his rule 60(b) motion being denied. The fact that Lancaster lacked contemporaneous knowledge of the entry of dismissal is not material to this issue. The simple failure of the clerk to mail notice of the entry of judgment, without more, does not permit relief to a party who has failed to appeal within the prescribed time.


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