Hudson v. Palmer, et al.
| Docket Number: | 2006-CP-00940-COA Linked Case(s): 2006-CP-00940-COA ; 2006-CT-00940-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-04-2007 Opinion Author: ROBERTS, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Defamation - Dismissal of insurance carrier - M.R.C.P. 57(b)(2) - Motion to strike - M.R.C.P. 56(e) - Invasion of privacy - Intentional infliction of emotional distress - Abuse of process - Malicious prosecution - Fraud - False arrest - False imprisonment - Property damage Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J, LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-23-2006 Appealed from: Jones County Circuit Court Judge: Billy Joe Landrum Disposition: GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS Case Number: 2005-37-CV3 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | ANTHONY J. HUDSON |
ANTHONY J. HUDSON (PRO SE) |
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| Appellee: | ELIZABETH PALMER D/B/A PRECISION QUICK LUBE; ROBERT PALMER; BRIERFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY; LAUREL LEADER-CALL NEWSPAPER; COMMUNITY NEWSPAPER HOLDINGS, INC.; AND BRIAN LIVINGSTON | L. GRANT BENNETT WAYMAN DAL WILLIAMSON L. CLARK HICKS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Defamation - Dismissal of insurance carrier - M.R.C.P. 57(b)(2) - Motion to strike - M.R.C.P. 56(e) - Invasion of privacy - Intentional infliction of emotional distress - Abuse of process - Malicious prosecution - Fraud - False arrest - False imprisonment - Property damage |
| Summary of the Facts: | Anthony Hudson took his vehicle to Precision Quick Lube to be serviced. The following day he discovered the oil cap was missing and presumed that employees at Precision had failed to replace it upon completion of their work. He made repeated attempts to have Precision repair those automotive problems he claimed to be having as a result of the missing oil cap. Hudson eventually filed a complaint raising numerous claims against the various parties involved. The court dismissed the claims, and Hudson appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Dismissal of insurance carrier Hudson made a claim with Precision’s insurance carrier, Brierfield. In response, Brierfield sent an appraiser to inspect his vehicle. Upon his inspection, the appraiser opined that there had been a short in the alternator in Hudson’s vehicle, but for reasons unrelated to the leaking oil. Notwithstanding this determination, Brierfield still made an offer of settlement of $242.67 which Hudson rejected. Hudson argues that the court erred when it dismissed Brierfield from the suit. Hudson acknowledges that Brierfield made a settlement offer, but that he rejected it. Therefore, there is no question as to whether coverage exists for the damages Hudson claims occurred as a result of the missing oil cap. Pursuant to M.R.C.P. 57(b)(2), a direct action may only be brought against an insurance company when there is an issue of coverage. Issue 2: Motion to strike The trial court found that the documents attached to Hudson’s affidavit violated numerous rules of evidence as to admissibility as raised by the defendants requiring exclusion from consideration. Hudson argues that the court erred in striking his affidavit and attached documentation, because he informed the court that he subpoenaed witnesses that would testify as to the authenticity of the documents. In Hudson’s affidavit submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment, he made no statement nor did he personally set forth any facts as required by M.R.C.P. 56(e), but only attached twenty copies of documents he believed entitled him to summary judgment. As noted by the court, these items were correctly excluded for various reasons to include relevancy, impermissible hearsay, and improper or lacking authentication. Issue 3: Defamation The court granted summary judgment on Hudson’s claim of defamation based on its conclusion that the amended complaint alleging defamation was not filed within the period allowed by the statute of limitations. Under section 15-1-35, causes of action for defamation must be brought within one year of their accrual. As is obvious from the professed date of accrual of Hudson’s alleged defamation and the date he alleged the cause of action within his amended complaint, the time limitation specified in section 15-1-35 had expired, and, as such, Hudson’s claim was untimely. Hudson alleges for the first time in his brief that he did not discover these alleged untrue statements until his arrest, as a result of the defendants’s concealment of the incident report. In those rare instances when because of the secretive or inherently undiscoverable nature of the publication the plaintiff did not know, or with reasonable diligence could not have discovered, that he had been defamed, the statute of limitations would not begin to run until such conditions had been met. A police incident report is not such a publication that is so secretive or inherently undiscoverable so as to delay accrual of Hudson’s cause of action. Issue 4: Invasion of privacy For the first time in his motion for summary judgment, Hudson alleged an invasion of privacy claim. The court granted summary judgment on the grounds that the claim was brought after the time required by the statute of limitations. A claim of invasion of privacy must be brought within one year of its accrual. At the very best, Hudson alleged invasion of privacy on November 10, 2005. As this was more than one year after the cause of action accrued, Hudson’s claim is barred. Issue 5: Intentional infliction of emotional distress Hudson first pled intentional infliction of emotional distress in his motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment based upon the merits of Hudson’s claim, or lack thereof, and as a result of the expiration of the statute of limitations prior to the filing of Hudson’s amended complaint. The statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress is one year. Hudson’s claim of infliction of emotional distress related to claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, or fraud that occurred on or before October 28, 2004. Therefore, Hudson’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred. Also, the proclaimed basis for Hudson’s claim is not supported in the least by the record. Issue 6: Abuse of process Hudson argues that the court erred in granting summary judgment against his claim of abuse of process because the defendants maliciously used the legal process in a wrongful manner to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed. An abuse of process claim requires the plaintiff show the defendant made an illegal use of a legal process, the defendant had an ulterior motive, and damage resulted from the perverted use of process. As to Hudson’s claim against Mrs. Palmer, the record shows that the criminal affidavit upon which process was issued was not signed by Mrs. Palmer. Additionally, she stated in her undisputed affidavit that she did not file the incident report against Hudson with any intended malice. While Mr. Palmer did file the criminal affidavit alleging that Hudson “willfully disturbed the public peace of Precision Quick Lube,” the record shows that he did not do so improperly. Issue 7: Malicious prosecution To prevail on a claim of malicious prosecution the plaintiff must prove the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings, either criminal or civil; by, or at the insistence of the defendants; the termination of such proceedings in plaintiff's favor; malice in instituting the proceedings; want of probable cause for the proceedings; and the suffering of damages as a result of the action or prosecution complained of. Because Mrs. Palmer did not initiate judicial proceedings against Hudson, he cannot sustain his burden of proof as to this claim against Mrs. Palmer. With regard to Hudson’s claim against Mr. Palmer, where Hudson’s claim fails is in the lack of proof as to the requisite showing of malice and want of probable cause. Mr. Palmer stated that Hudson made numerous harassing phone calls to Precision and threatened to picket the business. Issue 8: Fraud Hudson argues he was the victim of fraud as a result of Mr. Palmer claiming to be the owner of Precision. Hudson completely fails to establish that he suffered any damage as a result of Mr. Palmer’s alleged misrepresentation. Therefore, Mr. Palmer was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Issue 9: False arrest Hudson seems to argue that because he was found not guilty of the charges brought by Mr. Palmer he is entitled to summary judgment against the defendants for his claim of false arrest. If the plaintiff’s arrest is supported by probable cause the claim must fail. Because Mr. Palmer had the necessary probable cause to initiate charges against Hudson, his claim fails. Issue 10: False imprisonment Hudson has offered no facts to support the charge of false imprisonment. In addition to the fact that the record shows no instance of the defendants ever detaining Hudson, his arrest was not unlawful, but was the result of a valid warrant being issued after an affidavit was filed in good faith. Issue 11: Property damage Hudson argues that the court erred in granting summary judgment against his claim of property damage. Hudson failed to provide the trial court with any evidence that the alleged act of failing to replace the cap actually caused damage to his vehicle. In fact, there is no evidence in the record proving Hudson’s vehicle sustained any damage as a result. |
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