Univ. of Miss. Medical Center, et al. v. H. Smith


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Docket Number: 2003-WC-02610-COA
Oral Argument: 11-09-2004
 

 

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Court of Appeals: Opinion Date: 02-01-2005
Opinion Author: CHANDLER, J.,
Holding: AFFIRMED

Additional Case Information: Topic: Workers' compensation - Presumption of no loss of wage earning capacity - Effort to find employment - Permanent disability
Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., IRVING, MYERS, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ.,
Procedural History: Admin or Agency Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 06-24-2003
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: Winston Kidd
Disposition: REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION DENYING BENEFITS TO SMITH.

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL CENTER AND MISSISSIPPI INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING, SELF-INSURED




JOSEPH T. WILKINS, III



 

Appellee: DAVID H. SMITH JOHN GRIFFIN JONES  

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Topic: Workers' compensation - Presumption of no loss of wage earning capacity - Effort to find employment - Permanent disability

Summary of the Facts: While working as a carpenter for the University of Mississippi Medical Center, David Smith sustained an admittedly compensable injury to his neck. He filed a petition to controvert. The administrative law judge found Smith to be permanently, totally disabled and awarded Smith disability benefits and the cost of medical services and supplies. The Commission reversed that decision. Smith appealed to circuit court, which reversed the decision of the Commission and reinstated the opinion of the administrative law judge. UMC appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: The Commission applied a presumption of no loss of wage earning capacity to this case because, after his surgery, Smith continued to work at UMC at the same or higher pay. A presumption of no loss of wage earning capacity arises when the claimant's post-injury earnings are equal to or exceed preinjury earnings. Smith argues that the Commission erroneously applied the presumption because the evidence indicated that his condition progressively worsened after the surgery. Where there is an accident which does not incapacitate but is progressive in nature, it is proper to consider the earnings of claimant between the date of the accident and the date of the disability. The medical evidence in this case shows that Smith's functional disability increased after the surgery. Smith's continuation of work after the surgery could not give rise to the presumption of no lost wage earning capacity because his injury had not fully manifested at that time. Rather, over the next year and a half his condition progressively worsened to the point that, according to his testimony, he was eventually forced to cease full-time work. As Smith's physical disability had not fully manifested when he returned to work, the Commission's application of the presumption that his injury caused no loss of wage earning capacity was erroneous. An injured employee establishes a prima facie case of disability by showing that, because of the work-related injury, he cannot secure work in the same or other jobs at pre-injury pay. An employer may rebut the claimant's prima facie case of disability by showing that the claimant's effort to find employment was unreasonable or constituted a mere sham. The Commission's finding that Smith was physically capable of returning to full-time, comparably gainful employment and that there was no credible medical evidence Smith was unable to work was unsupported by substantial evidence. The undisputed medical evidence clearly established that Smith's work capabilities were impacted by the injury. In addition, the evidence showed that Smith lost wage earning capacity because at the time he left UMC he could not obtain work in the same or other employment at a wage equal to his pre-injury wage. The willingness of Smith's supervisor to accommodate his neck injury does not prove Smith suffered no post-injury loss of wage earning capacity. Wages attributable to the kindness and generosity of an employer are not indicative of the employee's actual capacity to command a certain wage on the open labor market. Considering Smith's age, employment history, education, and physical limitations, the evidence established a permanent loss of wage earning capacity resulting from Smith's neck injury. The issue of whether a claimant's permanent disability is partial or total is a fact question to be determined from the evidence as a whole, including both medical and lay testimony. A claimant is competent to prove his own claim, and his testimony may be accepted without corroboration. Smith's testimony about his headaches was uncontradicted and entirely credible given the medical evidence that he received regular treatment for headache pain with narcotic medication. Smith has shown himself to be limited by his injury from all but irregular work in which he can set his own pace and duration. Therefore, Smith proved he was permanently, totally disabled.


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