Pittman v. State
| Docket Number: | 2006-KA-00676-COA Linked Case(s): 2006-KA-00676-COA ; 2006-CT-00676-SCT ; 2006-CT-00676-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-06-2007 Opinion Author: LEE, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Sale of cocaine & Possession of cocaine - Entrapment defense - Jury instructions - Sufficiency of evidence - Admission of evidence - Tape recording - M.R.E. 608 - Defense Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 04-13-2006 Appealed from: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Samac Richardson Disposition: CONVICTED OF COUNT I SALE OF COCAINE AND SENTENCE OF THIRTY YEARS WITH FIFTEEN YEARS TO SERVE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, THE LAST FIFTEEN YEARS SUSPENDED AND FIVE YEARS OF SUPERVISED PROBATION; COUNT II POSSESSION OF COCAINE AND SENTENCED TO EIGHT YEARS WITH FIVE YEARS TO SERVE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MDOC, THE LAST THREE YEARS SUSPENDED AND FIVE YEARS OF SUPERVISED PROBATION, WITH SENTENCE IN COUNT II TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO THE SENTENCE IN COUNT I; AND TO PAY COURT COSTS AND A $5,000 FINE District Attorney: David Byrd Clark Case Number: 2005-0598 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | ANDREA PITTMAN |
J. M. RITCHEY |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: STEPHANIE BRELAND WOOD |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Sale of cocaine & Possession of cocaine - Entrapment defense - Jury instructions - Sufficiency of evidence - Admission of evidence - Tape recording - M.R.E. 608 - Defense |
| Summary of the Facts: | Andrea Pittman was convicted of one count of sale of cocaine and one count of possession of cocaine. On the sale of cocaine count, Pittman was sentenced to thirty years with fifteen years to serve and five years supervised probation. On the possession count, Pittman was sentenced to eight years with five years to serve and five years supervised probation. She appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Entrapment defense Pittman argues that she was entrapped because she was induced into committing a crime that she would not normally have committed and that the conduct by the sheriff’s department was so egregious as to amount to entrapment as a matter of law. Once the defendant produces evidence that he or she was induced by a government agent to commit the criminal act and that he or she did not have a predisposition to commit the criminal act, the burden shifts to the prosecution to produce evidence of predisposition and the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on entrapment. Entrapment as a matter of law occurs when the conduct by law enforcement is so offensive as to require the discharge of the defendant. A witness testified that Pittman bragged about getting paid by her boss to buy cocaine for him. Pittman knew where to find cocaine and admitted that she had been to this house less than a month prior to her arrest in order to buy some marijuana and that she asked that some cocaine be set aside for her after the sale. There is no evidence that she was fearful or reluctant to participate on the day of the sale. In finding Pittman guilty, the jury clearly believed she was predisposed to commit both crimes. Pittman argues that her entrapment defense also applies to her possession conviction. As Pittman contends that the cocaine was not hers, her entrapment defense does not apply to her possession conviction. Issue 2: Jury instructions Pittman argues that the court erred in failing to grant jury instructions which define entrapment to some extent as a matter of law. The defendant is entitled to have instructions given that present her theory of the case unless an instruction incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. Because there was no evidence to support Pittman’s contention that she was entrapped as a matter of law, the court did not err in denying these instructions. Issue 3: Sufficiency of evidence In regard to the sale of cocaine conviction, Pittman argues that, given the misconduct by law enforcement, no reasonable juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that she was guilty. There was an audio recording of the transaction, Pittman stated that she bought the cocaine from a man whom she had visited before to buy drugs, and Pittman was caught with some of the buy money in her wallet. This was sufficient evidence. Issue 4: Admission of evidence Pittman argues that the court should have allowed testimony showing her close emotional attachment to her mother, and testimony about an agent’s grudge against her and her family. The jury was able to hear extensive testimony from Pittman about the close relationship she had with her mother and the effect her mother’s illness had on Pittman. The record shows that the agent was aware of a possible conflict because he testified that since he knew Pittman he did not want to be the agent in charge of the case and turned the information over to a deputy. The testimony at trial showed that it was the deputy’s decision, not the agent’s, to proceed with the buy. Therefore, there is no error. Issue 5: Tape recording Pittman argues that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear a tape recording of a voice message, because the State never disclosed the existence of this tape to Pittman. Under M.R.E. 608, specific instances of conduct may not be proved by extrinsic evidence for impeachment purposes; they may only be inquired about on cross-examination. Although the introduction of the tape recording may have been improper, any error was harmless since a substantial right of Pittman’s was not affected by the ruling. Issue 6: Defense Pittman argues that since there was no proof she received any remuneration from the transaction, she was entitled to argue that she was merely a conduit and could not have been convicted of selling the cocaine. However, our law is clear that a seller does not have to realize a profit to be guilty of the sale of a controlled substance. |
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