Evans v. State
| Docket Number: | 2006-KA-00253-COA Linked Case(s): 2006-KA-00253-COA ; 2006-CT-00253-SCT |
|
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-25-2007 Opinion Author: MYERS, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Sexual battery - Motion to suppress - Competency to stand trial - UCCCR 9.06 - Continuance - Voir dire - UCCCR 3.05 - Special venire - Conduct with third parties - Victim’s credibility - Harsh sentence - Ineffective assistance of counsel Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-07-2005 Appealed from: NEWTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Marcus D. Gordon Disposition: CONVICTED OF COUNT I - SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE OF LIFE; COUNT II - SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE OF LIFE; COUNT III - SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY YEARS; COUNT IV - SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY YEARS, ALL TO BE SERVED IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND SENTENCES TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY District Attorney: Mark Sheldon Duncan Case Number: 05-CR-034-NWG |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | HUEY L. EVANS |
LISA M. ROSS |
||
| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LADONNA C. HOLLAND |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Sexual battery - Motion to suppress - Competency to stand trial - UCCCR 9.06 - Continuance - Voir dire - UCCCR 3.05 - Special venire - Conduct with third parties - Victim’s credibility - Harsh sentence - Ineffective assistance of counsel |
| Summary of the Facts: | Huey Evans was found guilty of four counts of sexual battery and sentenced to serve two consecutive life sentences and two consecutive twenty-year terms. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Motion to suppress Evans argues that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence obtained from his home and statements made by him, because the evidence was illegally obtained without a warrant and the statements were a product of the illegal search and seizure. Two sheriff’s deputies testified that Evans gave free and voluntary consent to search his home. A signed and executed consent to search form was introduced into evidence at trial supporting this voluntary consent. Because Evans presented no evidence regarding his mental capability at the suppression hearing, the court did not err in finding that Evans voluntarily and knowingly consented to the search of his home. Issue 2: Competency to stand trial Evans argues that the court erred in denying his motion for a competency hearing to determine whether he was fit to stand trial, because the judge suggested that a psychiatric evaluation be performed. UCCCR 9.06 requires that a trial court order a psychiatric evaluation if it has reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. If a trial judge orders a psychiatric evaluation without a reasonable question as to the defendant’s competency, he is not also required to order a competency hearing. Because the trial judge did not find that a reasonable ground existed to suspect that Evans was mentally incompetent to stand trial, the court was not required to order a competency hearing pursuant to Rule 9.06. Issue 3: Continuance On the morning of trial, the State moved to amend the indictment against Evans to substitute the dates that the sexual battery was alleged. The court granted the motion. Evans argues that had a continuance been granted, he could have better prepared the computer expert he had retained to testify regarding whether the dates and times associated with the provocative and nude photographs of the victim could have been manipulated on the computer. However, Evans makes no argument as to how the difference in the dates and times appearing with the photographs would exonerate him or become essential to his defense. Thus, the trial court did not err in allowing the indictment against Evans to be amended as to its form. Issue 4: Voir dire Evans argues that the court abused its discretion in limiting his voir dire of the jury to twenty-six minutes, and attributes the limitation to his lawyer’s failure to question members of the jury as to whether they, a family member or close friend had been the victim of a sexual assault. UCCCR 3.05 grants a trial judge the discretion to set a reasonable time limit for voir dire. The record reflects that the trial judge used this discretion and allotted ten minutes for voir dire. However, by Evans’ own admission, his lawyer exceeded the time limitation and continued voir dire for twelve more pages in the transcript. Within this time period, Evans’ lawyer had plenty of time to pose a specific question to the potential jurors regarding their past experience with the crime of sexual assault. Issue 5: Special venire Evans argues that the court abused its discretion in advising him to abandon his request for a special venire; however, he cites no authority. Thus, this issue is without merit. Issue 6: Conduct with third parties At trial, the victim testified that Evans requested that she invite some of her friends to their home so that he could photograph her and her friends. Evans argues that the trial court erred in admitting this testimony because it concerns his illegal contact with others. However, no testimony was elicited or divulged regarding Evans’ conduct with third parties. The victim simply testified as to Evans’ requests of her, which was admissible testimony. Issue 7: Victim’s credibility Evans sought to attack the victim’s credibility and show that she had a motive to lie for ill will by introducing evidence at trial regarding a juvenile adjudication of a shoplifting charge. The crime of shoplifting cannot be used for impeachment purposes because it is not a crime categorized as crimen falsi. Issue 8: Harsh sentence Evans argues that his sentences are violative of the United States and the Mississippi Constitution because they are too harsh. Generally, a sentence that does not exceed the maximum term set by statute will not be disturbed upon appeal. In light of the evidence put forth supporting Evans’ guilt, and the nature of the crime of which he was convicted, Evans’ sentences were not grossly disproportionate or constitutionally violative. Issue 9: Ineffective assistance of counsel Evans argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The record does not contain an affirmative showing of ineffectiveness. Furthermore, neither of the parties has stipulated so as to allow the Court to make a finding regarding Evans’ claim of ineffective assistance. Thus, Evan’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be better raised in a motion for post-conviction relief. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
