Walton v. Snyder
| Docket Number: | 2006-CA-01769-COA Linked Case(s): 2006-CA-01769-COA ; 2006-CT-01769-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-04-2007 Opinion Author: BARNES, J. Holding: The judgment of the Chancery Court of Lee County is affirmed as to issues I and II, and reversed and rendered as to issue III. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Modification of child support - Retroactive application - M.R.C.P. 60(b) Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE, P.JJ., IRVING, J., CHANDLER, J., GRIFFIS, J., ISHEE, J. ROBERTS, J., AND CARLTON, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-29-2006 Appealed from: LEE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT Judge: Talmadge Littlejohn Disposition: GRANTED PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT; INCREASE RETROACTIVE FROM DATE OF FILING OF PETITION TO MODIFY; DEFICIENCY AWARDED TO MS. SNYDER DUE TO UNDER REPORTING OF INCOME BY DR. WALTON IN ORIGINAL CHILD SUPPORT PROCEEDING Case Number: 00-0773-41-L |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | BILLY RAY WALTON |
JOHN A. FERRELL |
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| Appellee: | TAMARA J. (WALTON) SNYDER | J. MARK SHELTON |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Modification of child support - Retroactive application - M.R.C.P. 60(b) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Tamara Snyder filed a complaint against Dr. Billy Ray Walton for contempt of court and for modification of the final judgment of divorce and for other relief. Ms. Snyder sought an increase in child support equal to or in excess of the statutory percentage of twenty percent of Dr. Walton’s adjusted gross income because of an increase in the couple’s two children’s expenses and an increase in Dr. Walton’s income since the original divorce proceedings. Ms. Snyder sought the increase to be retroactive from the date of the final judgment of divorce in March 2002. Ms. Snyder requested that Dr. Walton be responsible for the costs incurred in private schooling and college for both children. Further, Ms. Snyder alleged fraud upon the court by Dr. Walton in understating his 2001 income by nearly $30,000 during the divorce proceedings. The court dismissed Ms. Snyder’s contempt of court allegation against Dr. Walton with prejudice. The court increased Dr. Walton’s child support to twenty percent of his adjusted gross income of $13,236.58, or $2,647.32 per month. The court increased the child support retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition to modify. The court, therefore, awarded Ms. Snyder a judgment in the amount of $15,709.80, which equals the difference between the amount of child support Dr. Walton was paying under the previous court order and the increase in child support, multiplied by the fifteen months from November 2004 until February 2006. The chancellor rendered a judgment against Dr. Walton of $9,216 which represents the deficiency in Dr. Walton’s child support payments of approximately $288 per month for the thirty-two month period, from March 2002 to November 2004, since Dr. Walton’s gross income was actually eighteen percent more than he had represented to the court at the time of the divorce. Dr. Walton appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Modification of child support Dr. Walton argues that the decision of the chancellor was improperly based upon the children’s attending private school and its attendant costs, because this factor cannot constitute a material change. While the best interest of the child will always serve as the touchstone for determining modification of child support, in order to obtain modification, the party seeking the change must prove there has been a substantial and material change in the circumstances of one of the interested parties arising after the original divorce decree. Changes in circumstances reasonably foreseeable at the time of the divorce, however, may not be considered as a material change by the chancellor. The expenses of private school are a legitimate factor to consider in modification proceedings, although the expenses are inadequate standing alone. Contrary to Dr. Walton’s assertion that the chancellor based his decision predominately on the added expense of private school, the chancellor expressly considered and discussed all ten factors supporting modification. The chancellor took into account the ages of the children, who at the time of the judgment were sixteen and thirteen years old, and their increased expenses, including that of private school and the need for a vehicle. The increased earning capacity of Dr. Walton was taken into account, as was Ms. Snyder’s recent income increase. The court noted that Dr. Walton underestimated his income at the time of the divorce. Considering these various factors, the chancellor did not err in finding a material change of circumstance. Further, as the chancellor noted, Dr. Walton’s annual adjusted gross income increased sixty percent from the time of the entry of divorce. He was only paying twelve percent of this increased income, much less than the twenty percent recommended in the statutory guidelines. Issue 2: Retroactive application Dr. Walton argues that the chancellor improperly increased the child support retroactively, commencing in November 2004, when Ms. Snyder filed her petition to modify. Modifications increasing child support shall be allowed as of the date of the petition to modify or later, at the discretion of the trial court, to prevent delay tactics or inappropriate self-help measures by the parties. Here, the chancellor did not abuse its discretion by entering a judgment against Dr. Walton of $15,709.80, which represents the difference in the amount of child support that Dr. Walton was formerly paying, and the increase multiplied by fifteen months. Dr. Walton argues that this retroactive increase in child support was error. Motions made under M.R.C.P. 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time. The rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. As Ms. Snyder did not file her motion within six months of the March 2002 judgment, she cannot rely upon any grounds found in subsections (1), (2) or (3). The court did not find Dr. Walton’s misstatements fraudulent, but rather a mistake. Even if Dr. Walton’s misstatement of income would have been found fraudulent, it would have been fraud upon an adverse party, falling within the Rule 60(b)(1) six-month time constraint, because Dr. Walton would have been the sole witness committing perjury. However, it is irrelevant whether the trial court found Dr. Walton’s statements fraudulent or not, because the only way to escape the six-month time constraints of Rule 60(b) is for there to be a finding of fraud upon the court, such as where several witnesses perjure themselves. That was not the case here. Therefore, under Rule 60(b), Ms. Snyder had six months from the date of judgment of March 2002, to file a motion for relief. The record indicates that she did not take any action on the misstatement until she filed her petition to modify child support in November 2004. Mrs. Snyder cites to Rule 60(b)(6) to justify this award. However, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be based upon a reason which may be found under the first five subsections of the rule. Therefore, the judgment against Dr. Walton of $9,216 was in error. |
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