Jones v. Jones
| Docket Number: | 2006-CA-00974-COA Linked Case(s): 2006-CA-00974-COA2006-CT-00974-SCT2006-CT-00974-SCT |
|
| Oral Argument: | 07-17-2007 | |
* This video is best viewed in the most current version of Google Chrome, Internet Explorer with Windows Media Player plug-in, or Safari (Mac Users). |
||
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-11-2007 Opinion Author: ISHEE, J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Sanctions - M.R.C.P. 37(b) - Reliance on perjury - Equitable distribution - Alimony - Attorney’s fees Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., CHANDLER AND CARLTON, JJ. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Barnes, J., concurs as to issues III and IV Non Participating Judge(s): IRVING, J. Dissenting Author : Griffis, J., with separate written opinion. Dissent Joined By : ROBERTS, J.; Barnes, J., joins issues I and II. Dissenting Author : Barnes, J., dissents as to issues I, II and V. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Barnes, J., concurs as to issues III and IV and dissents as to issues I, II and V. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-25-2006 Appealed from: Hinds County Chancery Court Judge: Stuart Robinson Disposition: FINAL JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE ENTERED Case Number: G2004-2398 R/1 |
|
| Note: | This opinion was aiffrmed in part and reversed and remanded in part by the Supreme Court on 11/20/2008. See the SCT opinion at: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO51305.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | RICHARD BRODERICK JONES |
MARK A. CHINN,
WILLIAM MATTHEW THOMPSON |
|
|
| Appellee: | NEVADA RAE BARR JONES | MICHAEL J. MALOUF, MELISSA ANN MALOUF | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Sanctions - M.R.C.P. 37(b) - Reliance on perjury - Equitable distribution - Alimony - Attorney’s fees |
| Summary of the Facts: | Nevada Rae Barr Jones and Richard Broderick Jones agreed to a divorce based on irreconcilable differences. The court equitably distributed the marital assets. Richard was awarded the marital home, the home he purchased in West Virginia for his son, the three automobiles in his possession, a motorcycle, the yard equipment, various accounts in Nevada’s name and some in his name, and the cash that Nevada had left in their joint account. Nevada received the New Orleans home, her three automobiles, a pair of scooters, a brokerage account in her name, and future income from her books. Richard appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sanctions Richard argues that the chancery court erred in denying his motions to strike and for sanctions against Nevada. In his two motions to strike and for sanctions, Richard asked the court to strike any reference by Nevada concerning allegations of fault against him, to presume Nevada was the author of the “Dear John” letter left to him, and to award him attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses. M.R.C.P. 37(b) prescribes the sanctions a trial court may impose for discovery violations. Since the parties had agreed to an irreconcilable differences divorce over two months before the first of these motions was filed, they had already agreed to drop any allegations of fault. While Richard may have sought this relief because he was concerned with the truth of Nevada’s testimony after she initially gave an incorrect date as to when she began a relationship with another man, it is nevertheless the chancellor’s duty to evaluate her credibility as a witness. Furthermore, the chancellor may not have issued an order limiting Nevada’s testimony, but many times throughout the case he did sustain objections to testimony she offered because it possibly crossed the line into proof of fault. In regard to authoring the letter left to Richard, Nevada admitted that she typed it on her computer. Therefore, this issue was moot. Richard also claims he should be awarded attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses that he expended to pursue sanctions. However, the relief sought by Richard in his motions was either irrelevant in an irreconcilable differences divorce or moot. While Nevada admittedly committed perjury during her deposition and destroyed her computer, she also filed a motion for sanctions against Richard alleging that he too committed perjury. Given the facts of this case, it would have been advisable for the chancellor to recommend an investigation into each parties’ allegations of perjury by the district attorney. Furthermore, faced with such misconduct from both parties, it was within the chancellor’s discretion to refuse to award sanctions. Issue 2: Reliance on perjury It was the chancellor’s duty to consider the veracity of Nevada’s testimony, and he did not erroneously rely on either her statements about her extramarital relationship or the destruction of her computer as Richard alleges. Issue 3: Equitable distribution Richard argues that the chancellor erred in his equitable division of the marital assets, because the division was one-sided and unfair and the chancellor did not adequately consider Richard’s contributions to the marriage. Nevada earned approximately ninety-six percent of the income during the marriage. Richard was fired from his job and did not find another. His contributions to the household were very limited. Neither party made substantial contributions to the stability of the marriage. There was nothing in the record concerning contributions to education or training and Richard’s contributions to Nevada’s career were minimal. Richard spent significant amounts on travel, entertainment, and personal pursuits while Nevada a considerable amount less. Each party had more emotional attachment to their respective homes, in which they lived at the time of trial. Nevada received $691,000 during the marriage for books written prior to the marriage, which she used as marital funds. Nevada must refund a $360,000 advance payment to Random House if she does not submit a satisfactory manuscript for a book she was writing. Proper division would eliminate the need for alimony and avoid future friction between the parties. Nevada had no pension and will lose Richard’s insurance. She has substantial earning capacity for her future books. Richard was fifty-five and in good health. At separation he was debt free, had a house, three cars, $56,000 in cash, and over $26,000 in IRAs. He had a capacity to earn additional income, but chose not to work during the marriage and has not worked since separation. While Richard finds error in the chancellor’s decision to award Nevada a substantially larger portion of the marital estate, the rule is that there is no right to an equal distribution of marital property. The division is left to the discretion of the chancery court. Issue 4: Alimony Richard argues that he is entitled to alimony payments from Nevada, because lack of alimony will place him in financial jeopardy and he was a victim of gender discrimination when the chancellor refused to award alimony. Alimony should be considered only if the situation is such that an equitable division of marital property, considered with each party’s non-marital assets, leaves a deficit for one party. Nothing in the record shows that Richard will have a deficit without any alimony payments. Furthermore, he still had not resumed working at the time of the trial, and has made little or no effort to help himself. The chancellor did not abuse his discretion in denying alimony payments to Richard. Issue 5: Attorney’s fees Richard argues that he should be awarded attorney’s fees. If the record does not reflect that a party is unable to pay attorney’s fees, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award them. The chancellor found that neither party had proven an inability to pay attorney’s fees. Based on such a determination by the chancellor, to award attorney’s fees to Richard would have constituted an abuse of discretion. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
