Community Care Ctr. of Vicksburg, LLC, et al. v. Mason
| Docket Number: | 2006-CA-00599-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-09-2007 Opinion Author: BARNES, J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Contract - Arbitration agreement - Failure to initial - Procedural unconscionability - Substantive unconscionability Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, P.J., Irving, Chandler, Griffis, Ishee, Roberts and Carlton, JJ. Dissenting Author : Myers, P.J. Concurs in Result Only: King, C.J. Procedural History: Motion to Dismiss Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CONTRACT |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-28-2005 Appealed from: WARREN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Isadore Patrick Disposition: DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND COMPEL ARBITRATION Case Number: 04-0077-CI |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | COMMUNITY CARE CENTER OF VICKSBURG, LLC D/B/A HERITAGE HOUSE NURSING AND
REHABILITATION CENTER AND LEGACY HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. |
MARJORIE S. BUSCHING
S. MARK WANN |
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| Appellee: | CAROLYN C. MASON | HENRY DEAN ANDREWS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Contract - Arbitration agreement - Failure to initial - Procedural unconscionability - Substantive unconscionability |
| Summary of the Facts: | Carolyn Mason admitted herself into the Heritage House Nursing and Rehabilitation Center as a private-pay patient. She signed an admission agreement, which contained an arbitration provision. After falling while apparently trying to escape from another resident, she filed suit against Community Care Center of Vicksburg d/b/a Heritage House, alleging negligence, negligence per se, premise liability, and gross negligence. Heritage House filed its answer and defenses, including a motion to compel arbitration. The court denied the motion to compel arbitration, and Heritage House appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Heritage House raises the issue of whether an individual, acting in her own capacity, can avoid the terms of an arbitration provision contained in a nursing home admission agreement which she signed when no exigent circumstances have been evidenced or available defenses proven under Mississippi contract law. In order to determine the validity of a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA, the court should consider whether there is a valid arbitration agreement and whether the parties’ dispute is within the scope of the arbitration agreement. The court should also consider whether legal constraints external to the parties’ agreement foreclosed arbitration of those claims. Only the usual contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, can be used to invalidate arbitration provisions. Mrs. Mason does not provide any evidence that there is not a contract except that the arbitration clause is not initialed and the acknowledgment signatures are out of place. Failure to initial the agreement is not dispositive. The affidavit executed by Mrs. Mason does not indicate that her failure to initial was an intentional rejection of the arbitration agreement. Although Mrs. Mason does not admit she did not read the arbitration clause, she states she has no recollection that an arbitration agreement was included in the documents she signed. The arbitration provision is, however, prominently displayed in the contract, and a reference to it appears in all capital, bold letters immediately before Mrs. Mason’s signature. The statements made in the affidavit are much more akin to an acknowledgment that Mrs. Mason did not read the provision than to a claim she intentionally rejected it. The evidence points to a valid arbitration provision between Mrs. Mason and Heritage House and that she intended to be bound by arbitration. The arbitration provision in the admissions agreement clearly provides that any legal dispute “shall be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration . . . and not by a lawsuit. . . .” Therefore, the dispute is within the arbitration agreement’s scope. The basis of Mrs. Mason’s argument concerning procedural unconscionability is that she did not willingly, knowingly, and voluntarily enter into the arbitration provision. The layout of the arbitration agreement is clear and conspicuous, with non-legalistic language used. Further, Mrs. Mason was familiar with the admissions process, as she had admitted herself and her husband to another nursing home previously and approved of the arbitration agreement in that admission agreement. The argument that Mrs. Mason did not know or understand what she was signing at the time is untenable. Her failure to initial that she carefully read the arbitration section does not establish a lack of knowledge. If Mrs. Mason had read what she signed, which she had a duty to do, there was sufficient evidence of notice of intent to arbitrate within the contract. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Mrs. Mason was in any type of exigent physical or mental distress at the time of her admission. While evidence would support that she may have been in a generalized weakened physical state from events in the months prior such as her husband passing away and viral gastroenteritis, this condition would not appear to affect her ability to read, understand, and sign a contract. Nor is there any evidence of mental incapacity. Thus, there is no evidence of procedural unconscionability. The terms of the arbitration provision oppressive. Each party had the right to demand and enforce the same remedy of arbitration. Either party could terminate the entire contract upon thirty days’ written notice. Furthermore, the resident could rescind the arbitration agreement within thirty days of execution. The arbitration provision specifically states Mrs. Mason had the right to seek legal counsel concerning the agreement, but she chose not to and did not have the documents sent to an attorney for review. There is no evidence Mrs. Mason was deprived of any benefits without a remedy or that Heritage House had an advantage over Mrs. Mason because of the language in the arbitration provision. Thus, there is no substantive unconscionability within the terms of the arbitration provision. |
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