Douglas Parker Elec., Inc., v. Miss. Design & Dev. Corp.


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Docket Number: 2006-CA-00285-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 02-20-2007
Opinion Author: IRVING, J.
Holding: Reversed and Remanded

Additional Case Information: Topic: Contract - Open account - Summary judgment - Statute of limitations
Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CONTRACT

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 07-07-2005
Appealed from: Harrison County Circuit Court
Judge: Roger T. Clark
Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED.
Case Number: A2402-03-200

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: DOUGLAS PARKER ELECTRIC, INC., A MISSISSIPPI CORPORATION




JOHN G. MCDONNELL



 

Appellee: MISSISSIPPI DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, A MISSISSIPPI CORPORATION WILLIAM ALEX BRADY  

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Topic: Contract - Open account - Summary judgment - Statute of limitations

Summary of the Facts: Mississippi Design and Development Corp. hired Douglas Parker Electric, Inc. to do electrical work on the Monte Carlo Casino barge, which was owned by Allen Paulson. At some point, MD&D indicated to Parker that it was necessary to pump water out of the barge to keep the barge from sinking. Parker offered to do the work. MD&D did not tell Parker not to do the work, but did inform Parker that it would not be paid immediately. Parker completed pumping the water from the barge in late September 2000. Parker maintains that after it submitted its invoices, totaling $126,850, it kept in touch with MD&D regarding the sale of the barge, and MD&D continually reassured Parker that it would pay Parker when the barge was sold. In July 2003, MD&D informed Parker that the barge had been sold, and MD&D had been paid what was owed to it in real property, instead of being paid in cash. On July 21, 2003, Parker’s attorneys mailed MD&D a demand letter for payment, to which MD&D apparently never responded. On September 23, 2003, Parker filed suit to collect against MD&D. The court granted MD&D’s motion for summary judgment, and Parker appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Open account Parker argues that the court erred in ruling that its agreement with MD&D was in the nature of an oral contract rather than an open account. An open account is an account based on continuing transactions between the parties which have not closed or been settled and must contain a final and certain agreement on price. Here, there is little evidence to indicate that there was any discussion of the price of Parker’s services, let alone a final and certain agreement on price. Furthermore, there was no running balance of credits and debits, nor was payment due at the convenience of either party. Instead, Parker understood that it would be paid when the barge was sold. Thus, the court did not err in finding that the agreement between the parties was in the nature of an oral contract rather than an open account. Issue 2: Summary judgment Parker argues that there are genuine issues of material fact sufficient to overcome summary judgment. In entering summary judgment against Parker, the court appears to have simply adopted MD&D’s account of events as true and ignored Parker’s version of events. There was no way for the court to rule as it did without impermissibly weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations, as the court essentially adopted one party’s version of events as true and dismissed the other party’s version entirely. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Parker was told that it would be paid if the insurance company agreed to pay, or whether Parker was told that it would be paid when the barge was sold. Therefore, the court erred in granting summary judgment. Issue 3: Statute of limitations The court found that Parker’s suit was filed outside the expiration of the statute of limitations, on the theory that the statute began to run when Parker completed its work and could theoretically request payment from MD&D. Where a right of action depends on the happening of an event in the future, the cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run only at the time when the event happens. If payment was dependent on the condition that the barge was sold, Parker’s cause of action did not accrue, and the statute of limitations did not begin to run, until the barge was sold. Therefore, based on Parker’s version of events, Parker’s suit was well within the statute of limitations. If Parker’s statement of events is true, then Parker’s cause of action arose when the barge was sold, because the condition precedent to Parker’s payment had been fulfilled only at that time. A genuine issue of material fact, sufficient to overcome summary judgment, exists as to whether Parker was told that it would be paid when the barge was sold. There is also a genuine issue of material fact as to whether equitable estoppel acts to toll the statute of limitations in this case.


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