Byrne v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al.


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Docket Number: 2002-CA-01773-COA
Linked Case(s): 2002-CT-01773-COA ; 2002-CT-01773-SCT ; 2002-CA-01773-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 12-09-2003
Opinion Author: Myers, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Personal injury - Premises liability - Duty of store owner - Mode of operation theory - No alternate route theory
Judge(s) Concurring: McMillin, C.J., King and Southwick, P.JJ., Bridges, Thomas, Lee, Irving, Chandler and Griffis, JJ.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 10-08-2002
Appealed from: WAYNE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Judge: Larry Eugene Roberts
Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED
Case Number: CV-2000-168 R

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: SHIRLEY BYRNE AND JIMMY BYRNE




THOMAS J. LOWE PETER K. SMITH



 

Appellee: WAL-MART STORES, INC., AND ANDREW LIGHTSEY AND JANE DOE EDLEY H. JONES, III  

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Topic: Personal injury - Premises liability - Duty of store owner - Mode of operation theory - No alternate route theory

Summary of the Facts: Shirley Byrne filed a premises liability lawsuit against Wal-Mart and two of its employees, Andrew Lightsey and Jane Doe, to recover for injuries she allegedly sustained when she slipped on an unidentified substance causing injury to her back and knee. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which the court granted. Byrne appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Byrne argues that the court improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the jury on issues concerning the nature, condition, identity and length of time the unidentified substance that led to her injuries was on the floor. In order to succeed in a premises liability action, the plaintiff must prove a negligent act by the defendant caused the plaintiff's injury, or that defendant had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition but failed to warn the plaintiff of the danger, or the dangerous condition remained long enough to impute constructive knowledge to the defendant. The duty of a store owner to its invitees is to exercise ordinary care and to keep the premises reasonably safe while warning invitees of dangerous conditions known to the store owner. Byrne failed to produce any proof that the object which caused her injury was the result of an affirmative act by Wal-Mart or Andrew Lightsey, as manager. There was no possible way that Andrew Lightsey had actual knowledge, because he was not at work on the day of Byrne’s injury. There was no proof offered by Byrne as to constructive knowledge either. Constructive knowledge is imputed to the store by a showing of the length of time the dangerous condition existed prior to the plaintiff’s injury. Byrne argues that she did not need to prove actual or constructive notice and that the court erred in failing to apply the “mode of operation” theory, i.e., that by allowing customers to walk around its store with food, Wal- Mart is involved in a mode of operation that creates unreasonable risks for its business invitees. The “mode of operation” theory has not yet been adopted in this state. Byrne also argues that the court erred by failing to apply the “no alternate route” theory, i.e., a Wal-Mart employee blocked her way down an aisle, so she was forced to take an alternate route to reach the check-out counter. The owner’s knowledge of the dangerous condition is the key to duty and liability. Byrne provided no proof that Wal-Mart had any knowledge that the object was placed on the floor.


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