Brown v. State
| Docket Number: | 2005-KA-02291-COA Linked Case(s): 2005-KA-02291-COA ; 2005-CT-02291-SCT ; 2005-CT-02291-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-23-2007 Opinion Author: CHANDLER, J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Sale of cocaine - Admission of tape recording - M.R.E. 801(d) - M.R.E. 804 - M.R.E. 803 - M.R.E. 103(a) - Entrapment instruction Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-04-2005 Appealed from: TATE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Andrew C. Baker Disposition: FOUND GUILTY OF SALE OF COCAINE AND SENTENCED TO FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITH SIX YEARS SUSPENDED PENDING FUTURE GOOD BEHAVIOR, AND TO PAY A FINE OF $5,000. District Attorney: John W. Champion Case Number: CR2004-127-BT |
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| Note: | This judgment was later reversed by the Supreme Court on 11/29/2007. The trial court judgment was reinstated. See the SCT opinion at: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/appellate_courts/sc/scdecisions.html. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | DERRICK BROWN A/K/A DERRICK LATORY BROWN A/K/A DEDRICK BROWN |
DAVID L. WALKER |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: W. GLENN WATTS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Sale of cocaine - Admission of tape recording - M.R.E. 801(d) - M.R.E. 804 - M.R.E. 803 - M.R.E. 103(a) - Entrapment instruction |
| Summary of the Facts: | Derrick Brown was found guilty of sale of cocaine and was sentenced to fifteen years, with six years suspended. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Tape recording During the testimony of the confidential informant, the court admitted the Task Force's audiotape recording of the informant’s telephone conversations prior to the drug sale as well as a transcript of the tape recording. Brown argues that the tape recording constituted hearsay and that its erroneous admission prejudiced him. M.R.E. 801(d) enumerates certain statements that are not hearsay though they literally fall within the definition of hearsay from the hearsay rule. These include prior statements by witnesses and admissions by a party-opponent. The State argues that the taped conversations of the informant and some number of unidentified persons were admissible pursuant to the State's legitimate interest in providing the jury with a rational and coherent story of what happened. Certainly, the State is correct in arguing that the taped conversations were not introduced for the express purpose of proving the truth of the matters asserted therein. That fact is readily apparent from the record containing the trial court's ruling admitting the tape for the purpose of showing that the conversations took place and the gist of those conversations, in other words, to lend background to the drug transaction. However, there was copious testimony from the informant and law enforcement that conversations setting up the drug transaction took place. The evidentiary value of the tape for the prosecution's stated purposes was marginal. Considering the taped conversations objectively in light of all the other evidence, the most powerful evidentiary function of the taped conversations was to relay hearsay evidence to the jury tending to show Brown's prior planning of the drug transaction. Because the State presented no evidence identifying the persons on the tape, the Court is unable to determine whether the statements on the tape would be exempt from hearsay as admissions by a party-opponent under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) (in the case of Brown's own statements) or 801(d)(2)(E) (in the case of statements by a co-conspirator offered against Brown). As the declarants were anonymous, the Court is unable to assess the applicability of any hearsay exceptions dependant upon the declarant's unavailability under M.R.E. 804. Further, insufficient evidence of the context of the anonymous declarant's statements was established by the proponent to enable assessment of the applicability of hearsay exceptions under Rule 803. Thus, the trial court's admission of the taped conversations constituted an abuse of discretion. The erroneous admission of the taped conversations substantially prejudiced Brown, necessitating reversal and remand for a new trial as required by M.R.E. 103(a). Issue 2: Entrapment instruction Brown argues that the trial court erred in refusing his proffered entrapment instruction. On appeal of the denial of an entrapment instruction, the Court asks whether sufficient evidence existed in the record such that a rational jury might have found for the appellant on the entrapment defense. For a successful entrapment defense, the defendant must show he was not ready and willing to commit the offense at the time the opportunity for doing so arose. An entrapment instruction is unnecessary where the defendant was merely asked by a law enforcement agent to sell the substance and was caught. According to Brown's own testimony, he was not induced to violate the law, but rather never formed the intent to aid and abet another person’s sale of cocaine. Though an entrapment defense was not supported by Brown's own testimony, Brown was entitled to assert inconsistent alternative theories of defense. Based on the evidence in the record, there was insufficient evidence that Brown was induced to aid and abet the sale of cocaine to entitle Brown to an entrapment instruction. |
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