Singleton v. State
| Docket Number: | 2005-KA-02013-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-06-2007 Opinion Author: ROBERTS, J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Sale of controlled substance within 1,500 feet of church - Impeachment - M.R.E. 608(b) - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(c) - M.R.E. 803(8) - M.R.E. 613(b) - Weight of evidence Judge(s) Concurring: LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): CARLTON, J. Concurs in Result Only: KING, C.J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-13-2005 Appealed from: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: William E. Chapman, III Disposition: CONVICTION OF SALE OF COCAINE, A SCHEDULE II CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITHIN 1,500 FEET OF A CHURCH AND SENTENCED TO SIXTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS SUSPENDED. District Attorney: DAVID BYRD CLARK Case Number: 2004-0539 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | GLEN SINGLETON, JR. |
BARNEY GLENN FOLSE |
||
| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Sale of controlled substance within 1,500 feet of church - Impeachment - M.R.E. 608(b) - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(c) - M.R.E. 803(8) - M.R.E. 613(b) - Weight of evidence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Glen Singleton, Jr. was found guilty of selling a schedule II controlled substance within 1,500 feet of a church. He was sentenced to sixty years, with twenty-five years suspended. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Impeachment During cross-examination, the defense attempted to impeach a witness by showing that he had recently been convicted of grand larceny. Singleton argues that the court erred by sustaining the State’s objection to these questions. M.R.E. 608(b) states in that specific instances of conduct may in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Grand larceny is not a crime generally considered to show an individuals tendency for truth and veracity. Therefore, the witness’s pending charge for grand larceny alone was not probative of his general truthfulness or untruthfulness. Issue 2: Hearsay Singleton argues that an agent’s remarks were inadmissible hearsay as there was no proof presented as to the unavailability of his supervising officer. M.R.E. 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The statement in question was not offered to prove the matter asserted. Furthermore, if the statement did qualify as hearsay it would still be admissible to the extent required to show why he acted as he did and where he was at a particular place at a particular time. Singleton also argues that the trial court erred in overruling his hearsay objection to the introduction of a photocopy of his driver’s license. The record shows that no photocopy of Singleton’s driver’s license was ever introduced, but only copies of a NCIC report and justice court record of a traffic citation containing Flora addresses for Singleton. The NCIC report neither satisfies M.R.E. 803(8)(A) nor M.R.E. 803(8)(B). The computer printout of a justice court record containing Singleton’s address would not fall under M.R.E. 803(8), and, under the facts of this case, would be inadmissible hearsay. The State argues that the documents were properly allowed into evidence as impeachment evidence. However, M.R.E. 613(b) does not apply to the documents, because the information contained in the documents was not a statement by Singleton, and, thus, would not qualify as a prior inconsistent statement. However, actual introduction of the documents the witness referred to during his testimony did not prejudice Singleton or adversely affect any substantial right. Issue 3: Weight of evidence The jury was left with the facts that a drug deal took place and involved Jackson and another individual. They were told by Jackson that Singleton was the dealer, and told by Singleton that he was not there. They heard the tape containing the voices of Jackson and the dealer, and heard the voice of Singleton when he testified. Thus, the overwhelming weight of the evidence is not so contrary to the verdict as to constitute an unconscionable injustice. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
