Jones v. B.L. Development Corp., et al.
| Docket Number: | 2005-CA-00955-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-24-2006 Opinion Author: GRIFFIS, J. Holding: Affirmed in Part, Reversed & Remanded in Part |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Intentional infliction of emotional distress - Statute of limitations - Section 15-1-35 - Negligent infliction of emotional distress - Assault - Statute of limitations - Negligence - Stalking - Section 97-3-107(4) Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., SOUTHWICK, IRVING, CHANDLER, BARNES, ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 04-26-2005 Appealed from: TUNICA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Larry O. Lewis Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF B.L. DEVELOPMENT AND PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MILLER Case Number: 2003-0092-LL |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | LAWUNDA C. JONES |
ROBERT G. JOHNSTON |
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| Appellee: | B.L. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND JIMMY MILLER | LORRIE K. RIDDER, JENNIFER M. BERMEL |
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| Topic: | Intentional infliction of emotional distress - Statute of limitations - Section 15-1-35 - Negligent infliction of emotional distress - Assault - Statute of limitations - Negligence - Stalking - Section 97-3-107(4) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Lawunda Jones filed a lawsuit against her employer, B. L. Development Corporation, and her supervisor Jimmy Miller, asserting claims for violation of Title VII, assault, battery, negligence per se, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. After discovery, the circuit court granted a summary judgment in favor of B.L. Development and a partial summary judgment in favor of Miller. The court certified the judgment as a final judgment under M.R.C.P. 54(b). Jones appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Intentional infliction of emotional distress The court determined that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is subject to the one-year statute of limitations in section 15-1-35. Jones argues that the claim is subject to the three-year statute of limitations and the claim does not require a physical manifestation of the injury and, even if it did, she presented evidence of physical manifestation. The Court of Appeals addressed the statute of limitations in Slaydon v. Hansford, 830 So. 2d 686 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) and found that the statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress is one year. Since the evidence indicated that the last instance of Miller’s conduct occurred on September 10, 2001 and Jones did not file her complaint until January 2003, her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is time-barred. Issue 2: Negligent infliction of emotional distress Jones argues it was error to grant summary judgment to B.L. Development, because there was sufficient evidence presented to show there was a genuine issue of a material fact as to whether the sexual harassment was committed within the course and scope of Miller’s employment and in furtherance of B. L. Development’s business and/or whether B. L. Development knew or should have known of Miller’s propensity to sexually harass fellow employees. An employer is vicariously liable for intentional torts committed in the course and scope of employment, or for those it authorized, or for those it ratified. Where an employer learns of the past intentional conduct and does nothing to reprimand the employee, this acts as a ratification. Jones presented evidence that three supervisors knew of Miller’s conduct, including Miller’s immediate supervisor. There was also testimony that Miller’s conduct was so notorious around the office that everyone knew about it. To be within the scope of employment, the act must be the kind he is employed to perform, occur substantially within the authorized space and time limits, actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and if force is intentionally used, it is not unexpected by the master. There is no evidence that Miller’s conduct was actuated in part by a purpose to serve B.L. Development. A master is also subject to liability for the torts of his servant committed outside the scope of employment if the servant was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation. Miller was Jones’ superior. The evidence indicated that when Jones would assert herself and tell Miller to leave her alone, she was denied certain privileges or given extra work. He would call her in his office to train her on counseling her inferiors or on how to work, during which time he would harass her. Further, the evidence was that the slot cards were placed in Miller’s possession, near his desk. Whenever Jones needed to get one, Miller would use the opportunity to grab her. He would also use the paging system to harass Jones. The evidence indicated that Miller used pre-shift meetings as his personal forum to speak, and he would engage his employees in lewd conversations about sex, proposition Jones, and grab her in front of the other employees. This evidence is sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether B.L. Development was liable for Miller’s misconduct as to the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Issue 3: Assault The court determined that the statute of limitations in section 15-1-35 barred Jones’ claims for common law assault and battery and statutory simple assault. Jones argues that a violation of a criminal statute is negligence per se, and each statute gives right to a private civil cause of action, and the court should have applied the general three-year catch-all statute of limitations, section 15-1-49. The court properly applied section 15-1-35 to Jones’ claims of common law assault and statutory assault, as there can be no escape from the bar of the statute of limitations applicable to intentional torts by the mere refusal to style the cause brought in a recognized statutory category and thereby circumvent prohibition of the statute. Issue 4: Negligence The court determined that there was no provision in section 97-3-107(4), the statute which defines the crime of stalking, for a private or civil claim. The evidence indicated that Miller knowingly and willfully engaged in a pattern of conduct for nine months which seriously alarmed and annoyed Jones. The course of conduct revealed a continuity of purpose to sexually harass Jones and to attempt to gratify his lewd inclinations toward her. This was the type of injury meant to be prevented by the statute, and Jones was in the class of persons sought to be protected. However, under the terms of the statute, it is clear that for a violation to occur the offending conduct must be intentional. Any civil action for violation of the stalking statute is so like menace, assault, and libel that it is subject to the one-year statute of limitations. Therefore, Jones’ claim under this statute is barred. |
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