Stinson v. Hall
| Docket Number: | 2005-CA-00469-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-12-2006 Opinion Author: LEE, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Mortgage - Deed absolute - Constructive trust Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., SOUTHWICK, IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-10-2005 Appealed from: LOWNDES COUNTY CHANCERY COURT Judge: Robert L. Lancaster Disposition: TRIAL JUDGE FOUND CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND Case Number: 2002-0015-L |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | SHEILA KNIGHT STINSON |
GARY GOODWIN |
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| Appellee: | STEVEN G. HALL AND KAREN P. HALL | STEVEN R. MCEWEN |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Real property - Mortgage - Deed absolute - Constructive trust |
| Summary of the Facts: | Sheila Stinson filed a complaint against Steven Hall and Karen Hall asking the court to declare a property transaction between her and the Halls null and void. Specifically, Stinson asked the court to declare a deed absolute to be a mortgage. The chancellor found the deed to be one absolute and not a mortgage, denied Stinson relief and dismissed the case with prejudice. Stinson appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Stinson argues that the chancellor erred in ruling that she failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the instrument in question was a mortgage and not a deed absolute. A deed absolute on its face may be found valid and effectual as a mortgage, if it were intended by the parties to operate as a security for the repayment of money. Helpful factors in making that determination include the relation of the parties, the financial condition of the grantor, the property’s value, possession by the grantor, the conduct of the parties, the payment of taxes, any subsequent dealings between the parties and whether the debt has been extinguished by agreement of the parties. It is clear that Stinson has failed to meet her burden in establishing that the deed was intended to be a mortgage. Stinson testified that there was no agreement between her and the Halls where she would be remain liable to them for any debt after the sale and conveyance of her property. Stinson’s CPA testified that she told him that she had sold her property. Stinson declared the transaction to be a sale on her 1997 income tax return. Stinson did not inquire about the possibility of repurchasing the land until several years after the transaction. The Halls allowed Stinson and her parents to remain in the house, and Stinson referred to herself as the Halls’ tenant. Also, Stinson was not under the assumption that she owed the Halls any money on a debt secured by the deed. Stinson also argues that the chancellor should have determined that she had a right to redeem her property and then impose a constructive trust for her benefit upon the legal title of the property. A chancellor may construct a trust for the benefit of the party whose confidence has been abused. The chancellor did not err in failing to impose a constructive trust after determining that the warranty deed was valid. |
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