Fleming v. Floyd
| Docket Number: | 2005-CA-00042-COA Linked Case(s): 2005-CA-00042-COA2005-CT-00042-SCT2005-CT-00042-SCT |
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| Oral Argument: | 08-02-2006 | |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-03-2006 Opinion Author: SOUTHWICK, J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Accident report - M.R.E. 803 (8) - M.R.E. 803(6) - Waiver of objection - Cross-examination - M.R.E. 611(b) - Ultimate issue - M.R.E. 704 - Sufficiency of evidence - Weight of evidence - M.R.E. 702 Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-06-2004 Appealed from: Jackson County Circuit Court Judge: Dale Harkey Disposition: JURY VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT. Case Number: CI 2000,00385(3) |
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| Note: | This judgment was later reversed by the Supreme Court. See the SCT opinion at: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO44538.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | ELIZABETH M. FLEMING |
JOHN W. CHRISTOPHER |
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| Appellee: | BRANDY M. THOMAS FLOYD | JOHN G. WHEELER |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Accident report - M.R.E. 803 (8) - M.R.E. 803(6) - Waiver of objection - Cross-examination - M.R.E. 611(b) - Ultimate issue - M.R.E. 704 - Sufficiency of evidence - Weight of evidence - M.R.E. 702 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Elizabeth Fleming and Brandy Floyd were involved in a car accident. Fleming filed suit against Floyd. The jury found in favor of Floyd, and Fleming appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Accident report The accident report was prepared by a Gautier policeman who investigated the accident. Neither party called the policeman as a witness. Testimony regarding the report came through the plaintiff Fleming’s accident reconstruction expert. Fleming argues that the court erred in admitting conclusions by investigating policeman contained in his report through the plaintiff’s expert witness. The document itself would have been admissible under M.R.E. 803 (8) as an official report prepared by the appropriate governmental authority. What is admissible as a public record are the factual findings resulting from an investigation but not the opinions and conclusions that are contained in the report. The officer’s coded conclusions in the report that one driver complied with the law and the other failed to yield would have been excluded if the only doorway for admission was Rule 803 (8) itself. The trial court found that any objection was waived due to the parties’ pre-trial agreement to introduce the document. Police reports are also admissible as business records under M.R.E. 803(6). The business record exception is not an unfettered right to admit all information contained within a police report except for hearsay statements from witnesses. An opinion in the report is admissible so long as the conclusion is based on a factual investigation and satisfies the Rule’s trustworthiness requirement. A police officer who is not qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction should not be allowed to state opinions on causation or fault in an accident. Though the police officer’s report was a business record, there was no evidence that the officer was qualified to give an opinion on causation. Thus, his opinions were not admissible as a business record. The effect of the parties’ consent to admitting this accident report was more limited than the trial court ruled. Consenting to admit the report does not consent to allowing new evidence in the form of technical or scientific proof. However, the report was first discussed by the plaintiff Fleming’s own expert. Experts are subject to cross-examination concerning the basis of their conclusions and under M.R.E. 611(b), the scope of cross-examination is not limited to the specific subject matter of the direct examination. The expert’s testimony concerning the accident report and some of the coded information opened the door for the defense to pursue that line of questioning further. Therefore, any objection to defense counsel’s pursuing explanation of other codes was waived. Although Fleming makes some effort to argue that this testimony invaded the province of the jury because it was evidence of the ultimate issue of fault and denied her due process, M.R.E. 704 provides that expert testimony is not barred simply because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by a trier of fact. Issue 2: Sufficiency of evidence Fleming argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for directed verdict and later for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The only witness who analyzed the physical evidence available after the accident was the plaintiff’s expert. He testified that Floyd was speeding, and that with such close margins between the occurrence and the avoidance of this accident, the speed was the sole proximate cause of the collision. The defendant Floyd provided no expert of her own. The investigating officer’s report concluded that Floyd had committed no violation. Though the evidence exonerating Floyd from having any fault in this accident was weak, there was at least some evidence on which jurors might rely. Issue 3: Weight of evidence The investigating officer’s report that exonerated Floyd was admitted. However, there is no evidence of what the investigator did before reaching that conclusion. Based on the evidence before him soon after the accident, with no one alleging that Floyd was speeding, the investigating officer may have had little on which to base a conclusion about anyone’s speed. In addition to the opinions of the accident reconstruction witness and of the investigating officer, the jurors had photographs and measurements of the scene. This evidence revealed with some clarity that the margin of safety was quite narrow on this stretch of road. There was no evidence to contradict that a ninety-four foot skid, which would have been even longer if not for the collision, required a finding that Floyd was exceeding the speed limit when she began to brake. Had the defendant Floyd been able to dispute that evidence with reliable expert testimony admissible under M.R.E. 702, there would have been a substantial jury question. Jurors are entrusted with credibility decisions; they likely decided the police officer made an honest report of belief. However, his unverified opinion was not entitled to much weight in comparison to the opinion of a witness, qualified at trial as an expert, that Floyd was speeding. The jury finding that Fleming had some fault is sustainable. The evidence that Floyd was also at fault is overwhelming. The jury’s assessment of fault solely to Fleming is implausible based on the physical evidence. Thus, a new trial should have been granted. |
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