Sandefer v. State
| Docket Number: | 2005-KA-01333-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-27-2007 Opinion Author: IRVING J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Burglary of dwelling - Admission of photocopies - Defense of consent - Section 97-17-29 - Section 97-17-23 - Denial of witness - URCCC 9.04(I)(1) - Use of juvenile convictions - M.R.E. 609(d) - Mistrial - Sufficiency of evidence Judge(s) Concurring: LEE, P.J., ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): CHANDLER AND ROBERTS, JJ. Dissenting Author : KING, C.J., dissents with separate written opinion. Dissenting Author : Myers, P.J., dissents without separate written opinion. Concurs in Result Only: Griffis and Barnes, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-01-2005 Appealed from: LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Sharion R. Aycock Disposition: CONVICTED OF BURGLARY AND LARCENY OF A DWELLING AND SENTENCED TO SERVE A TERM OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MDOC WITH EIGHT YEARS SUSPENDED AND FIVE YEARS OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION District Attorney: JOHN RICHARD YOUNG Case Number: CR04-839 |
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| Note: | KING, C.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. MYERS, P.J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | RANDY LLOYD SANDEFER |
VICTOR ISRAEL FLEITAS |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JOSE BENJAMIN SIMO |
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| Topic: | Burglary of dwelling - Admission of photocopies - Defense of consent - Section 97-17-29 - Section 97-17-23 - Denial of witness - URCCC 9.04(I)(1) - Use of juvenile convictions - M.R.E. 609(d) - Mistrial - Sufficiency of evidence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Randy Sandefer was convicted of burglary and larceny of a dwelling. He was sentenced to twenty-five years, with eight years suspended and five years post-release supervision. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Admission of photocopies Sandefer argues that the court improperly allowed into evidence photocopies of the money exchanged by him at a store. There was testimony that the bills exchanged at the store resembled bills taken from the victim’s house and there was testimony that Sandefer had said that he got the bills in question from the victim’s home. The court did not err in determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect. Questions as to whether the money was actually the money taken from the home were raised by the defense, as seen by the thorough cross-examination of the victim regarding perceived discrepancies in the dates on the bills. Issue 2: Defense of consent Sandefer argues that there was no evidence produced to show that he was in the victim’s house unlawfully. Sandefer claims that, based on his lawful presence in the home, he should have been indicted under section 97-17-29, rather than section 97-17-23. The legislature’s choice of wording in section 97-17-23 prescribes two ways that a burglary may be committed by an intruder and at least one way that it may be committed by an invited guest or by one with permission to be in the dwelling, each different from the proscribed conduct set forth in section 97-17-29, which admittedly applies only to persons who have permission to be on the premises. There is nothing ambiguous about the wording of section 97-17-23. The fact that section 97-17-29 also exists does not make section 97-17-23 ambiguous, because section 97-17-23, by its plain wording, applies to “every person,” while section 97-17-29, by its plain wording, applies only to those persons who happen to be lawfully in the dwelling. Surely, an invited guest is a person; therefore, a guest falls within the ambit of 97-17-23. While it is true that there was uncontested testimony that Sandefer was a frequent and welcome guest in the victim’s home, she made it amply clear that neither Sandefer, nor anyone else except her former husband, had permission to be in the house’s safe room where the money was located. The evidence offered by the State is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Sandefer burglarized the secure room in the victim’s home. As her testimony showed, Sandefer did not have permission to be in the locked basement room. Issue 3: Denial of witness Sandefer argues that the court erred in refusing to allow a witness to testify before the jury. The basis of the court’s ruling was that the witness’s existence was only revealed to the State late on the second day of Sandefer’s trial. According to URCCC 9.04(I)(1), once the State objected to the introduction of the witness’s testimony, the court should have granted the State a reasonable opportunity to interview the newly discovered witness. If, after interviewing the witness, the State claimed unfair surprise or undue prejudice and sought a continuance or mistrial, the court should have excluded the evidence or granted a continuance for a period of time reasonably necessary for the State to meet the non-disclosed evidence or granted a mistrial. The nature of the witness’s proffered testimony was such that an interview held in the middle of trial would have likely been inadequate to allow the State to prepare for his testimony. However, the testimony could only have been excluded if the circuit court determined that the defendant’s discovery violation was willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage. Here, there is no evidence whatsoever that the discovery violation was willful or motivated by a desire to obtain an unfair advantage over the State. Instead, the record reveals that defense counsel only learned of the witness’s existence shortly before it was disclosed to the court. Therefore, his testimony should not have been excluded, regardless of the discovery violation. Because the testimony would have been important to Sandefer’s case, the case is reversed and remanded. Issue 4: Use of juvenile convictions Sandefer argues that the court erred in refusing to allow Sandefer to use a witness’s juvenile record for impeachment purposes. The court did not err in refusing to allow admission of the conviction for impeachment purposes under M.R.E. 609(d) since the charges against the witness were reduced to crimes that would not be admissible for impeachment purposes if committed by an adult. Issue 5: Mistrial Sandefer argues that the court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after two separate incidents: after a witness testified that he and Sandefer had been involved in other misconduct, and after a witness testified that Sandefer told him he went back to the victim’s home later and removed other objects from the safe room. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial in the first instance, because the court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard witness’s remark. Because it is not clear from the second witness’s testimony exactly when Sandefer was supposed to have returned to the house to take more items, the court did not abuse its discretion in this instance either. Issue 6: Sufficiency of evidence There was evidence that the victim possessed around $6,000 in pre-1959 currency that was stolen. Within two weeks of the last time she saw the money, Sandefer was observed spending strange-looking twenty-dollar bills, all of which were printed prior to 1959. A witness who was with Sandefer, testified that Sandefer told him that he had gotten the money from the victim’s home. This evidence is sufficient to sustain Sandefer’s conviction. |
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