Raiola v. Chevron USA


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Docket Number: 2002-CA-01171-COA
Linked Case(s): 2002-CA-01171-COA
Oral Argument: 01-14-2004
 

 

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Court of Appeals: Opinion Date: 02-24-2004
Opinion Author: MYERS, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Defamation - Infliction of emotional distress - Breach of contract - Tortious interference with contract - Negligent hiring
Judge(s) Concurring: McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: Wrongful Termination

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 06-14-2002
Appealed from: Jackson County Circuit Court
Judge: Dale Harkey
Disposition: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED.

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: JOSEPH RAIOLA




KAYE J. PERSONS



 

Appellee: CHEVRON U.S.A., INC. D/B/A CHEVRON PASCAGOULA REFINERY; BILL PORTER, INDIVIDUALLY; AND BOBBY BURKES, INDIVIDUALLY PATRICK R. BUCHANAN KIMBERLY GEE STITH STEVEN R. MCCOWN STACEY S. CALVERT  

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Topic: Defamation - Infliction of emotional distress - Breach of contract - Tortious interference with contract - Negligent hiring

Summary of the Facts: Chevron fired Joseph Raiola, and he sued alleging discrimination based on national origin, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and negligent hiring and retention. Chevron removed the suit to federal court. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted Chevron’s motion for summary judgment on the federal claims and remanded the state law claims to the Jackson County Circuit Court. The circuit court granted Chevron’s motion for summary judgment, and Raiola appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Raiola argues that he is not collaterally estopped from raising his state law claims, because the district court judge remanded Raiola’s state claims instead of exercising supplemental jurisdiction, he was not allowed to properly raise his state law claims at the MESC hearing, and his state law claims were not determined and not essential to the referee’s determination. There is no evidence in the record that the district court judge made any findings as to the merits of Raiola’s state claims. In addition, the Board of Review’s finding of fact that Raiola was fired for misconduct is conclusive if it is supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud. There was no evidence of misconduct and no allegations of fraud. As a result, Raiola is precluded from arguing that Chevron’s termination decision was illegal. In order for Raiola to prevail on a claim of defamation, he must prove that the employees made a false and defamatory statement, unprivileged publication to a third party, negligence on the part of the employees in publishing the statement, and there is either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or existence of special harm caused by publication. Truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim. Since it has already been determined that Raiola was guilty of receiving pay for time not worked, his employers’ claim that Raiola was a thief would be protected. Moreover, the employer enjoyed a qualified privilege because any statement made by an employer against an employee when the statement in question affects the employee’s employment is protected by a qualified privilege. Nor is there any evidence that the statements were made with actual malice. In order for Raiola to prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, he must prove Chevron’s conduct to be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious. Although Chevron’s alleged treatment of Raiola, if true, may have been inappropriate or even upsetting, none of the conduct rises to the level of extreme and outrageous. While Raiola argues Chevron breached its contract with him despite the fact that he was an employee at will, he has presented no evidence of an employment contract. Raiola also argues that Burkes and Porter tortiously interfered with his employment contract. Burkes and Porter are privileged to interfere with Chevron’s contractual relationship with Raiola since they occupy a position of responsibility with the company and are working within the scope of that responsibility and showed no bad faith. Raiola also argues that Chevron was negligent in the hiring and retention of Burkes and Porter. However, he has admitted that he never made a formal complaint regarding this alleged abuse until after he was terminated and also admitted that he had no evidence of incompetence on the part of Porter.


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